Sense and nonsense about European security policy.

• Author: Brenner, Michael
• Position: Cover story - Essay

The revived constitution for the European Union has renewed interest in prospects for its under-achieving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Timely and welcome as this interest is, it is dismaying to see that it is being spurred by legal mandates and still-modest institutional reforms. It is the acute external pressures that menace Europeans' well-being that ought to compel and inform moves to re-engage on the pressing issue of whether, and how, Europeans can act in concert to cope with an unruly world. The Middle East in particular presents a set of intersecting, combustible crises that pose clear and serious danger to the continent's safety, stability and economic (energy) security. Iraq, Iran, Palestine/Israel, Lebanon--each is spinning further and further out of control. Each is aggravated by the serial failures of American policies that have dominated the action while queering the pitch for tentative European diplomacy (unilateral, trilateral or collective).

It is time for an unsparing rethink of why Europe finds itself still in the quandary of its chronic inability to impress itself on the world in a manner commensurate with its interests, vulnerabilities and potential influence. Patterned ways of stating the problem have had a stultifying effect on the all too intermittent discourse on what should and could be done to rectify matters. For effective change, what are the core assumptions that need to be (re)-examined with realism and clarity? There seem to be five.

European unity is the sine qua non for a meaningful CFSP.

It is self-evident that no single European power is able to make a major impression on the most serious international trouble-spots, but beyond that facile postulate, the picture loses clarity. It is by no means clear where the threshold for effectiveness lies, i.e. what aggregation of means, methods and prescience would make a difference. Unanimity is ideal; overwhelming consensus is highly desirable. But, in practice, a lesser constellation of countries may be sufficient. Circumstances--the nature(s) of the problem, the features of the landscape, the deployable resources, the skill with which they are utilized--determine what level of concert is required. Indeed, the quest for consensus itself can be a liability if it delays action by prolonging deliberations. Agreement can often only be achieved on the basis of a fragile compromise formula that elides differences. It becomes primarily a reflection of group solidarity rather than a considered judgment as to what might work best.

If one accepts the validity of this criticism, does it follow logically that it would be good to jettison the unanimity rule that governs legally-binding actions launched by the EU and with its authority? At a practical level, the answer probably is "yes." The next question then becomes that hardy perennial: What alternative is there? And at what price should it be pursued? The answer is contingent. It depends foremost on (a) the importance attached to addressing a given external issue in Europe's interests on European terms and (b) the degree of convergence in interpreting what to do. Those seem straightforward notions, but other factors enter into the equation: the strength of commitment by a critical mass of governments to exert themselves in doing things that may prove risky and costly (as denominated in various "currencies" economic and political); the level of accord (i.e. whether it covers a range of follow-on actions and/or a set of intersecting issues or is a self-limiting one-shop affair); and the available mechanisms for collaboration. Yes, a constant presence by High Representative Javier Solana and an enhanced Council secretariat could, together, make some practical difference. But these possible...