Inconsistency in decision making as a proxy to corruption

• Author: Ketrina Çabiri
• Pages: 143-148

Vol. 3 No. 2

July 2017

ISSN 2410-3918

Acces online at www.iipccl.org

143

Academic Journal of Business, Administration, Law and Social Sciences

IIPCCL Publishing, Graz-Austria

Inconsistency in decision making as a proxy to corruption

PhD (C.) Ketrina Çabiri

Abstract

This study targets the decision-making process and the politico-administrative relations

in the Public Procurement Review System in Albania (PPRS). The inner logic of this study

is composed of interrelation between decision making and accountability of actions and

inactions, which pose the risk for decision making to face corruption due to the lack of legal

and/or social auditing mechanisms.

The study targets decision making in Public Procurement Commission (PPC) in Albania by

reviewing decisions to identify stable pa erns of fl awed, inconsistent interpretation which

allow corruptive actions and inactions to take part.

Keywords: accountability, inconsistent interpretation, decisions, Pubic Procurement.

Introduction

Maintaining integrity in public procurement is one of the most important pillars

of modern national procurement systems (Arrowsmith, Lineralli & Wallace, 2000;

Kelman, 1990). However, research on corruption shows that Public Procurement

System (PPS) is one of the most critical policy fi elds, especially when formal

monitoring mechanisms are questionable. According to Bac (1998, p. 101) lack of

satisfactory formal models on public bureaucracies and supervision procedures

impedes our understanding of the many organizational aspects of corruption. More

recent research over the past twenty years has typically (though not always) been

more preoccupied with external political forces rather than what goes on inside the

agency (cf. Brehm and Gates, 1997) however, following theoretical models such as

Agent theory and Capture of State, the inside of bureaucracies explains the tendency

of the la er to engage into corruptive a airs. In this vein it is important to point out

that corruption is more probably when the monopoly of information is high and

the accountability within the organization is low. According to ‘Klitgaard formula’,

Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability (Klitgaard, 2000) although

the Public Procurement Review System in Albania is approximated to the European

legal framework, the institutional se ing refl ect the lack of monitoring mechanisms,

providing an open space for systematic favouritism, corruption and collusion to

arise, and puts into question the overall integrity of the system.

The Public Procurement Commission is the highest body in the fi eld of public

procurement. Its decisions are administratively fi nal and PPC acts as a quasi-judicial

appeals body which promotes competitions and non-discriminatory treatment for

economic operators. In Albania PPC is a collegial body, directly elected by the Prime

Minister. This opens the debate for political dependence and sta instability and on

the other hand, as a collegial body, PPC o cials fi nd it “safer” to commit such a crime