Anti-Bribery Compliance Incentives: Advantages and Disadvantages

AuthorFabian Teichmann
PositionAttorney-at-Law and Public Notary, Teichmann International (Schweiz) AG
Pages15-26
European Journal of Economics, Law and Social Sciences
IIPCCL Publishing, Graz-Austria
Vol. 2 No. 1
January, 2018
ISSN 2519-1284
Acces online at www.iipccl.org
15
Anti-Bribery Compliance Incentives: Advantages and Disadvantages
Dr. Dr. Fabian Teichmann
AorneyatLawandPublicNotary
Teichmann International (Schweiz) AG
Abstract
This article explores both advantages and disadvantages of anti-bribery incentives in
multinational corporations. It argues that incentives for anti-bribery compliance could help
to eliminate corruption in Eastern Europe. However, it is also acknowledged that such anti-
bribery incentives would have to be combined with other compliance tools.
Keywords: Bribery, Corruption, Compliance, Incentives.
Anti-Bribery Compliance Incentives: Advantages and Disadvantages
Corruption has been dominating the business world in Eastern Europe for decades.
Multinational corporations have tried out a large variety of anti-corruption tools.
Relatively lile aention has been paid to the idea of incentivizing employees to
act in compliance with all rules and regulations. Hence, an explorative study based
upon ten semi-structured expert interviews has been conducted. The results will
subsequently be discussed as well as compared and contrasted with the existing
literature.
AntiBriberyincentives have both advantages and disadvantagesWhile they may
notbesuitableforallemployeesandcannotbeappliedasaonesizetsallsolution
for compliance issues, they could constitute an extremely valuable supplementary
tool to existing anti-bribery measures.
Agency Theory
The idea of creating the right incentives by rewarding people for their overachievements
inorder toprevent themfrom minimizingtheir internaleortis verymuch inline
with the characteristics of agency theory. It is acknowledged that agents usually want
to be compensated for acting in their principals’ interests (McColgan, 2001: 6), and, in
this context, incentives could help to allow the agents to maximize their own utility
withouthavingtocompromisetheirprincipalsgoalsJensenMeckling
However, it should also be taken into account that both principals and agents can
havethe same goals and so avoid agoalconict GomezMejia  Wiseman 
For instanceemployees mayalready besuciently motivatedto becompliant
dueto intrinsicfactors suchas adesire tocombat bothpovertyandbriberyWhile
this approach could certainly be applicable to some employees, both the literature
andthe empirical ndings suggest that it does not proveto be true for all agents
Since multinational corporations need to implement mechanisms that are not only
applicable to a selected few or the majority but to all employees, the approach
suggested by the interviewees to create the right incentives does indeed seem to be

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT