Downside beta and the cross section of equity returns: A decade later

Published date01 March 2020
AuthorA. Doruk Gunaydin,Yigit Atilgan,K. Ozgur Demirtas
Date01 March 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12258
Eur Financ Manag. 2020;26:316347.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eufm316
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© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12258
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Downside beta and the cross section of equity
returns: A decade later
Yigit Atilgan
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K. Ozgur Demirtas
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A. Doruk Gunaydin
School of Management, Sabanci
University, Istanbul, Turkey
Correspondence
K. Ozgur Demirtas, School of
Management, Sabanci University,
Orhanli, 34956 Tuzla/Istanbul, Turkey.
Email: ozgurdemirtas@sabanciuniv.edu
Abstract
This study reexamines the relation between downside
beta and equity returns in the United States. First, we
replicate the 2006 work of Ang, Chen, and Xing who
find a positive relation between downside beta and
future equity returns for equalweighted portfolios of
NYSE stocks. We show that this relation doesn't hold
after using valueweighted returns or controlling for
various return determinants. We also extend the original
sample, add AMEX/NASDAQ stocks or utilize alter-
native downside beta measures and still find no down-
side risk premium. We focus on factor analysis results,
persistence of downside beta, and various subsamples to
understand the economic reasons behind the findings.
KEYWORDS
asset pricing, downside beta, downside risk, equity returns, tail risk
JEL CLASSIFICATION
G10; G11; G12
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INTRODUCTION
Studies that focus on the relation between asset returns and downside risk have a long history in
asset pricing. Almost 70 years ago, Roy (1952) introduced the concept of safetyfirst investors who
are concerned about minimizing the probability of a loss event and Markowitz (1959) suggested the
use of semivariance rather than variance as a risk metric.HoganandWarren(1974),Krausand
Litzenberger (1976), Arzac and Bawa (1977), Bawa and Lindenberg (1977), and Harlow and Rao
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The authors acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions by John Doukas (the Editor), two anonymous referees,
and the participants of the 2017 European Financial Management Association annual meeting and 24th Annual
Conference of the Multinational Finance Society.
(1989) went beyond the original capital asset pricing model framework and introduced models that
incorporate lower partial moments in an equilibrium context. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also
contributedtothefieldwithprospecttheoryin which investors make decisions based on the
potential value of losses and gains rather than expected outcomes and their asymmetric value
functions are steeper for losses than gains which implies loss aversion.
In recent years, the literature that empirically tests the relation between downside risk and
equity returns has blossomed. Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2014) document a positive and
significant relation between expected stock returns and hybrid tail covariance risk based on the
colower partial moment between daily equity and market returns. Kelly and Jiang (2014)
construct an aggregate measure of tail risk by exploiting monthly firmlevel crashes and show
that equities with higher sensitivities towards aggregate tail risk earn higher returns. Using
investable option trading strategies, Cremers, Halling, and Weinbaum (2015) construct
mimicking portfolios for aggregate volatility and jump risk factors and find that equities that
load more on these two factors have lower expected returns. Lu and Murray (2019) also rely on
S&P 500 options to construct an ArrowDebreu security that pays off in bear market states. The
authors use the returns on this security as a measure of bear market risk and find that equities
with higher exposure to this risk have lower future returns. ChabiYo, Ruenzi, and Weigert
(2018) focus on the concept of crash sensitivity and use a copulabased approach to calculate the
lowertail dependence of each stock with the market. Their results suggest that stocks with
stronger lowertail dependence earn higher future returns. Finally, Atilgan, Bali, Demirtas, and
Gunaydin (2019) measure downside risk using valueatrisk and expected a shortfall and
uncover a negative relation between these metrics and future equity returns.
A key study that evoked this recent interest on downside risk has been authored by Ang,
Chen, and Xing (ACX, 2006). ACX are driven by the idea that assets that are more sensitive to
market downturns than uptrends are undesirable for lossaverse investors since such assets
provide their investors with low payoffs precisely when the wealth of investors is decreasing.
