Persistency of window dressing practices in the U.S. repo markets after the GFC: The unexplored role of the deposit insurance premium
| Published date | 01 March 2023 |
| Author | Aziz Jaafar,Salvatore Polizzi,Alessio Reghezza |
| Date | 01 March 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12367 |
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12367
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Persistency of window dressing practices in
the U.S. repo markets after the GFC: The
unexplored role of the deposit insurance
premium
Aziz Jaafar
1
|Salvatore Polizzi
2
|Alessio Reghezza
3
1
Bangor Business School, Bangor
University, Bangor, UK
2
Department of Economics, Business and
Statistics, University of Palermo,
Palermo, Viale Delle Scienze, Italy
3
Department of Political Science,
University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
Correspondence
Salvatore Polizzi, Department of
Economics, Business and Statistics,
University of Palermo, 90128 Palermo,
Viale Delle Scienze, Italy.
Email: salvatore.polizzi@unipa.it
Abstract
We investigate whether the regulatory improvements
made in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
have been effective in limiting bank downward
window dressing by means of repos in the United
States. We find that a strict application of the Basel III
regulation wipes out incentives to engage in window
dressing to bolster the level of leverage Tier 1 ratio at
quarter‐end. We also show that the persistency of
window dressing is related to the computation of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assessment
base, which motivates banks to engage in window
dressing to reduce the deposit insurance premium.
KEYWORDS
bank holding companies, deposit insurance premium, leverage
tier 1 ratio, repurchase agreements, window dressing
JEL CLASSIFICATION
G14, G21, G28, M41, M48
Eur Financ Manag. 2023;29:634–663.634
|
wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eufm
EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2022 The Authors. European Financial Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The authors are grateful John Doukas (the Editor), two anonymous referees, Danilo Conte, Philip Molyneux and
Costanza Rodriguez d'Acri for their valuable comments. This paper has won the second ADEIMF 2021 best paper
award at the ADEIMF Conference held in Palermo (Italy). All remaining errors are our responsibility. Open Access
Funding provided by Universita degli Studi di Palermo within the CRUI‐CARE Agreement.
1|INTRODUCTION
The issue of bank window dressing has been under the spotlight from both regulators and
academics as it affects the reliability, quality and transparency of financial and regulatory
reporting. Window dressing has been defined variously in the banking literature, but in
principle, it involves the use of short‐term financial transactions to manipulate accounting
numbers around the quarter‐end reporting date (Allen & Saunders, 1992). It is a practice ‘in
which financial institutions adjust their activity around an anticipated period of oversight or
public disclosure to appear safer or more profitable to outside monitors’(Munyan, 2017, p. 1).
1
Opaque financial information can undermine the ability of investors to make rational and
optimal economic decisions (Chen et al., 2016; Lamoreaux et al., 2019). In addition, financial
statement figures are used by regulators and supervisors for various reasons. For instance, this
information may be used to set and monitor regulators' and supervisors' policies, as a basis to
compute regulatory capital requirements or deposit insurance premiums and to define
corrective supervisory actions (Whalen, 2011; Kreicher et al., 2013). However, window dressing
may compromise the effectiveness of such measures (Bushman & Williams, 2012). In this
regard, the Bank for International Settlement (BIS, 2018, p. 1) stated that ‘window‐dressing by
banks is unacceptable as it undermines the intended policy objectives […] disrupting the
operations of financial markets’.
Repo markets offer banks various opportunities to engage in window dressing and,
specifically, in downward window dressing. Window dressing can be detected when there is a
trend difference of a financial variable that can be either upward or downward (depending on
banks' incentives) between its value at the quarter‐end of a reporting date and its value
registered during the quarter. Specifically, upward (downward) window dressing refers to the
action oriented to increase (decrease) a balance sheet indicator level near the quarter‐end
reporting period.
2
As a form of collateralized borrowing, repos permit banks to borrow short‐
term funding against some of their assets, thereby temporarily expanding their balance sheet.
The cash received can be lent via reverse repos and the newly acquired collaterals be used for
further borrowing. At the end of the quarter, banks can reverse the balance sheet expansion by
closing part of their reverse repo positions and using the cash received to repay repos. This
shrinks total assets and boosts the reported level of capital ratio (Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision, 2008).
3
In this paper, using a hand‐collected data set of 70 large U.S. BHCs over 2011Q2–2016Q1
taken from the FR Y‐9C Call Report, we analyze window dressing practices of U.S. BHCs.
Employing panel fixed effect regressions, we estimate the extent of window‐dressing by using
the measure proposed by Owens and Wu (2015). This measure compares the average of the
current and prior quarter‐end values of repos and federal funds with their average values
measured throughout the quarter. Our aim is threefold. First, we test whether, before the
enforcement of Basel III regulation in 2013, U.S. BHCs engaged in downward window dressing
1
For alternative definitions of window dressing, see Feltham and Xie (1994).
2
In this paper, we refer to the term ‘window dressing’to describe the general problem owed to accounting
manipulation, but we use the term ‘downward window dressing’to define the behaviour of reducing the amount of
repos at quarter‐end (in comparison to the amount registered during the quarter) to avoid the regulatory compliance
burden.
3
The reported level of capital ratios increases as repo transactions are collateralized, thus receiving very low weights.
However, the overall amount of repo transactions is included in the denominator of the capital ratio.
JAAFAR ET AL.EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
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