Do new CEOs really care about innovation?
| Published date | 01 January 2024 |
| Author | Wasim Ahmad,Hisham Farag,Yaopeng Wang |
| Date | 01 January 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12411 |
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12411
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Do new CEOs really care about innovation?
Wasim Ahmad
1
|Hisham Farag
2
|Yaopeng Wang
3
1
Finance and Accounting Group, School
of Management, Cranfield University,
Bedford, UK
2
Department of Finance, Business
School, University of Birmingham,
Birmingham, UK
3
Department of Finance, Business
School, University of Shanghai for
Science and Technology, Shanghai,
China
Correspondence
Yaopeng Wang, Department of Finance,
Business School, University of Shanghai
for Science and Technology, Shanghai,
China.
Email: ypwang@usst.edu.cn
Abstract
This study asks whether new chief executive officers
(CEOs) care about innovation postturnover. Using a
large sample of Chinese listed firms between 2008 and
2019, our identification strategy relies on the exogen-
ous variation in CEO turnovers. Our difference‐in‐
difference estimates indicate that new CEOs improve
R&D efficiency and generate more and higher quality
patents. We further show that this positive effect is
more pronounced when CEOs have longer career
horizons and overseas experience. Overall, our findings
indicate that CEO turnover represents an effective
mechanism for fostering innovation and new CEOs
indeed care about innovation. Our results could benefit
several groups of stakeholders with respect to CEO
selection process.
KEYWORDS
CEO turnover, corporate innovation, difference‐in‐difference
JEL CLASSIFICATION
G34, J63, O32
1|INTRODUCTION
Chief executive officers (CEOs) are typically viewed as critical to the success and survival of
firms, and CEO turnover has important long‐term implications for firms' corporate policies and
outcomes. As such, the literature documents significant impacts of CEOs on firm performance
Eur Financ Manag. 2024;30:230–283.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eufm230
|
© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
We are grateful to the Editor (John Doukas) and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback and
suggestions throughout the review process. We also thank participants of the 2021 European Financial Management
Association Annual Meeting at the University of Leeds, UK for their constructive comments. All remaining errors are
the responsibility of the authors.
(Bandiera et al., 2020; Nourayi & Daroca, 2008; Saidu, 2019); leadership change (Carmeli et al.,
2011; Chen et al., 2019) and survival rates (Jenter et al., 2016). Consequently, CEO turnover has
attracted considerable attention from academics practitioners, and the media. Recent studies
also suggest a decline on average CEO tenures (Goyal & Low, 2019), an increase in involuntary
dismissals and high performance‐turnover sensitivity (Alexandridis et al., 2019) leading to
significant changes in the firm performance (Bhagat et al., 2010; Dikolli et al., 2014; Jenter &
Kanaan, 2015; Kato & Long, 2006). Previous studies have provided useful insights into the
effects of CEO turnover on post‐turnover operating and market performance (Jenter &
Lewellen, 2020; Kim, 1996; Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993). Yet, empirical evidence on the
association between CEO turnover and corporate innovation is scant. Our study attempts to fill
this gap.
CEO turnover is a critical event that impacts organisational functions and performance.
This is because CEOs are responsible for developing and implementing strategies and oversee
operational and functional decisions within an organisation. Therefore, a CEO change could
radically affect corporate policies, procedures, and performance (Finkelstein et al., 2009;
Hambrick & Quigley, 2014). The extant literature examining CEO turnover‐performance nexus
suggests that turnovers (particularly forced) are preceded by poor operating and market
performance (Denis et al., 1997; Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Jenter & Lewellen, 2020; Warner
et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988). For example, Jenter and Lewellen (2020) document a close link
between performance and turnover and find that performance‐induced turnovers account for
between 38% and 55% of all turnovers. These studies also suggest that firm performance should
improve following CEO turnovers. The empirical evidence on the relationship between
turnover and performance, however, is mixed. For instance, some studies document
improvements in operating earnings and stock returns following turnovers (Denis &
Denis, 1995; Huson et al., 2004). This strand of the literature suggests that managerial
turnover improves performance by learning from previous organisational mistakes, reversing
past poor investment decisions and resetting strategic directions leading to better performance
(Alexandridis et al., 2019; Haveman et al., 2001; Shen & Cho, 2005). On the other hand, another
strand of the literature does not find evidence of performance improvements following CEO
changes (Cao et al., 2017; Wiersema, 2002). The change in CEO is disruptive and successor
CEOs' policies and restructuring could provoke instability and ambiguity for employees leading
to poor performance (Ballinger & Marcel, 2010; Schepker et al., 2017).
