Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag.

• Jurisdiction: European Union
• Celex Number: 62014CJ0062
• ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:2015:400
• Date: 16 June 2015
• Court: Court of Justice (European Union)
• Procedure Type: Reference for a preliminary ruling
• Docket Number: C-62/14

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)

16 June 2015 ( *1 )

‛Reference for a preliminary ruling — Economic and monetary policy — Decisions of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright monetary transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets — Articles 119 TFEU and 127 TFEU — Powers conferred on the ECB and the European System of Central Banks — Monetary policy transmission mechanism — Maintenance of price stability — Proportionality — Article 123 TFEU — Prohibition of monetary financing of Member States in the euro area’

In Case C‑62/14,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany), made by decision of 14 January 2014, received at the Court on 10 February 2014, in the proceedings

Peter Gauweiler,

Bruno Bandulet and Others,

Roman Huber and Others,

Johann Heinrich von Stein and Others,

Fraktion DIE LINKE im Deutschen Bundestag

v

Deutscher Bundestag,

intervener:

Bundesregierung,

THE COURT (Grand Chamber),

composed of V. Skouris, President, K. Lenaerts, Vice-President, A. Tizzano, L. Bay Larsen (Rapporteur), T. von Danwitz, A. Ó Caoimh and J.-C. Bonichot, Presidents of Chambers, J. Malenovský, E. Levits, A. Arabadjiev, M. Berger, A. Prechal, E. Jarašiūnas, C.G. Fernlund and J.L. da Cruz Vilaça, Judges,

Advocate General: P. Cruz Villalón,

Registrar: K. Malacek, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 14 October 2014,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

— Mr Gauweiler, by W.-R. Bub, Rechtsanwalt, and D. Murswiek,

— Mr Bandulet and Others, by K.A. Schachtschneider,

— Mr Huber and Others, by H. Däubler-Gmelin, Rechtsanwältin, and by C. Degenhart and B. Kempen,

— Mr von Stein and Others, by M.C. Kerber, Rechtsanwalt,

— Fraktion DIE LINKE im Deutschen Bundestag, by H.-P. Schneider and A. Fisahn and by G. Gysi, Rechtsanwalt,

— the Deutscher Bundestag, by C. Calliess,

— the German Government, by T. Henze and J. Möller, acting as Agents, and by U. Häde,

— Ireland, by E. Creedon, G. Hodge and T. Joyce, acting as Agents, and by M. Cush and N.J. Travers, Senior Counsels, and M.J. Dunne and D. Moloney, Barristers-at-Law,

— the Greek Government, by S. Charitaki, S. Lekkou and M. Skorila, acting as Agents,

— the Spanish Government, by A. Rubio González, A. Sampol Pucurull and E. Chamizo Llatas, acting as Agents,

— the French Government, by F. Alabrune, G. de Bergues, D. Colas and F. Fize, acting as Agents,

— the Italian Government, by G. Palmieri, acting as Agent, and by P. Gentili, avvocato dello Stato,

— the Cypriot Government, by K.K. Kleanthous and N. Ioannou, acting as Agents,

— the Netherlands Government, by M. Bulterman and J. Langer, acting as Agents,

— the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna, C. Herma and K. Maćkowska, acting as Agents,

— the Portuguese Government, by L. Inez Fernandes, P. Machado and M.L. Duarte, acting as Agents,

— the Finnish Government, by J. Heliskoski and H. Leppo, acting as Agents,

— the European Parliament, by A. Neergaard, U. Rösslein and E. Waldherr, acting as Agents,

— the European Commission, by B. Martenczuk, C. Ladenburger, B. Smulders and J.-P. Keppenne, acting as Agents,

— the European Central Bank (ECB), by C. Zilioli and C. Kroppenstedt, acting as Agents, and H.-G. Kamann, Rechtsanwalt,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 14 January 2015,

gives the following

Judgment

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the validity of the decisions of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 6 September 2012 on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright monetary transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets (‘the OMT decisions’) and the interpretation of Articles 119 TFEU, 123 TFEU and 127 TFEU and of Articles 17 to 24 of Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (OJ 2012, C 326, p. 230; ‘the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB’).

2 The request has been made in the context of a series of constitutional actions and dispute resolution proceedings between constitutional bodies, which concern the participation of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank) in the implementation of the OMT decisions and the alleged failure, of the Bundesregierung (Federal Government) and the Deutscher Bundestag (Lower House of the German Federal Parliament), to act with regard to those decisions.

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

The OMT decisions

3 According to the minutes of the 340th meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB (‘the Governing Council’) on 5 and 6 September 2012, that body ‘approved the main parameters of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), which would be set out in a press release [(“the press release”)] to be published after the meeting’.

4 The press release is worded as follows: ‘As announced on 2 August 2012, the [Governing Council] has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s [OMTs] in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy. These will be known as [OMTs] and will be conducted within the following framework: Conditionality A necessary condition for [OMTs] is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. Such programmes can take the form of a full EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary market purchases. The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the country-specific conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme. The Governing Council will consider [OMTs] to the extent that they are warranted from a monetary policy perspective as long as programme conditionality is fully respected, and terminate them once their objectives are achieved or when there is non-compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme. Following a thorough assessment, the Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and suspension of [OMTs] in full discretion and acting in accordance with its monetary policy mandate. Coverage [OMTs] will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes as specified above. They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access. Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years. No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of [OMTs]. Creditor treatment The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning [OMTs] that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through [OMTs], in accordance with the terms of such bonds. Sterilisation The liquidity created through [OMTs] will be fully sterilised. Transparency Aggregate [OMT] holdings and their market values will be published on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of [OMT] holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis. Securities Markets Programme Following today’s decision on [OMTs], the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) is herewith terminated. The liquidity injected through the SMP will continue to be absorbed as in the past, and the existing securities in the SMP portfolio will be held to maturity.’

The main proceedings and the order for reference

5 Several groups of individuals, including a group supported by more than 11000 signatories, have brought various constitutional actions concerning the OMT decisions and the alleged failure of the Bundesregierung and the Deutscher Bundestag to act with regard to those decisions. In addition the Fraktion DIE LINKE im Deutschen Bundestag (The Left Party Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag) has made an application, in dispute resolution proceedings between constitutional bodies, for a declaration that the Deutscher Bundestag is under certain obligations with regard to the OMT decisions.

6 In support of those actions, the applicants in the main proceedings submit (i) that the OMT decisions form, overall, an ultra vires act inasmuch as they are not covered by the mandate of the ECB and infringe Article 123 TFEU and (ii) that those decisions breach the principle of democracy entrenched in the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and thereby impair German constitutional identity.

7 The Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) states that if the OMT decisions exceed the mandate of the ECB or infringe Article 123 TFEU it will have to uphold these various actions.

8 In that regard the referring court observes in particular, alluding to the principle of conferral of powers provided for in Article 5(1) and (2) TEU, that the mandate assigned to the ESCB must be...