Defining the Right to be Forgotten and its relationship with freedom of expression
Author | Besnik Muçi - Eugerta Muçi |
Position | KU Leuven & University of Zurich |
Pages | 26-37 |
Vol. 4 No. 1
January, 2020
European Journal of Economics, Law and Social Sciences
IIPCCL Publishing, Graz-Austria
ISSN 2519-1284
Acces online at www.iipccl.org
26
Defi ning the Right to be Forgo en and its relationship with freedom of
expression
PhD Besnik Muçi
MSc (C.) Eugerta Muçi
KU Leuven & University of Zurich
Abstract
Freedom of expression and dissemination of information is the bedrock of a free and democratic
society. This freedom provides an avenue for public discourse as well as for the self-fulfi llment
and development of each individual. The risk of harm posed by content and communications
on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the
right to respect for private life, is high. A new aspect, among many others consolidated over
the years in national and international jurisprudence of the right to privacy, is the right to be
forgo en. This right stems from a combination of the development of technology and the need
to fi nd a remedy in protecting the individual rights of each person. Since 2014, international
courts such as the Court of Justice of the European Union and international instruments
have started to tackle specifi cally with the right to be forgo en and thus, this work will try to
interpret and explore these developments.
In this sense, the main objective of this manuscript is to give the defi nition of the right to be
forgo en, the need for this right and its existence separately. Another issue is whether the
right to be forgo en can be exercised only by natural persons. Lastly, the aim of this work is to
analyze the place of the right to be forgo en in relation to other rights especially the balance
with the right of the freedom of expression.
Keywords: The right to be forgo en, private life, personal data, deletion or anonymization,
freedom of expression, GDPR.
Introduction
Freedom of expression and dissemination of information is the bedrock of a free and
democratic society.1 This freedom provides an avenue for public discourse2 as well as
for the self-fulfi llment and development of each individual.3
The means by which freedom of expression can be exercised has evolved over the
centuries and has certainly been conditioned by the development of science and
1 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, App no. 9267/81 (ECtHR, 2 March 1987), para 47; Lingens v.
Austria,
App no. 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986), para 41–42; Claude-Reyes v. Chile, Judgement on Merits, Reparations
and Expenses. (IACtHR, 19 September 2006), para 85.
2 General Comment 34, United Nations Human Rights Committee; UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the right to Freedom of Speech
and Thought” (17 April 2013).
3 Lingens v. Austria, App no. 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986), para 41–42
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