Bank ownership concentration and stock price informativeness: International evidence
| Published date | 01 January 2024 |
| Author | Anh‐Tuan Doan,Kun‐Li Lin,Chung‐Hua Shen |
| Date | 01 January 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12409 |
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12409
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Bank ownership concentration and stock price
informativeness: International evidence
Anh‐Tuan Doan
1
|Kun‐Li Lin
2
|Chung‐Hua Shen
3
1
International School of Business,
University of Economics Ho Chi Minh
City, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
2
Department of Business Management,
National Taichung University of Science
and Technology, Taichung, Taiwan,
Taiwan (R.O.C.)
3
Department of Finance and Banking,
Shih Chien University, Taipei,
Taiwan, (R.O.C.)
Correspondence
Kun‐Li Lin, Department of Business
Management National Taichung
University of Science and Technology,
No. 129, Section 3, Sanmin Rd, North
District, Taichung 404, Taiwan (R.O.C.).
Email: linkl@nutc.edu.tw
Abstract
This paper examines the relation between ownership
concentration and stock price informativeness around
the world. Using a sample of banks from 59 countries
between 2002 and 2019, we find robust evidence from a
linear model supporting the entrenchment effect.
However, the nonlinear model shows that the effect
of control rights on the informativeness of stock prices
forms a U‐shaped curve. We also document that banks
with controlling shareholders have more volatility in
the information content of bank stock prices in a poor
regulatory environment or developing countries.
KEYWORDS
banking ownership, regulation, stock price informativeness
JEL CLASSIFICATION
G32, G14, G38
1|INTRODUCTION
Financial economists generally agree that in efficient markets stock prices change to reflect
available information, both firm specific and marketwide. However, Roll (1988) finds that firm‐
specific news and market returns explain only a small portion of variations in stock returns and
concludes that investors acting on their private information can drive firm‐specific return
Eur Financ Manag. 2024;30:92–128.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eufm92
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© 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
We thank the editor, Professor John Doukas, and two anonymous reviewers for valuable and constructive comments.
We also thank conference participants at the 2020 European Financial Management Association (EFMA) Conference
for helpful remarks and discussions. Lin gratefully acknowledges financial support of the National Science and
Technology Council, Taiwan (R.O.C.), under Grant MOST 104‐2410‐H‐035‐013‐MY2. Anh‐Tuan Doan gratefully
acknowledges financial support of the International School of Business, University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam.
variation. These findings have led to extensive studies on the relation between information,
firm‐specific return variation, and systematic return variation. Specifically, during the global
financial crisis, public information about the risk exposure of individual banks appears to have
been particularly scarce. The crisis has highlighted the important role of bank‐specific
information in maintaining the stability of the financial system (Barth et al., 2012). Regulators
have responded by requiring greater transparency and encouraging the incorporation of more
bank‐specific information into stock prices (i.e., stock price informativeness).
The literature on bank stock price informativeness has shown that bank stock returns are
more informative in countries with more stringent capital regulations and with more
supervision that emphasises private monitoring (Francis et al., 2015). In contrast, our paper
examines the importance of ownership concentration in stock price informativeness, since
ownership structure is a key determinant of internal corporate mechanisms (La Porta
et al., 1998,1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997b).
Conceptually, concentrated ownership can have two different effects on the informativeness
of stock prices, depending on whether the managerial entrenchment or incentive alignment
effect is dominant. Under managerial entrenchment, controlling shareholders can shift the
allocation of funds from nonrelated borrowers to related borrowers. The potential for abuse
arises when related borrowers obtain favourable loan terms relative to nonrelated borrowers
with similarly risky loans or if controlling shareholders receive private benefits, such as
opportunities to maintain other transactions with related borrowers that are beneficial to
themselves or related parties (e.g., their privately owned companies). Controlling shareholders
can then divert resources away from minority shareholders or debtholders to serve their own
interests. Hence, entrenched controlling shareholders have the incentive to cover up their self‐
serving behaviours or to limit related information leakage by withholding unfavourable
information or selectively disclosing such information, to help them camouflage those
behaviours and/or opportunistically time the release of value‐relevant private information to
the market. Thus, concentrated power over control deters the flow of bank‐specific information
to the market, contributing to creating a more opaque information environment. From the
entrenchment perspective, one can thus expect informative stock prices to be inversely
associated with ownership concentration, ceteris paribus.
