Behavioural research and corruption: A new promise for governments?

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12218
• Date: 01 November 2018
• Published date: 01 November 2018

ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT

Behavioural research and corruption: A new

promise for governments?

Luca Di Donato*

Abstract

This essay explores the link between corruption and behavioural economics. The findings of

behavioural economics may widen the analysis of corruption and improve strategies to face it.

The first part describes bounded rationality theory, according to which human cognitive capacities

are not infinite and individuals are affected by behavioural biases and heuristics. The second part

focuses on specific biases, limitations and motivations—such as misperception of risks, context, trust,

moral sentiments and others—that can influence criminal behaviour. The third section illustrates how

these new behaviourally informed regulatory approaches can be integrated into the regulatory State.

Finally, the essay attempts to provide some suggestions for regulators, including some positive and

negative points about the behavioural approach.

1|INTRODUCTION

Several fields within the sciences—behavioural economics, cognitive science, neuroscience and others—examine

human behaviour and their findings appear relevant to administrative law, because they can increase the level of

information about policies, providing an evidence base with which to develop good governance. The findings of

these sciences might provide valid support to face the so‐called knowledge problem

1

—evoking one of epistemic

idea

2

—which potentially affects all governmental decisions. Starting from this perspective, regulations need to be

re‐thought

3

and regulators should include ‘the real world consequences in to regulatory interventions’.

4

Much

research has shown that people are not always rational and are subject to recurring cognitive biases in decision‐

making: people can be influenced by how data and information are presented; individual behaviour is greatly

influenced by other people's perceived behaviours; and so on.

The fundamental result is to widen regulators' points of view and improve policy design; with specific regard to

the case of corruption, ‘anti‐corruption policies are more effective if they not only punish but also reduce

*

PhD candidate at Luiss Guido Carli University. I thank Alberto Alemanno, Francis Snyder, Maria Weimer, and all the participants at

the Conference ‘New Directions in EU and Global Risk Regulation’organised at HEC, Paris (19–20 June 2015) for their precious com-

ments on an earlier draft of this paper.

1

C.R. Sunstein, ‘Choosing Not to Choose’(2014) 64 Duke Law Journal,1–52, at 1.

2

F. von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (University of Chicago Press, 1948), at 78.

3

M. Adler and E.A. Posner, ‘Happiness Research and Cost–Benefit Analysis’, in E.A. Posner and C.R. Sunstein (eds.), Law and Happiness

(University of Chicago Press, 2010), 253–292, at 254.

4

C.R. Sunstein, ‘Paradoxes of the Regulatory State’(1990) 57 University of Chicago Law Review, 407–441, at 408.

DOI: 10.1111/eulj.12218

510 © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Eur Law J. 2018;24:510–523.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eulj