can be reduced by giving people power to elect officers of government and demand an account from them at the end
of their tenure.
Today's students of politics also talk about “the rules of the game”and “playing by the rules”, and in societies com-
mitted to democratic rule, representation and accountability are crucial for securing legitimacy. A part of the credo is
that the will of “the people”shall ultimately prevail. The people are the constituent power, and a legitimate order shall
reflect how citizens want to organize and govern their life in common. The distribution, exercise and change of power
must be explained and justified through reasoned argument and public contestation, and informed, voluntary consent
to foundational rules is fundamental. The ruled must not be subjected to rulers beyond their control. Actors are
accountable for what they do and what they could have done. No one is accountable for things they do not control.
Most contemporary thinking about democratic governance emphasizes accountability as a normative principle
and a mechanism for securing citizens' influence.
Accountability processes are supposed to detect, assess and sanc-
tion deviances from authorized mandates. They are also first‐order political processes offering an opportunity to con-
test the truth, moral, and power bases of the existing order and develop a new one.
Citizens' perceptions of
accountability regimes depend on substantive performance, procedural fairness and institutional arrangements for
explaining, justifying, assessing and sanctioning behaviour.
An effective democratic accountability regime depends
on three types of processes: (a) the institutionalized routines of partly autonomous watchdog institutions with a legal,
financial, managerial or expert mandate; (b) accountability politics within a constituted political order; and (c) account-
ability politics as part of (re)constituting an order.
The focus here is on order‐challenging accountability politics in the European context and in particular related to
European‐level institutions. In settled democracies in normal times, it is common to take the existing order for granted
rather than relentlessly considering alternative orders. Demands for explanations and justifications are more likely in
unsettled polities and at critical junctures. Crises trigger rethinking of the political order, its ordering effects, and
dynamics of change. People question what kind of community they want to live in, and accountability processes
become part of contestations over the proper role of institutions and actors. Why, then, the recent upsurge in
and what can it tell us about European developments, accountability, the role of democratic
politics in society, and how to study the political?
Aristotle, The Politics (Penguin, 1962), at 124.
M. Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism' (2010) 33 West European Politics, 946.
A political order is an institutional arrangement prescribing who can legitimately make decisions applicable to the whole community
and who is responsible and can be held to account. An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices,
embedded in structures of meaning and resources. Institutions create order and orderly change. They define legitimate ways to orga-
nize government and appropriate action for different roles in various contexts, what kind of behaviour can be expected from different
office holders. Institutions change routinely, but they do not automatically adapt to intentional reforms or environmental changes.
They are relatively unvarying in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expec-
tations of individuals and changing external circumstances. J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, ‘Organizing Political Life: What Administrative
Reorganization Tells Us About Government’(1 983) 77 The American Political Science Review, 281; J.G. March and J.P. Olsen,
Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics (Free Press, 1989); J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, ‘Elaborating the “New Insti-
tutionalism”’, in R.A.W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder and B.A. Rockman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford University
Press, 2006), at 3.
I. Pérez Durán, ‘Accountability from the Perspective of the Forum: Citizens’Attitudes Toward Accou ntability in Europe' (2016) 39
West European Politics, 815.
P.C.Schmitter, ‘The Ambiguous Virtues of Democracy’(2004) 15 Journal of Democracy, 47; S. Gustavsson, C. Karlsson and T. Persson
(eds.), The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union (Routledge, 2009); C.T. Borowiak, Accountability & Democracy: The Pitf alls and
Promises of Popular Control (Oxford University Press, 2011); C. Pollitt and P. Hupe, ‘Talking about Government: The Role of Magic Con-
cepts’(2011) 13 Public Management Review, 641; T. Schillemans, ‘The Public Accountability Review: A Meta‐Analysis of Public
Accountability Research in Six Academic Disciplines’(Utrecht University School of Governance Working Paper, 2013); M. Bovens, R.E.
Goodin and T. Schillemans (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford University Press, 2014); T. Wright, ‘The Politics
of Accountability’,in M. Elliot and D. Feldman(eds.), The Cambridge Companion to PublicLaw (Cambridge University Press, 2015 ), at 96;
J.P.Olsen, Democratic Accountability,Politic al Order, andChange: ExploringAccountability Processesin anEra ofEuropean Transformation
(Oxford University Press, 2017).