CEOs' general managerial skills and corporate risk taking subject to the moderator of CEO tenure
| Published date | 01 November 2023 |
| Author | Tiecheng Leng,Luyao Pan |
| Date | 01 November 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12401 |
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12401
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
CEOs' general managerial skills and corporate
risk taking subject to the moderator of CEO
tenure
Tiecheng Leng
1
|Luyao Pan
2
1
School of Management, Harbin Institute
of Technology, Harbin, China
2
International Business College, South
China Normal University, Foshan, China
Correspondence
Luyao Pan, International Business
College, South China Normal University,
Shishan University Town, East A101,
The Lab Building, Nanhai District,
528000 Foshan, China.
Email: lypan@ibc.scnu.edu.cn
Abstract
In this study, we examine the relation between chief
executive officers' (CEOs') general managerial skills
and firms' risk‐taking behaviour. We find that general-
ist CEOs are associated with significantly higher firm
risk, with the association decreasing significantly with
CEO tenure. We propose the following managerial
skills transformation explanation: the longer a CEO
stays with a firm, the less general and more firm
specific the CEO's skills and knowledge become;
therefore, any effect of the CEO's general managerial
skills only appears in the early years of tenure.
KEYWORDS
CEO tenure, CEOs' general managerial skills, firm risk
JEL CLASSIFICATION
G32, J24
1|INTRODUCTION
The general managerial skills of chief executive officers (CEOs) are presumably transferable
across firms and industries and impact managerial behaviour and corporate decisions. Custódio
et al. (2013) construct a general ability index (GAI) by considering the different aspects of a
CEO's professional career, including the number of firms and industries in which the CEO has
worked, prior CEO positions held at different companies, and experience with conglomerate
Eur Financ Manag. 2023;29:1620–1656.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eufm1620
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© 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
We thank John A. Doukas (the editor), two anonymous referees, Yun Dai and Xianming Zhou for valuable comments
and suggestions. We thank Xiangle Li for excellent research assistance. Luyao Pan acknowledges financial support
from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant no. 72002229). All errors are our own.
firms. Using this index, many researchers have investigated the effects of CEOs' general
managerial skills on CEO compensation (Brockman et al., 2016; Custódio et al., 2013; Liu et al.,
2020), corporate strategic policies regarding innovation (Custódio et al., 2019) and mergers and
acquisitions (M&As; see G. Chen et al., 2020), and firms' cost of capital (Mishra, 2014) and
performance (Betzer et al., 2020; Gounopoulos & Pham, 2018).
A recent debate in the literature has focused on the role of CEOs' general managerial skills
in firms' risk‐taking behaviour. Custódio et al. (2013) contend that, since generalist CEOs have
chosen a more diversified career, they are expected to be more risk averse than specialists.
However, other scholars hold the opposite view, arguing that generalists are likely to take more
risks than specialists. According to Custódio et al. (2019), Gounopoulos and Pham (2018) and
Mishra (2014), general managerial abilities allow generalists to switch firms more easily; thus,
their personal wealth is less contingent on their firms' performance and longevity than that of
specialist CEOs. Therefore, generalists have stronger incentives to undertake risky projects.
Brockman et al. (2016) further note that, since job switching causes CEOs to lose firm‐specific
skills, generalist CEOs who change jobs more frequently are likely to be less risk averse.
Consistent with the notion of generalists being less risk averse, Mishra (2014) documents that
firms run by generalist CEOs have a higher cost of equity capital, Gounopoulos and Pham
(2018) report that generalist CEOs in newly listed firms are associated with a higher probability
of failure and shorter survival time, and Custódio et al. (2019) find that generalist CEOs
promote innovation.
Although previous studies have provided evidence showing the important role of CEOs'
general managerial skills in firms' risk‐taking behaviour, these studies have examined the
overall effects on the risk‐related corporate policies or firm‐level outcomes of CEOs' general
managerial skills without paying attention to the potential evolution of the effects with CEOs'
tenure. Noting a potentially important feature of CEOs' general managerial skills, we expect
CEOs' tenure to have a significant impact on the relation between CEOs' general managerial
skills and firms' risk‐taking behaviour. In particular, we emphasize the following “general to
firm‐specific”transformation process of general managerial skills that is intuitive but has not
been noted in previous studies: as a CEO stays with the same firm, the CEO's skills gradually
become less general and more firm specific. Intuitively, with the passage of time, a CEO's skills
and knowledge of the firm's business and customer and supplier relationships pertaining to the
industry become established and accumulate, whereas those unrelated to the firm and the
industry gradually become obsolete. A strong empirical implication is that, if there is any effect
of generalist CEOs on firms' risk‐taking behaviour, this effect is only evident when CEOs are in
their early tenure. In this study, we examine the relation between CEOs' general managerial
skills and firm risk by modelling the interaction between this relation and CEOs' tenure,
thereby examining how the relation evolves with CEOs' tenure.
