CEO marital status and corporate cash holdings
| Published date | 01 January 2024 |
| Author | Ahmed Elnahas,Md. Noman Hossain,Siamak Javadi |
| Date | 01 January 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12413 |
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12413
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
CEO marital status and corporate cash
holdings
Ahmed Elnahas
1
|Md. Noman Hossain
2
|Siamak Javadi
3
1
Department of Finance, Robert C.
Vackar College of Business and
Entrepreneurship, University of Texas
Rio Grande Valley, Edinburg,
Texas, USA
2
Department of Finance and Supply
Chain, College of Business, Central
Washington University, Ellensburg,
Washington, USA
3
Department of Finance, Robert C.
Vackar College of Business and
Entrepreneurship, University of Texas
Rio Grande Valley, Brownsville,
Texas, USA
Correspondence
Ahmed Elnahas, Robert C. Vackar
College of Business and
Entrepreneurship, University of Texas
Rio Grande Valley, 1201 W University
Dr, Edinburg, TX 78539, USA.
Email: ahmed.elnahas@utrgv.edu
Abstract
We examine the effect of CEO marital status on corporate
cash holdings. Consistent with the classical agency
framework, we find that firms with single CEOs hold
more cash compared to otherwise similar firms with
married CEOs and that the excess cash held by single
CEOs is significantly discounted by shareholders. Our
findings survive a battery of tests to ease endogeneity and
selection bias, confirming that results are not simply
reflecting innate heterogeneity in preferences. Overall, our
findings indicate that a variable outside the common firm‐
and macro‐level determinants, CEO marital status, can
significantly influence corporate policies.
KEYWORDS
cash holdings, CEO, firm value, marital status
JEL CLASSIFICATION
G30, G32, G35
1|INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that a CEO is the single most influential individual in a modern corporation.
Consequently, financial economists have paid significant attention to studying how CEOs'
personal traits affect their firms' policies and decision‐making processes. For example,
Eur Financ Manag. 2024;30:187–229. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eufm © 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
We would like to express our gratitude to the anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.
Further, we are indebted to Hua Cheng (Discussant), Gautam Hazarika, Suin Lee, Yu Liu, Nam Nguyen, Mahdi Rastad,
Bruno Arthur, Incheol Kim, Levent Kutlu, Armando Lopez‐Velasco, Andre Mollick, Monika Rabarison, Jean‐Baptiste
Tondji, Salvador Contreras, and other seminar participants at the 2020 Southern Finance Association, the 2021
Southwest Finance Association, and the 2021 economics and finance seminar series at the University of Texas Rio
Grande Valley. All remaining errors are ours.
researchers investigate the impact of CEOs' gender (Adhikari, 2018), overconfidence (Aktas
et al., 2019; Malmendier & Tate, 2005), age (Andreou et al., 2017), military affiliation
(Benmelech & Frydman, 2015), political ideology (Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014; Elnahas &
Kim, 2017; Hossain et al., 2022), and personal debt and risk‐taking (Cain & McKeon, 2016;
Cronqvist et al., 2012). Recently, researchers have studied the impact of a CEO's marital status
on corporate decision‐making. For example, Hilary et al. (2017) find that firms headed by single
CEOs display a higher degree of earnings management than those headed by married CEOs.
Roussanov and Savor (2014) show that firms headed by single CEOs exhibit higher stock return
volatility, have more aggressive investment policies, and are less likely to respond to changes in
idiosyncratic risk. Lu et al. (2016) conclude that hedge funds run by single managers take more
risks than those run by married managers. Similarly, Belenzon et al. (2016) find that firms run
by married couples behave more conservatively than other family‐owned firms. Other studies
also document the effect of marital status on risk aversion in terms of asset allocation, saving
and portfolio choices, life insurance policies, and accounting policies (Hallahan et al., 2004;
Hong & Ríos‐Rull, 2012; Love, 2009; Riley & Chow, 1992; Roszkowski et al., 1993). In this
paper, we extend this literature by investigating the effect of the marital status of CEOs on
corporate cash holdings.
The recent attention that financial economists have paid to the impact of CEO marital
status on corporate policies is not surprising. Social scientists have always considered marriage
as the building block of communities (Slater, 1963). In their report titled “why marriage
matters,”a group of renowned family scholars documents that marital status affects several
aspects of human life that include family (e.g., quality relationships and biosocial effects),
economic (e.g., poverty rates and wealth creation), physical health and longevity (e.g., lower
rates of injury, illness, disability, and life expectancy), and mental health and emotional well‐
being (e.g., rates of crime, suicide, and mental illness) (Wilcox et al., 2005). According to the
behavioural consistency theory, the personal traits of a CEO, such as marital status, not only
affect her/his personal behaviour and choices but also the policies and decisions of the firm
she/he leads.
