Build, buy or partner? The relative performance of an acquisitive strategy
| Published date | 01 June 2024 |
| Author | Olubunmi Faleye |
| Date | 01 June 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12443 |
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12443
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Build, buy or partner? The relative
performance of an acquisitive strategy
Olubunmi Faleye
D'Amore‐McKim School of Business,
Northeastern University, Boston,
Massachusetts, USA
Correspondence
Olubunmi Faleye, D'Amore‐McKim
School of Business, Northeastern
University, Boston, MA 02115, USA.
Email: o.faleye@northeastern.edu
Abstract
We conceptualize mergers as one of several strategies
for creating value and study merger performance by
evaluating the performance of firms employing an
acquisitive strategy. Relative to other firms, acquisitive
firms are valued lower, exhibit lower employee and
total factor productivity, and innovate less. These
effects are concentrated among firms whose workforce
is vulnerable to acquisition‐related personnel disrup-
tions and/or those that are more dependent on
employee relationship‐specific investments. We there-
fore propose that an acquisitive strategy diminishes
firm value and performance by fostering disruptive
conditions that undermine employee effectiveness and
weaken their incentives.
KEYWORDS
corporate strategies, employee incentives, firm value, mergers
and acquisitions
JEL CLASSIFICATION
G34
Eur Financ Manag. 2024;30:1271–1304. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eufm
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This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
© 2023 The Authors. European Financial Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
We gratefully acknowledge comments by two anonymous referees, Rajesh Aggarwal, Laura Field, Ron Masulis, Vikas
Mehrotra, Anya Mkrtchyan and seminar participants at Northeastern University, Queensland University of Technology
Corporate Finance Conference, and the Dykhouse Program Workshop in Money, Banking, and Financial Regulation at
South Dakota State University.
1|INTRODUCTION
The question of whether mergers and acquisitions (M&As) create or destroy value for the
acquirer has long attracted significant research attention. Typically, studies have explored this
question by examining the acquirer's abnormal stock return around deal announcement or its
postmerger operating performance. Earlier studies (e.g., Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Morck
et al., 1990) show that returns to acquiring firms are mostly negative. Recent studies, however,
have questioned this result. They attribute findings of negative acquirer returns to extraneous
factors, including data screens that exclude partial acquisitions, private targets and private
acquirers (see, e.g., Alexandridis et al., 2017; Netter et al., 2011; Yilmaz & Tanyeri, 2016).
The common approach in prior studies is that the unit of analysis is often a specific
transaction or acquisition program. In this paper, we propose a different but complementary
approach founded on the standard premise that the primary objective of management is to
maximize firm value. Building on this premise, we explicitly recognize that firms have several
strategic alternatives for achieving this objective and thus evaluate the valuation and
performance of firms employing an acquisitive strategy relative to those adopting alternative
strategies, such as organic growth and strategic partnerships. Thus, while previous studies
essentially evaluate the question of whether an acquisition is “good”or “bad”for the acquiring
firm, we complement these studies by analyzing the question of whether acquisitions are a
“better”or “worse”means for achieving the goal of maximizing firm value. This approach also
allows us to evaluate other questions that have received minimal attention in the literature, in
particular, the role of employee incentives in M&As.
Mintzberg (1987) differentiates between intended strategy and realized strategy. The former
views strategy as a statement of intent, that is, how a firm proposes to achieve its business
objectives. The latter, in contrast, views strategy as a pattern in a series of resource allocation
decisions followed by actions. Since our goal is to evaluate how the use of an acquisitive
strategy impacts firm value, it is essential that firms we classify as adopting an acquisitive
strategy actually engage in acquisitions and not merely declare an intention to do so. Therefore,
we conceptualize strategy in the latter sense and define a firm's adoption of an acquisitive
strategy in a given year based on its acquisition activities during the preceding 5 years.
1
We consider two other business development strategies as potential alternatives to an
acquisitive strategy: organic growth and strategic partnerships. A firm implementing an organic
growth or “build”strategy pursues opportunities on its own, using corporate resources to
expand its operations and develop new businesses. On the other hand, the strategic partnership
strategy involves the use of formal interfirm contracts (e.g., alliances and joint ventures) to gain
access to specified resources (e.g., technical skills, production facilities and intellectual
properties) of other firms without repeated open‐market transactions or an outright merger. We
1
Mintzberg acknowledges that strategy as “a plan”or as “realized actions”often complement each other. While it is
difficult to measure ex ante strategy in a large sample study such as this, we manually examine corporate disclosures for
a handful of top acquirers in our sample to see if they contain ex ante discussions of employing an acquisitive strategy.
