Institucional balance, EU and national agencification processes. The need for dialogue
Author | Joan Solanes Mullor |
Position | Lecturer of Constitutional Law at Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
Pages | 85-111 |
JOAN SOLANES MULLOR
Lecturer of Constitutional Law at Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Revista Española de Derecho Europeo 68
Octubre – Diciembre 2018
Págs� 85 – 111
SUMARIO: I� INTRODUCTION� II� INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: A NATIONAL AND EU PRINCIPLE� III� THE RE-
LEVANCE OF EU INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE IN THE DEBATE OVER EU AGENCIES� IV� NATIONAL
INDEPENDENT REGULATORS AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: A MATTER FOR THE EU?�
V� LINKING THE EU AND NATIONAL AGENCIFICATION PROCESSES: PATHS FOR DIALOGUE� VI�
CONCLUSIONS� VII� REFERENCES�
RESUMEN: En las últimas décadas, la UE ha sido prota-
gonista en el proceso de agencicación en Europa, tan-
to a nivel de la UE, con las agencias de la UE como una
forma de gobernanza de la UE, como a nivel nacional,
introduciendo reguladores nacionales independientes a
través del derecho derivado� El artículo explora el papel
del equilibrio institucional en el proceso de agencica-
ción, destacando su papel decisivo a nivel de la UE y sus
deciencias a nivel nacional. Esta diferencia se ha ma-
nifestado de varias maneras� Por un lado, la debilidad de
los organismos de la UE se debe a la ponderación de las
preocupaciones sobre el equilibrio institucional de la UE
y, por el otro, encontramos reguladores nacionales fuer-
tes donde el equilibrio institucional nacional no era una
preocupación principal� Esto ha llevado a problemas,
con intrusiones en la independencia de la agencia en
algunos casos y problemas de responsabilidad en otros,
ABSTRACT: In recent decades, the EU has been a pro-
tagonist in the agencication process in Europe, both
at the EU level – with EU agencies as a form of EU
governance – and at the national level – introducing
independent national regulators through secondary
law� The article explores the role of the institutional
balance in the agencication process highlighting its
decisive role at the EU level and its shortfalls at the
national level� This difference has manifested itself
in several ways� On the one hand, the weakness of
EU agencies results from weighting EU institutional
balance concerns and, on the other, we nd strong
national regulators where national institutional
balance was not a primary concern� This has led to
problems –with intrusions on agency independence
in some cases and accountability issues in others –
in accommodating independent national regulators�
INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE, EU AND
NATIONAL AGENCIFICATION PROCESSES:
THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE*
* PhD at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (2014) and LL.M. at Harvard L aw School (2009).
86 JOAN SOLANES MULLOR
REDE 2018 • 68
para acomodar a reguladores nacionales independien-
tes� El artículo explora diferentes formas de interco-
nectar a la UE y las agencias nacionales en el proceso
de agencicación, particularmente a través del con-
cepto de identidad constitucional nacional, y propone
que el diálogo y la comunicación entre todos los ac-
tores de la UE y nacionales involucrados en el proceso
sean más uidos.
The article explores different ways to interconnect
the EU and national agencies in the agencication
process, particularly through the concept of national
constitutional identity, and it proposes making the
dialogue and communication between all the EU and
national actors involved in the process more uid.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Agencias de la UE– Autoridades
Reguladoras Nacionales– Equilibrio Institucional–
Identidad Nacional Constitucional
KEYWORDS: EU Agencies– National Regulatory
Authorities– Institutional Balance– National Cons-
titutional Identity
Fecha de recepción: 7-9-2018
Fecha de aceptación: 21-9-2018
I. INTRODUCTION
The agencification process in Europe presents two primary dimensions, one at the
level of the European Union (EU) and the other at the national level. Over the last three
decades, the EU has relied on agencies to perform the functions under its competence. EU
agencies have thus increased in number and now form a decisive part of the EU administra-
tive landscape1. At the same time, the EU has reinforced agencies as a form of government
and administration at the national level. The EU has introduced agencies in several sectors
as a means of organizing national regulators. The energy and telecommunications sectors
are good examples because they show the evolution of EU legislation which first merely
envisaged an agency independent of private operators that was subsequently built up into
a regulatory agency that was also independent from national legislators and executives2.
The EU has played a determinant role at both levels, especially as an agent of chan-
ge. Since the 1990s, intense scholarly debate over the role of agencies in rethinking EU
governance has taken place, a debate focusing on the agencies’ impact on EU institutio-
nal balance, the tension between technocracy and democracy, and accountability3. The
1. For a map of the current EU agencies, see the official website of the EU: https://europa.eu/
european-union/about-eu/agencies_en.
2. The first and second generations of E U legislation on energ y (1996-1998 and 2003) and te-
lecommunications (1980’s-1990’s and 2002) only required that regulators be separated from
private actors. A full national regulatory agency, independent from nationa l legislators and
executives in addit ion to private actors, was adopted in the third generat ion of EU legislation
on energy and telecommunicat ions (2009). Section IV infra de scribes the evolution of this le-
gislation i n detail.
3. In the 1990s a nd 2000s, politica l scientists and lawyers developed a n intense resea rch agen-
da on EU agencies. The resea rch groups of the European University Inst itute (EUI) and the
contributions of Giandomenico Majone, were especially i mportant in establishing the ter ms
of the debate and subsequent scholarship has been built over their contributions. For the key
role of the EUI, see A. K reher, «Introduction», in A. K reher (ed), The New European Agencies.
Conference Report (Europea n University Inst itute, 1996) at 1, 1-4. Section III infra re fers, when
appropriate, to some aspect s of this debate.
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