By examining a sample of Compustat ExecuComp firms from 1993 to 2007 for which the
GAI has been constructed by Custódio et al. (2013), we obtain two major observations. We first
find CEOs' general managerial skills to have a significantly positive effect on firm risk for CEOs
in the early years of their tenure. Second, we find that the positive relation between firm risk
and the GAI weakens as the CEO's tenure increases. The weakening effect of tenure on the
GAI–firm risk relation is statistically highly significant and economically strong. With CEO and
firm characteristics and industry‐by‐year fixed effects controlled, the effects of the GAI on firm
risk are significantly positive for CEOs in the early 4 years of tenure (tenure years 0–3) and
become insignificant in the next 2 years (tenure years 4 and 5) and significantly negative
thereafter (tenure years greater than 5).
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In support of the above main findings, CEOs' general managerial skills have similar effects
on the riskiness of corporate policies. For example, in the early stage of tenure, generalists are
more aggressive than specialists in terms of research and development (R&D) policy and patent
applications, but the difference attenuates with tenure. In addition, relative to specialists,
generalists tend to use fewer fixed costs versus variable costs and implement a higher degree of
diversification strategy the longer they manage their firms.
Our second main finding, tenure's weakening of the relation between the GAI and firm risk,
highlights the important role of CEO tenure in the general to firm‐specific managerial skills
transformation process. Intuitively, we expect such a transformation to be more relevant for
new CEOs who start as outsiders than for those who start as insiders, since insiders' human
capital and business experiences could have long been confined to the same firm, thus
becoming largely firm specific. Indeed, in our sample, insider CEOs had an average tenure of
18 years with their firm before assuming the CEO position. Hence, we expect a notable
difference in the effect of general managerial skills between inside and outside CEOs. To
investigate this difference, we perform a subsample analysis of outside and inside CEOs in
which outside CEOs are defined as those with preappointment tenure within the median of the
total sample (i.e., 4 years). Consistent with our conjecture, we find that our main findings of
the initial positive effect of CEOs' general managerial skills on firms' stock return volatility and
the pattern of tenure weakening the effect are mainly driven by outside CEOs.
By conducting robustness checks, we rule out potential alternative explanations for our
findings, such as the change in generalists' managerial preferences with tenure or the
performance‐driven risk‐taking behaviour of generalist CEOs. We also rule out the possibility
that our findings reflect the pattern of outside CEOs' risk‐taking behaviour or generalist CEOs'
risk‐taking profile with age. Using the methods of propensity score matching (PSM), firm or
CEO fixed effects and instrumental variables (IVs), we show that our main results are robust to
endogeneity concerns.
Our paper is related to the literature studying the effects of CEOs' general managerial skills.
Although the shift in the relative importance of general managerial skills was first emphasized
by Murphy and Zábojník (2004,2007) as a potentially important determinant of the upward
trend in CEO compensation over the three decades before the early 2000s, this CEO
characteristic was not extensively investigated until Custódio et al. (2013) developed the GAI
and made the data publicly available. Until now, researchers have examined the effects of
CEOs' general managerial skills on CEO compensation, corporate strategic policies and firm‐
level outcomes. Contributing to this literature, our study addresses an important dimension of
general managerial skills that have not yet been noted, that is, CEO tenure. This dimension
raises serious issues regarding the characterization of generalist CEOs. When managerial skills
undergo the transformation from general to firm specific with managerial tenure, generalist
CEOs staying with the same firm are bound to become specialists at a certain stage. An
important implication is that any effects of general managerial skills are likely to be a
decreasing function of managerial tenure and are expected to disappear with long‐
tenured CEOs.
Our paper is also related to the literature studying the determinants of CEOs' risk‐taking
behaviour. Existing research has identified a vast number of determinants of CEOs' risk‐taking
behaviour, such as the compensation incentives provided to CEOs (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012;
Coles et al., 2006; Do et al., 2022) and CEO characteristics and experience (e.g., Bernile et al.,
2017; Cain & McKeon, 2016; Faccio et al., 2016; Kamiya et al., 2019; Serfling, 2014). Our paper
adds to this stream of literature by showing that CEO managerial skill generality is a
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LENG AND PAN
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