The authors motivate the role for downside beta in asset pricing as a risk attribute by relying on
the disappointment utility function of Gul (1991) in a rational representativeagent framework.
They investigate the significance of a relation between downside beta and the cross section of
returns of US equities. Their main results are twofold. First, for equities trading in NYSE
between 1962 and 2001, individual stocks with higher downside betas have higher average
contemporaneous returns as equities that have high covariation with the market when the
market declines display high average returns over the same period. Second, high past downside
beta predicts higher equity returns over the next month except the portion of the cross section
which includes stocks with excess volatility.
Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) call for the reexamination of past research on the cross section
of equity returns and argue that many of the historically discovered factors would be deemed
significant by chance.In this paper, we revisit the evidence for the existence of a significant
downside risk premium by investigating the relation between downside beta and future equity
returns. We focus on future returns rather than contemporaneous returns since there is a long
tradition in finance starting with Fama and MacBeth (1973) who calculate predictive betas
based on conditional information and examine oneperiodahead returns. Moreover, a return
determinant must successfully predict future returns to present a trading strategy. We measure
downside beta in the exact manner as ACX (2006) as the sensitivity of excess stock returns to
excess market returns during market downturns. A market downturn is defined as periods
during which the excess market return has been lower than its mean value during the past year.
First, we replicate the results of ACX (2006) and find a significant downside risk premium when
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equities with the highest volatilities are excluded from the sample each month. Second, we
observe that this premium vanishes when standard asset pricing factors are controlled for and/
or valueweighted portfolio returns are used. The significantly positive relation between
downside beta and future equity returns also ceases to exist in a crosssectional regression
framework that controls for a multitude of firmspecific attributes. Adding nonNYSE stocks to
the original sample and/or extending the sample period until 2014 also erases any significant
tradeoff between downside risk and future equity returns.
Next, we investigate some potential economic mechanisms behind why changing the sample
period or methodology causes the downside risk premium to vanish. First, we focus on the
results from the factor regressions and find that the market factor is the main driver behind the
significantly positive relation between downside beta and future stock returns documented in
ACX (2006). Moreover, the factor model used in our study is able to better explain equal
weighted portfolio returns due to the lower exposure of valueweighted portfolio returns
towards the market, size, and value factors. Second, we investigate whether the lack of a
downside premium is due to lower postranking downside betas associated with a zerocost
strategy that buys (sells) equities in the highest (lowest) downside beta quintile every month
when alternative samples and methodologies are utilized. Our results provide no evidence for
this hypothesis. Third, we investigate the performance of the zerocost strategy for different
subsample periods. We find that the zerocost strategy performed better during periods of high
market volatility, displayed very low returns during the post2001 period, and experienced
sharp drops and jumps around the 2008 financial crisis.
Finally, we focus on an extended sample that includes all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
stocks between 1962 and 2014 to check the robustness of our results. For this sample, we show
that altering the proxy for the market portfolio does not affect the main results. Moreover,
bivariate portfolio analyses and firmlevel crosssectional regressions show that the relation
between downside beta and 1monthahead stock returns is insignificant. Furthermore, we
show that the particular definition of downside beta that we use in our tests is not the driver of
the flat relation between downside beta and equity returns by utilizing alternative downside
beta metrics based on new cutoff points and time windows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
variables. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 provides additional tests and
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2
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DATA AND VARIABLES
2.1
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Data
The data for equity returns, shares outstanding, and volume of shares traded comes from Center
for Research in Security prices (CRSP). The book value of equity for each firm is necessary to
calculate booktomarket ratios and this data is obtained from Compustat. The riskfree rate
used to calculate excess returns is the interest rate on 1month US Tbills obtained from the
Federal Reserve database. We winsorize all independent variables at the 1% and 99% level
within each month to avoid putting too much weight on extreme observations following ACX
(2006). Our study aims to investigate the robustness of the positive relation between downside
beta and future equity returns in different sample settings. In the tests that examine the relation
between downside betas and future returns, ACX (2006) focus only on NYSE stocks between
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ATILGAN ET AL.

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