Anti-Bribery Compliance Incentives: A Potential Solution?

AuthorFabian Teichmann
PositionAttorney-at-Law and Public Notary, Teichmann International (Schweiz) AG
Vol. 3 No. 3
January, 2018
Balkan Journal of Interdisciplinary Research
IIPCCL Publishing, Graz-Austria
ISSN 2410-759X
Acces online at
Anti-Bribery Compliance Incentives: A Potential Solution?
Dr. Dr. Fabian Teichmann
Aorney-at-Law and Public Notary
Teichmann International (Schweiz) AG
This article argues that incentives could help to ght corruption in multinational corporations. In
particular, it is suggested that both reducing the wrong incentives and increasing the right ones
could help to eradicate bribery. However, since the issue is rather complex, it might be necessary
to use a performance matrix in order to accurately measure and reward compliant behavior.
Keywords: Bribery, Corruption, Compliance, Incentives.
In the literature it has been suggested that (a) corruption is still a major problem for
multinational corporations; (b) incentives may sometimes even encourage employees
to pay bribes, and currently are not commonly used to prevent corruption; and (c)
agents oen behave opportunistically, and thereby may deliberately act against
their principal’s interest. It has also been inferred that, to date, both compliance and
whistleblowing schemes have not been suciently developed to prevent corruption
in multinational corporations. While prior studies seem to support the payment of
incentives to public servants in order to prevent them from accepting bribes, such an
approach has not yet been explored in depth in relation to the private sector.
Incentive systems as a management tool is a research topic that has been investigated
in depth in the past. In fact, extensive literature exists regarding incentives, goal
seing, and performance measurement. However, research on the relationship
between incentives and bribery is still rather scarce. In particular, the existing literature
focuses on incentives and corruption in the public sector but does not extend to the
private sector. Hence, further research is needed, the foundation for which has been
built in this chapter. Conceptualizations were drawn through analysis of analogous
prior research on incentives, and helped to facilitate corresponding examinations on
incentives and corruption in multinational companies.
When designing anti-bribery incentive systems, one has to address multiple questions.
Both external and internal conditions have to be taken into account. In particular, market
conditions and other multinational corporations’ goals and behavior play an important role.
However, the internal politics within the corporations, employees’ motives, and human
nature in general need to be taken into account. Hence, a profound analysis is required.
First, it needs to be dened how specically monetary rewards should be linked to
performance. Furthermore, the incentive plan needs to be designed in a way that
prevents employees from circumventing it. In addition, it should be considered how
the incentive plan aects actions that are not specically targeted. One should keep in
mind that employees can only manage a limited number of tasks. Hence, if multiple
aspects are covered by an incentive plan, weights for the individual tasks need to be
carefully chosen. Lastly, external circumstances such as market conditions will also
have to be considered (Locke, 2004: 130).

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