Accountability: concepts and approaches

• Author: Brito Bastos, Filipe; Zeitlin, Jonathan
• Pages: 12-14

IPOL | Economic Gove rnance Support Unit

12PE 645.747

2.ACCOU NTABILITY: CONCE PTS AND AP PROACHES

2.1.Accountability: a conte sted con cept

Accountability is a notoriously contested concept (Bovens et al. 2014). One widely us ed definition is

that it constitutes “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation

to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose qu estions and pass judgment, and the

actor ma y face cons equences” (Bovens 2007: 450). The ques tion of whether public institutions act

accountably can also be broken down into several essential sub-questions relating tovarious

dimensions of accountability: “who” is accountable, “to whom”, “for what”, “by which standards”, and

“with wha t effect” ( Mashaw 2006: 115-116, 118).

The govern ance of the Ba nking Union is characterised by a multilevel structure, where EU and Member

State authorities cooperate intensely in a variety of ways (Božina Beroš 2018: 47ff). Networked

admin istra tion of this k ind brings man y challenges, s ome of which a re already fa miliar from other EU

policy areas, such as pharmaceutical regulation, competition law enforcement, or management of the

structural funds, just to name a few. One recurring challenge is thatthe dispersion of tasks in

admin istr ative n etwor ks dilutes politica l res ponsibilit y, while th ose n etwor ks’ weak visib ility “in sulates

them from public s crutin y” (Mastenbroek an d Martinsen 2017: 429) . Moreo ver, there is the “pr oblem of

many hands, many levels, and many eyes” in the accountability of European multilevel administration,

inso far as t he mult itude of act ors involv ed in making and implemen ting policies is placed un der the

oversigh t of a variety of s upervisors, in a way which may n ot always be entirely coherent or without

gaps (Wille 2015: 477-478).

Crucially, h owever, it sho uld be noted tha t the commo n definition of account ability developed by

Bovens a nd othe rs relies, wh ether explicitly or im plicitly, on a principa l-agent model (Bovens et al. 2014:

12, 13-14). Such a definition is thus not well-suited to capture the accountability issues concerning

independent institut ions such as the ECB, where other po litical au thorities (such a s the Co uncil and the

European Parliament) have v ery limited powers to sanction their actions. 2It shou ld likewis e be n oted

that this model of accountability is explicitly “r etrospective” or backward-looking (Bo ve ns et al. 2 014:

6), an d is t hus o f limite d valu e in as sessin g the effect ivene ss of s upervisory po licies an d pra ctices under

conditions of high uncertainty and rapidly evolving conditions, such as those characteristic of financial

markets.

2.2.Principal-agent v s. dynami caccountability

In this section, we distinguish between two contrasting models of accountability, one based on

principal-agent relations, which is backward-looking, and the other a dynamic and forward-lo oking

model, which we argue is m ore appro priate to independent institutions operating under high levels of

uncertainty.

Principal-agent (P-A) accountability asks whether an agent has used their discretion in ways aut horised

and intended by the principal. Typical questions and asses sment criteria include the following. H as the

agent followed established legal and adm in istrative regulat ions and procedures? Have th ey acted

within their nar rowly defined manda te? Have they met the performance targets s et by or ag reed with

2In his origina l formu lation, Bov ens a cknowled ges th at political accoun tability typ ically takes the form of a princip al-agent relation between

the foru m a nd th e actor, b ut arg ues that it can als o be exte nded toother accountability relations where the forums are not principals of the

actors, such as legal and professional accountability. He also argues that “the possibility of sanctions” is “a constitutive element” of

accoun tability on th is d efin ition. See Boven s (2007: 451) .