NATO caveats can be made to work better for the alliance.

• Author: Hunter, Robert E.
• Position: Defense - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The NATO allies are now being required to face the possibility that they may not prevail in Afghanistan. Facing new challenges from Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters, the Afghan government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are by no means certain of success. Equally at risk are economic, political, and social developments to give the average Afghan a sense that supporting the government in Kabul and its ISAF allies is the best bet for the long haul. Militarily, NATO commanders have made it clear that they need more troops--at least two more combat brigades--and more helicopters. But they also need greater flexibility in the use of those forces that are available, and limitations here are posing difficulties at least as troubling as shortfalls in numbers.

The word that best describes this problem is "caveats," the limitations that individual NATO nations place on the use of their forces, even when actually deployed in Afghanistan. All 26 NATO allies have forces there, in greater or lesser numbers, but not all allies are prepared to join in battle in the same way and to the same degree. As a result, the greatest burden of fighting, in the heavily-conflicted regions of the South and East, is being borne by only a few allies, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Estonia and Canada, which has not suffered so many combat fatalities since the Korean war--78 deaths so far. The caveats can take several forms, but two stand out. One involves the decision keeping an ally's forces under tight control from the national capital even when they arrive in Afghanistan (instead of transferring them to the operational control of NATO commanders in theater): that caveat severely limits the ability to conduct a coherent tactical campaign since it often remains unclear at the planning stage which allies' troops will be permitted to take part.

Even more significant are the national caveats regarding where in Afghanistan allied troops can be deployed. In effect, this determines whether these forces are available to be put where they are most needed--usually in harm's way. Up to a point, this may be understandable for some of the smaller, less well-equipped and effective allied forces: they can still contribute usefully to the overall campaign--meeting garrison requirements and helping to staff the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). But several of the larger allies with more capable forces...