Implications on EU External Affairs

• Author: Eisele, Katharina
• Pages: 190-194

EPRS | European Parli amentary Re search Servic e

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7. Implications on EU Exte rnal Affairs

This Section explores two of th e key imp lication s of EU r eturn and readmiss ion policy o n EU ext ernal

affairs: (1) th e use of incentives o r conditionality to conclude EURAs and other arrangements; (2) the

incentivisation o f other readmission agreements. It must be emphasised that, although the focus on

thes e two implicatio ns a re for the purposes of this Stud y, this is not to diminish oth er key

implications on EU external affairs (including any unintended consequences, which may even be

presently unknown). This Section focuses on the use of incentives or conditionality in light of firstly,

the recent amendments to the Visa Code which now contemplates a fo rm of posit ive and negative

incentives; and secondly, the European Commission’s proposal to ‘budgetise’ the EDF. 393 This

Section focuses on the incentivisation of oth er readmission agreements in order to contextualise

firs tly, the disjunction between the lack of procedural rights and gu arantees afforded to returned

persons under readmiss ion agreements or other arrangements (see S ections 5 an d 6) and t he

proliferation of such agreements; and secondly, the inversion of the European Commission’s policy

choices from v oluntary to fo rced return in its pr oposed recast of the R eturn Directive.394

7.1. Incentives/Conditionality

The use of incentives in the context of EURAs had its origins in European Commission negotiations

with third countries and the pursuit of the third-country national and stateless person clause in

EURAs that third countries found unattractive combined with the insufficient leverage held by the

European Commission when negotiating.395

As out lined earlier, EUR As are predicated o n “unbalanced reciprocities” between th e EU and the

third country,396 meaning that even though the texts of the agreements are reciprocal, in practice it

is more in the interests of the EU to return the partner country’s nationals, third country nationals

and sta teless persons than it is for a single third country to return EU citizens. Further, third countries

have also had inadequat e means to be able t o implement EURAs. 397 Initia l resp onses included

financial and operational support, followed then by efforts to link visa facilitation and the conclusion

of EUR As , follo wed las tly by t he integ ration of readmission into EU external a ffair s.398 EU re admission

policy has become “grafted on to other issues of ‘high politics’”.399

Notwit hstan ding its init ial use in e xceptio nal cases o nly,400 visa facilita tion has b ecome a standard

incent ive to con clude EURA s.401 However, Trauner and Kruse observed that visa facilitation makes

dist inction s bet ween pr ivileged and n on-privileged citizens’ a ccess to the EU and th e poten tial for

393 European Commission (2018b), op. cit.

394 European Commission (2018d), op. cit.

395 Coleman (2009), op. cit., pp.194-197.

396 Cassarino (2010), op. cit.

397 Billet (2010), op. cit., pp.74-75.

398 Coleman (2009), op. cit., pp.195-197.

399 Cassarino (2010), EP Study, op. cit., p. 26.

400 Schieffer , M. (20 03), ‘Community Readmission Agre ements wit h Thir d Count ries – Objectives, Substance and Current

State of Negotiations’, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 5, p34 3-357 at p.356; Coleman (2009), op. cit., p.195.

401 Her nández i Sagr era, R . (201 0), ‘The EU-Russia r eadm issio n-visa facili tation n exus: an export able migr ation mode l for

Easte rn Europ e?’, Eu ropean Securi ty, Vol. 1 9 No. 4, pp.569-584; Trauner and Kruse (2008), op. cit.