A, B or C? Experimental Tests of IPO Mechanisms
| Author | Olena Voloshyna,Stefano Bonini |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00590.x |
| Published date | 01 March 2013 |
| Date | 01 March 2013 |
European Financial Management, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2013, 304–344
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00590.x
A, B or C? Experimental Tests of IPO
Mechanisms
Stefano Bonini
Universit`
a Commerciale ‘Luigi Bocconi’, Via Roentgen 1, 20122, Milan, Italy
E-mail: stefano.bonini@unibocconi.it
Olena Voloshyna
Universit`
a Commerciale ‘Luigi Bocconi’, Via San Francesco 3, 20122, Milan, Italy
E-mail: olena.voloshyna@unibocconi.it
Abstract
Empirical research has provided extensive evidence on the inefficiency of book-
building in controlling underpricing. Both academics and practitioners have
investigated this phenomenon proposing innovative offering methodologies. In
this paper we explore the information revelation and underpricing properties of
two baseline models, uniform auctions and bookbuilding, and two newly proposed
mechanisms, Ausubel auction and Competitive IPO. Our findings confirm the
empirical weaknesses of bookbuilding and provide hints that standard auctions
may stimulate less bidding. However, (a) the Competitive IPO features increase
competition both among banks and among investors resulting in more information
revelation and less underpricing than standard bookbuilding; and (b) the Ausubel
auction yields superior price discovery and underpricing outcomes than uniform
clock auction and bookbuilding. Our experimental results provide novel insights
into the ongoing debate on optimal equity offering mechanisms, suggesting that
the solution to current issuing methodologies shortcomings may require the
The authors acknowledge financial support from SDA Bocconi Research Division 2005.
This paper has been completed while Stefano Bonini was Visiting Associate Professor at
NYU–Stern Department of Finance. We are indebted to Alessandro Previtero,SDA Bocconi
and UCLA for invaluable support in experiment structuring and comments. We thank Tim
Jenkinson and Howard Jones at Said Business School, the University of Oxford, for helpful
discussions and support. We are indebted to Peter Bossaer ts, Stefano Gatti, Sandro Shelegia,
Alessandro de Cillis, seminar participants at Bocconi University and the EFMA Conference
2007 for their comments. We owe special gratitude to the Editor, John Doukas, and two
anonymous reviewers for invaluable comments and suggestions. The ideas expressed in the
paper do not necessarily reflect the position of the authors’ respective institutions. Anyer rors
remain our own. Correspondence: Stefano Bonini.
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2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
A, B or C? Experimental Tests of IPO Mechanisms 305
development of a ‘hybrid’ procedure blending properties of existing and new
mechanisms.
Keywords: IPO,bookbuilding,underpricing,experiments,auctions
JEL classification: C92, D44, G11, G24.
1. Introduction
After the 2008 standstill in the IPO market following the financial crisis, IPO filings
have started to grow again1revivingthe long-standing interest in the eff iciency of equity
offerings methodologies and in the behaviour of market participants (Jenkinson, 2009).