These companies include Oracle, Alphabet, AutoNation, Cisco, Brown & Brown, Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., Quanta
Services, United Rentals, Airgas and IPC Healthcare. In each case, the company clearly states an intention to deploy an
acquisitive strategy, using statements such as “an active acquisition program is an important element of our corporate
strategy”and “acquisitions are an important element of our overall corporate strategy and use of capital.”Each
company made multiple acquisitions in the years following these disclosures. Thus, there appears to be a strong
correlation between ex ante strategy and ex post resource allocations in acquisitions. We are grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for suggesting that we examine this issue.
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define analogous measures for the adoption of these strategies and evaluate the effectiveness of
an acquisitive strategy by relating our strategy measures to firm value and performance.
The effect of an acquisitive strategy on firm value depends on its combined impact on the
size, timing and riskiness of future corporate cash flows relative to those of alternative
strategies. Conceptually, the timing effect is fairly straightforward. Because an acquisitive
strategy involves purchasing other businesses with existing operations, its effect on future cash
flows manifests faster than the effects of either organic growth or strategic partnerships. In
contrast, it is not clear a priori whether an acquisitive strategy has a positive or negative effect
on the size or riskiness of future cash flows. The size effect is theoretically indeterminate
because, compared with alternative strategies, an acquisitive strategy is likely to increase
revenue (due to synergies and/or market power gains) as well as investments in operating
capital (because targets are usually acquired at a premium to replacement costs) while having
an uncertain effect on operating expenses. Similarly, an acquisitive strategy may increase or
decrease the riskiness of future cash flows, depending on the riskiness of the combining firms'
cash flows as independent firms and the correlation between those cash flows. Thus, the
question of the relative impact of an acquisitive strategy on firm value is ultimately an
empirical one.
We explore this question using a sample of over 26,000 yearly observations on 2900 firms
during 1996–2018. We find that an acquisitive strategy is associated with a statistically
significant reduction in firm value. The effect is also economically meaningful: An increase of
one standard deviation in acquisitiveness is associated with a reduction of 4.6% in firm value,
and each additional (weighted) acquisition during the preceding 5 years is associated with a
reduction of 2.2% in firm value in the current year. In contrast, firm value increases with both
organic growth intensity and new partnership formations. An increase of one standard
deviation in the former and latter is associated with an increase in firm value of 3.8% and 1.6%,
respectively. Results are robust to different proxies for an acquisitive strategy and alternative
functional forms.
While these results suggest that an acquisitive strategy diminishes firm value, we recognize
the difficulty of interpreting them as causal and therefore perform several analyses to aid in
identifying the effects of an acquisitive strategy. First, we control for historical valuation during
the period over which our proxy for acquisitiveness is measured to alleviate reverse causality
concerns. Next, we estimate firm fixed effects models to control for time‐invariant correlated
omitted variables. Finally, we use instruments based on geographical distance and peer
behavior for the adoption of an acquisitive strategy in a two‐stage least squares (2SLS)
instrumental variable (IV) framework. Each test indicates that the negative relation between
firm value and an acquisitive strategy is not likely to be attributable to confounding factors.
Prior work such as Pfeffer (1995) emphasizes the importance of a firm's workforce in
creating value, noting that workforce‐related soft assets including employee know‐how,
corporate culture and interpersonal relationships are significant value drivers. Building on
these studies, we hypothesize a potential channel for the negative effect of an acquisitive
strategy on firm value by focusing on its effect on employees. Compared with organic growth
and strategic partnerships, an acquisitive strategy is more likely to create a need for recurring
layoffs. This fosters employment uncertainty for employees, which potentially lowers their
commitment and loyalty to the firm. Relatedly, recurring layoffs can also lessen employees'
incentives to invest in firm‐specific human capital because it provides the firm with
opportunities to expropriate such investments. An acquisitive strategy also disrupts personnel
FALEYE EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
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