Cash holding is one of the corporate policies that has received growing academic attention
in the literature (Bates et al., 2009; Dittmar & Mahrt‐Smith, 2007; Dittmar et al., 2003; Duchin,
2010; Fritz Foley et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2013; Harford, 1999; Harford et al., 2008; Nikolov &
Whited, 2014; Opler et al.,1999; Pinkowitz et al., 2006). Understanding corporate cash holding
policy is important because cash holdings act not only as a safety net in the presence of costly
external financing but also may impact investors' concerns about managerial self‐dealing.
Indeed, the two predominant theories of corporate cash holdings, the precautionary motive and
the agency framework, make mixed predictions about the possible impact of CEO marital
status on cash holdings.
Cash provides a safety cushion against bankruptcy risks and ameliorates adverse cash flow
shocks. Consistent with this view, Bates et al. (2009) find that the increase in corporate cash
holdings is positively correlated with the increase in firm‐specific risks. Similarly, Adhikari
(2018) provides evidence that firms with more risk‐averse managers hold more cash. Prior
literature has characterized single individuals as less risk‐averse than married individuals.
Roussanov and Savor (2014) show that single CEOs are less risk‐averse compared to married
CEOs. Similarly, Lu et al. (2016) conclude that hedge funds run by single managers take more
risk than those run by married managers. It follows that a single CEO with a lower degree of
risk aversion is expected to hold less cash than a married CEO. We call this our risk aversion
hypothesis.
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ELNAHAS ET AL.
In addition to having low‐risk aversion, single individuals have always been characterized
as more self‐centred by social scientists. DePaulo and Morris (2005) document that single
individuals have been consistently viewed as more self‐centred and envious than married
individuals. Similarly, Wilcox et al. (2005) claim that marriage turns individuals' attention away
from dangerous, antisocial, and self‐centred activities. Further, Campbell and Lee (1992) link
singlehood to social isolation and view marriage as an attachment to wider communities and
increased investment in social ties. By definition, a self‐centred CEO who is more willing to
seek her/his interest at the expense of those of others (including shareholders) would engage
more in self‐dealing, which aggravates the agency problem in firms headed by single CEOs.
1
However, how would this aggravated agency problem affect the cash holdings of firms
headed by single CEOs? The agency framework provides opposing predictions regarding the
association between marital status and cash holdings. On the one hand, researchers show that
poorly governed firms with escalated agency issues dissipate more cash (Dittmar & Mahrt‐
Smith, 2007), particularly on acquisitions (Harford et al., 2008). Consequently, this argument
predicts that firms headed by single CEOs dissipate more cash, that is, hold less cash—a
prediction similar to our risk‐aversion hypothesis. We call this our poor governance hypothesis.
On the other hand, the classical agency framework pioneered by Jensen (1986) suggests that
corporate insiders generally have a personal incentive to retain cash rather than increase
dividends and that they rely on cash and liquid assets to finance their risky projects, empire‐
building, and self‐dealing, allowing them to avoid the market scrutiny necessary for raising
external finance. This classical agency framework predicts that firms headed by single CEOs,
due to escalated agency issues, hold more cash. The positive association between agency
problems and cash holdings is consistent with the work of Dittmar et al. (2003), Kalcheva and
Lins (2007), and Pinkowitz et al. (2006). We refer to this as our classical agency problem
hypothesis.
The impact of CEO marital status on corporate cash holding is ultimately an empirical
question that depends on how marital status affects a CEO's risk aversion and agency problem.
Using a sample of 19,864 firm‐year observations between 1993 and 2008, we find that firms
with single CEOs hold about 1.3 percentage points more cash compared to firms with married
CEOs, after controlling for the known determinants of cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999), other
CEO characteristics such as tenure, age, duality, pay‐performance sensitivity (Delta), risk‐
taking incentives (Vega), CEO ownerships, and the inclusion of industry and year fixed effects.
This effect is economically significant. For the average firm in our sample that has a total asset
size of about $4.3 billion, the above figure is equivalent to holding about $56 Million more cash
by firms with single CEOs.
2
Next, we address the endogeneity concerns. Specifically, (i) culture, religion, or managers'
early life experience, among other traits, might be jointly correlated with CEO marital status
and cash holdings, leading to an omitted variable bias in our baseline results. For instance,
corporate cash holdings could be affected by the level of CEO overconfidence (Chen et al.,
2020); (ii) the association between CEO marital status and cash holdings may be spurious and
attributable to the innate heterogeneity in preferences rather than marital status; and (iii) there
1
Self‐centeredness is defined by Dambrun and Ricard (2011)as‘the self takes on a central point of reference with regard to many
psychological activities (i.e., conation, motivation, attention, cognition, affect/emotion, and behaviour). The exaggerated importance
given to the self emerges mainly from self‐centeredness and refers to the increased degree with which the individual considers that his
own condition is more important than that of others and this takes unquestionable priority’. Further, they argue that self‐centred
psychological functioning includes characteristics such as biased self‐interest, egoism, egocentrism, and egotism.
2
Our sample ends in 2008, because CEOs marital status data is available between 1993 and 2008.
ELNAHAS ET AL.EUROPEAN
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