The large underpricing associated with the traditional book-built issuances alongside
the existence of potential conflicts of interest have spurred a vigorous discussion about
the optimal design of Initial Public Offerings (IPO). While, several contributions have
highlighted the theoretical advantages (Ausubel, 2002a; Biais et al., 2002; Bennouri and
Falconieri, 2006) and empirical superiority of auction-like mechanisms (Derrien and
Womack,2003; Vandemaele,2003; Degeorge et al., 2010), book-building is still the most
common methodology as documented, among others, by Sherman (2005), Jagannathan
and Sherman (2006) and Ljungqvist (2007). These authors suggest that auctions may
have not replaced bookbuilding because the most common auction structure (uniform
price) carries significant undersubscription risks and does not provide incentives to fully
reveal information. However, several studies (Derrien and Womack, 2003; Vandemaele,
2009; Degeorge et al., 2010) show that carefully designed auction procedures can
mitigate those problems and provide superior outcomes. The lack of consensus on the
superiority of any of these pure offering mechanism allows conjecture that the solution
to bookbuilding shortcomings may require the development of a ‘hybrid’ procedure
that blends the properties of existing and newly designed mechanisms, as argued by
Jagannathan et al. (2010) Vandemaele (2003) and in line with findings in Derrien and
Womack (2003)
In this paper we try and contribute to the literature by testing the price discovery,
information revelation and underpricing properties of standard bookbuilding and
uniform auctions thus exploring their alleged shortcomings. We achieve this goal by
testing these offering methodologies against two innovative models – competitive IPO
and Ausubel auction – that introduce features aimed at overcoming the bookbuilding
and uniform price auction flaws. Competitive IPO is a recently developed empirical
mechanism introduced by the investment bank Dresdner Kleinwor t Wasserstein (DKW)
as the offering mechanism for the 2004 Pages Jaunes (PJ) IPO which offers the desirable
property of decoupling pricing and allocation roles with the goal of improving IPO
efficiency (Jenkinson and Jones, 2009). Pioneering applications of this methodology
haveyielded promising results but the limited number of issues has not allowed yet for any
formal study testing its properties. On the other hand, Ausubel (2002, 2004) theoretical
model proposes an innovativeprice-discriminatory multi-unit auction which has received
considerable attention as a viable alternative to existing IPO offering methodologies
for it blends two desirable properties: simplicity and optimal information revelation.
Ausubel (2002) indicates that such a dynamic auction model should generate efficient
1See quarterly SEC Filings data at www.secfilings.com
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2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
306 Stefano Bonini and Olena Voloshyna
results while at the same time mitigating the well known overbidding and winner’s curse
problems of standard auction. Yet, while dynamic and Ausubel auctions have been tested
in a general multi-unit environment (Engelmann and Grimm, 2009), there is no evidence
either in experimental or real-world applications on the outcomes of these mechanism
for share offerings.
Although these alternatives provide theoretically superior outcomes, both issuers and
intermediaries may be reluctant to adopt them, or modify existing procedures borrowing
from these models, given the limited evidence on their realisations and therefore the
risk of yielding a weak or unexpected market response.2This lack of predictability
contributes to explaining the the renewed interest in alternative issuing methodologies
(WSJ, 2009; Ritter, 2009; Degeorge et al. 2010). In this paper we tackle this issue by
providing experimental evidence on the behaviour of market participants under these
two innovative offering formats and their baseline bookbuilding and uniform price
auction formats. This approach is reliable whenever no or limited field data are available
(Offerman and Potters, 2006; List, 2006; Holt, 2005; Smith, 1982; Wilde, 1980). In our
experiments we test the offering outcomes against the two baseline control mechanisms,
bookbuilding and uniform-price clock auction to isolate the differential performance,
measured by underpricing, and simultaneously investigate the price revelation process
thus shedding further light on the potential applications and expected drawbacks of these
alternatives to traditional bookbuilding.
Results show that both competitive IPO and Ausubel auctions yield extremely satis-
factory results in information revelation, price discovery and in mitigating underpricing
(defined as the difference between the share value and the offer price). Competitive IPO
outperforms bookbuilding in information revelation: on average, investors disclose 20%
more of the share-value information (139% more for experienced players)in competitive
IPO than in bookbuilding. Similarly, Ausubel auctions minimise the information rent
without generating a significant winner’s curse. When looking at price discovery, the
Ausubel auction mechanism does not meaningfully outperform a baseline uniform-price
format with an almost zero average difference betweenthe share value and the offer price
for both formats. Finally, both Competitive IPO and Ausubel auction yield a level of
underpricing of less than one price tick while in bookbuilding the underpricing is seven
times larger.
Our results deliver novel experimental evidence which is useful in the ongoing quest
for more efficient equity issuing methodologies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reviews IPO literature, sections 2 and 3
discuss the competitive IPO, the theoretical background of the Ausubel auction and
formulates research hypotheses. Section 4 develops the experimental design. Results
of the experiments are reported in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the implications and
concludes.
2The need for accurate ex ante testing of novelissuing mechanisms is highlighted by Wilhelm
(2005), pg. 13: ‘Reshaping current practices will also require considerable courage among
senior managers of issuing firms [...] I am not persuaded that applications of auction theory
to electricity markets or auction-based advertising systems, for example, shed a great deal
of light on the optimal implementation of theory in IPO markets.’
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2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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