However, under incentive alignment, ownership concentration can facilitate the alignment
of interests between controlling and minority shareholders (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Lins, 2003;
Mitton, 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986,1997b). The theoretical literature has demonstrated that
controlling owners can impose greater monitoring of management and use their influence to
push managers to make decisions that increase overall shareholder value, which is the
alignment hypothesis (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The implication,
then, is that concentrated ownership could encourage the controlling shareholders to
voluntarily disclose more and better bank‐specific information for the benefit of minority
shareholders. In the banking sector, controlling shareholders have strong incentives to monitor
bank management through tight oversight of lending practices, operational efficiency, and risk
management (Unite & Sullivan, 2003). This improved cost–benefit trade‐off facilitates more
informed trading, which, in turn, leads to more information being impounded into stock prices
(Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). Thus, we predict that, under incentive alignment, informative
stock prices are positively related to ownership concentration, ceteris paribus.
In summary, we predict that the informativeness of stock prices is a concave function of
ownership concentration that is represented by the percentage of shares held by the ultimate
controlling shareholder at the beginning of a fiscal year. This is because, although the
DOAN ET AL.EUROPEAN
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entrenchment effect initially dominates the incentive alignment effect, it can be mitigated
when concentration extends beyond a certain level and the firm assumes the characteristics of a
private company owned by the dominant shareholders. Fan and Wong (2002) argue that, once
the controlling owner obtains effective control of the firm, an increase in voting rights will not
further entrench the controlling owner.
To study the role of ownership concentration in stock price informativeness in greater
detail, we use a firm‐level data set on the ownership structure of banking firms. We focus on
banks because they play a particularly important role in the financial intermediation process of
modern economies and they have additional characteristics to those of nonfinancial firms that
require a separate analysis. Our study furthers this line of research with two improvements.
First, our measure of ownership concentration differs from those in the literature. Studies
commonly use the percentage of shares directly controlled by the largest shareholder as a proxy
for ownership concentration. The consideration of only direct shareholdings may, however,
underestimate the true ownership concentration, because only ultimate ownership reflects the
full‐fledged power of the controlling shareholder. Therefore, we consider instead the entire
structure of the ultimate owner's voting rights as a proxy for ownership concentration.
1
Namely, we consider both the direct and indirect shareholdings of the ultimate owner, since
pyramidal and cross‐holdings are also important.
Second, we use the global banking sector for our study, because it is a more appropriate
sample for examination. Theoretically, entrenchment and incentive alignment effects could be
worse in the banking sector than in the nonfinancial sector, for three reasons. First, banks with
concentrated ownership are typically affiliated with a business group that is the capital supplier
of the related firms, through pyramids or cross‐shareholdings. For example, ultimate owners
may provide credit with more favourable terms to connected firms, prop up distressed firms in
a group with unsecured loans, or adopt liberal lending policies for related parties (Laeven, 1999;
Unite & Sullivan, 2003; Williams & Nguyen, 2005).
2
Second, unlike other industries, the
banking sector is subject to heavy regulation. This is because banks have depositors and
nonfinancial firms do not. Consequently, bank shareholders may collude with managers
against deposit holders to extend high‐risk loans that may result in a high level of impaired
loans and inadequate bank capital (Boyd et al., 1998). Additionally, Pathan (2009) argues that
strong boards increase banks' risk appetite. To some extent, supervisory authorities act as the
representative of deposit holders and safeguard their interests, while deposit insurance protects
the wealth of deposit holders. However, deposit insurance can reduce market discipline
(Demirgüç‐Kunt & Detragiache, 2002; Demirgüç‐Kunt & Huizinga, 2004; Hassan et al., 2004).
Hence, regulators aiming to ensure the safety and stability of banking systems might not serve
the best interests of minority shareholders (Haw et al., 2010). Third, Morgan (2002) argues and
empirically shows that the financial nature of bank assets and their high leverage make them
inherently more opaque and riskier than the assets of other firms. The large information
asymmetry that arises from the opacity of banking assets and proprietary information makes it
more difficult to monitor insiders and to detect insider expropriation.
1
Using voting rights allows us to trace the ownership concentration back to the ultimate owner and, hence, to accurately assess the
severity of agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders (Lang et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2009). As evidenced in
previous empirical studies, the relevant agency problem shapes the corporate information environment (e.g., Andreou et al., 2016; Attig
et al., 2006; Fan & Wong, 2002; Le & Doan, 2020).
2
For example, Unite and Sullivan (2003) find that virtually all large commercial banks in the Philippines are affiliated with business
groups.
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DOAN ET AL.
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