Investment in research and development (R&D) is one of the key decisions made by CEOs
because investment in developing new products, processes and technologies often confers
competitive advantages that are vital for future productivity performance (Ettlie, 1998;
Scherer, 1984). Corporate innovation is not only an important determinant of firm performance
(Baer, 2012; Gunday et al., 2011; Tuan et al., 2016), but also, it is vital for aggregate national
productivity and overall economic development (Porter, 1992). Hence, understanding the
determinants of corporate innovation is imperative for academics and policy makers alike. A
sizeable body of literature has investigated the determinants of corporate innovation such as
the role of equity analysts (Fiorillo et al., 2022), corporate social responsibility (Liu et al., 2021),
creation culture (Wang et al., 2021), CEOs and board characteristics (Cao et al., 2021;
Chen, 2013; González‐Uribe & Groen‐Xu, 2017; Mazouz & Zhao, 2019; Sena et al., 2017). Given
the key role of CEOs in fostering innovation, the literature documents a significant impact of
CEOs characteristics on innovation; for instance, CEO overconfidence (Galasso &
Simcoe, 2011), sensation seeking (Sunder et al., 2017), inventing ability (Islam & Zein, 2020),
exploratory mindset (He & Hirshleifer, 2022), general managerial skills (Custódio et al., 2019)
AHMAD ET AL.EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
|
231
and education (Beladi et al., 2022). Although some studies examine changes in R&D spending
around CEO turnovers (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993), the impact of
CEO changes on overall innovation (input and output) activities is scant, particularly in
emerging markets.
Theoretical arguments from the literature predict improvements in innovation performance
following CEO changes due to divergent incentives of departing and successor CEOs. The quiet
life hypothesis suggests that lazy incumbent managers would underinvest in innovation due to the
risks involved in innovation in the absence of incentives or threat of replacement (Aghion
et al., 2013). These agency issues are likely to be more severe in firms where managers are close to
departing their firms due to retirement or contract expiration (Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993).
Dechow and Sloan (1991) find a reduction in R&D spending in firms where CEOs are close to
departing their firms. Similarly, Boot (1992) argues that managers are reluctant to divest poorly
performing investments due to career concerns. These agency issues are likely to be exacerbated in
emerging markets like China due to the lack of robust corporate governance mechanisms, market
discipline and political entrenchment (He et al., 2020;Jiangetal.,2010). Managerial turnover
provides an opportunity for successor CEOs to reset the poor investment decisions of departing
managers and the empirical evidence supports this conjecture. For instance, successor CEOs
reverse value‐destroying decisions by divestitures and operational downsizing (Ansari et al., 2014;
Conyon & He, 2014; Goel & Thakor, 2008), and successor CEOs add value through superior
mergers and acquisitions, reversing prior poor investments through asset disposals and adopting
more efficient investment strategies (Alexandridis et al., 2019). Moreover, to showcase their
managerial ability, successor CEOs are likely to optimise innovation strategies. Innovation success
also yields career benefits for CEOs; successor CEOs enjoy relatively longer career horizons, and
the results from the literature shows that firms with longer horizon CEOs invest more in R&D and
produce better quality innovations (González‐Uribe & Groen‐Xu, 2017).
In this study, we investigate CEOs turnover‐innovation nexus in a large sample of Chinese‐
listed firms. Our choice of Chinese sample is mainly motivated by two reasons. First, China is the
largest emerging market and second largest economy in the world. A large part of China's rapid
economic growth is attributable to the innovative capabilities of Chinese firms. In fact, China has
emerged as one of the most innovative nations in the world during the past decade.
1
Second, there
are significant institutional differences between Chinese and developed markets. For instance, the
ownership, control and corporate governance mechanisms of Chinese listed firms are radically
different compared to those from developed markets, making China an interesting setting to study
the impact of CEO turnover on innovation. Moreover, other factors such as weak legal and
institutional environment, underdeveloped investor protection legislation, state control and
ownership, and importance of political connections might have significant different implications
for causes (and consequences) of CEO changes on Chines firms' policies compared to their
Western counterparts
2
(Cao et al., 2017;Heetal.,2014;Kato&Long,2006).
1
China filed 1.2 million patents in 2016 more than the combined total of the United States, Japan, The Republic of Korea and the
European Patent Office. It was ranked among the 20 most innovative economies in the world for the first time in 2018 (WIPO: https://
www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2018/article_0005.html). According to a recently released Global Innovation Index 2022 by WIPO,
China ranks 11th among the most innovative nations in the world (https://www.wipo.int/global_innovation_index/en/2022/).
2
Unlike the developed markets (e.g., US and UK) that utilise a unitary (one‐tier) board, Chinese companies set up a supervision board to
monitor the decisions made by the board of directors or CEOs (Farag & Mallin, 2016). Nevertheless, most of the members of the
supervision board are the former board of directors, and they have no actual rights to make any strategic decisions (e.g., CEO
recruitment), which consequently reduces the efficiency and transparency of the whole internal corporate governance system
(Sabbaghi, 2016). In addition, for CEO recruitment in Chinese companies, the nominee must gain over 50% affirmative votes from the
shareholders. See Jiang et al. (2013) for further details.
232
|
EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
AHMAD ET AL.
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeUnlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations
Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations
Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations
Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations
Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations