Prioritizing beliefs and the formation of expectations
Published date | 01 December 2023 |
Author | Timo Ehrig |
Date | 01 December 2023 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/emre.12602 |
SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE
Prioritizing beliefs and the formation of expectations
Timo Ehrig
Université libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels
School of Economics and Management,
Brussels, Belgium
Correspondence
Timo Ehrig, Université libre de Bruxelles,
Solvay Brussels School of Economics and
Management, Av. Franklin Roosevelt 42, 1050
Brussels, Belgium.
Email: timo.ehrig@ulb.be
Abstract
How do expectations for novel opportunities—like Amazon from the perspective
of 1998—come about? To form such expectations, decision-makers need to derive
plausible conclusions that go beyond the available information by interpreting it
with the help of theories. I explain why asymmetric expectations among rational
individuals can exist, even when information is symmetric: Differences in the will-
ingness to question of (defined as “a preference ordering over”) elementary theo-
retical explanations of the novelty bring about heterogeneity in final expectations.
I further argue that one source of better expectations is the skill to choose the rela-
tive willingness to question beliefs and thus the skill to integrate theories. I iden-
tify the skills of decision-makers to detect and resolve inconsistencies and to
decide when to give up beliefs again as sources of advantages in forming
expectations.
KEYWORDS
belief revision, contradictions, expectations, novel opportunities, theory-based view
INTRODUCTION
How individuals form expectations, and if they can form
expectations that allow them to acquire resources at
prices below their rent-generating potential, are two cen-
tral questions underlying the explanation of the origins of
competitive advantages. The currently emerging theory-
based view (TBV) of strategy (Felin & Zenger, 2009,
2017; Ehrig & Schmidt, 2022a) explains heterogeneous
expectations by differences in visions, intentions, or sim-
ply theoretical assumptions used to evaluate information.
In the perspective of the TBV, differences in expectations
can be explained, even if we assume equal intuitive statis-
tical skills, equal skill in analogical transfer, and equal
access to factual information among all involved
decision-makers. They are explained by different
theories—imagined causal models of how and why a
novel opportunity may become viable. Accepting this
proposition about the origin of heterogeneity, the ques-
tion then is which reasoning skills are conducive to better
expectation formation. Here, “reasoning skill”cannot be
reduced to intuitive statistic inference and analogical
transfer. Rather, we need insights into how basic con-
cepts proposed by the TBV, like belief revision (Ehrig &
Foss, 2022; Ehrig & Schmidt, 2022b; Zellweger &
Zenger, 2023), relate to psychological processes, what
exactly augments or even replaces Bayesianism as a
normative ideal, and if reasoning skills can be improved
by learning prescriptive reasoning procedures that are tai-
lored to thinking in theories. Is there a “rational”founda-
tion of the TBV beyond Bayesianism (Grandori, 2010)?
To make progress in answering these questions, this
paper explores rational components of theory-based rea-
soning, a line of thought that arguably started with Felin
and Zenger (2009). I argue that if strategists think in the-
ories, they will necessarily need to resolve contradictions.
Resolving contradictions requires strategists to let go of
beliefs, while these beliefs may have originated in experi-
ence and/or imagination. As such, the process of resolv-
ing contradictions is an inescapable part of strategic
reasoning and how it is handled can make a key differ-
ence for arriving at superior expectations. The skill to
resolve contradictions is very different from accumulating
factual information and processing it. As I shall discuss,
key to this skill is the ability of the strategist to wisely
decide which beliefs he/she should let go first—the skill to
order beliefs by the willingness to question them (Ehrig &
Schmidt, 2022a). Extending prior results, I discuss the
psychological origins of this skill and how it relates to the
skill of forming a coherent logical subjective theory of a
novel opportunity while being exposed to a debate in
which contradictory fragments of theories about the
novel opportunity are proposed. I ground this discussion
by proposing a belief revision procedure that decision-
DOI: 10.1111/emre.12602
European Management Review. 2023;20:651–664. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/emre © 2024 European Academy of Management (EURAM). 651
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