Abstract

• Author: Michie, Rona; Wishlade, Fiona; Mendez, Carlos
• Pages: 3-4

Fact-finding study on the GBER transparency re quirement

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ABSTRACT

The aims of this study were threefold:

• to provide an overview of approaches to meeting the State aid transparency

requirements

• to assess the effectiveness of different approaches using available data; and

• to identify potential changes to the transparency requirements that might improve levels

of compliance.

The review of reporting arrangements reveals diverse arrangements for compliance with the

transparency requirements. Formally, the transparency requirement under the GBER flows from

the direct applicability of EU law and in principle does not require further implementation. As a

result, in about a third of countries there is no specific State aid legislation. The remaining

countries have enacted State aid legislation, but the substance of this varies widely.

All countries have at least one State aid coordinating body, but arrangements vary. Most State aid

coordinating bodies only have an advisory role, but in some countries there is mandatory

oversight.

Six ‘models’ are identified reflecting:

• whether or not awarding bodies are responsible for encoding awards in TAM;

• whether or not there is a national State aid register; and, if so,

• whether or not the national register is used for compliance purposes instead of TAM.

To consider the effectiven ess of different approaches to compliance with the transparency

requirements, a detailed assessment of the available data was undertaken. The most robust

dataset concerns reporting delays. However, a very significant data gap concerns awards that

have not been reported at all. Analysis of the reporting delays showed that the transparency

‘model’ and associated regulatory stringency offered little explanatory power in accounting for

the timeliness of reporting. Variances are largely driven by the performance of individual granting

authorities - a very few bodies account for the majority of delays.

A selection of case studies was undertaken to identify potential changes to the transparency

requirements that might improve levels of compliance. Some detailed proposals were identified,

but while these might facilitate the use of TAM and address some operational frustrations, it

seems unlikely that they would have a material impact on compliance. In broad terms, countries

where awarding bodies are responsible for TAM encoding do not want any additional reporting

burdens, and countries where national registers are in place do not want additional demands to

be made that would disrupt existing systems.

On the basis of this study, three recommendati ons can be made.

First, a more accurate assessment of compliance might be gleaned from requiring Member States

to report the actual number of payments under SARI, as well as expenditure; the number of

awards anticipated might also be made an obligatory entry under SANI2. Neither would provide a

complete solution, but over time would enhance the capacity accurately to identify likely

instances of transgression.