Settling down: T+2 settlement cycle and liquidity

Published date01 November 2022
AuthorAhmed Baig,Stephen Breeze,Justin Cox,Todd Griffith
Date01 November 2022
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12344
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12344
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Settling down: T+2 settlement cycle and
liquidity
Ahmed Baig
1
|Stephen Breeze
2
|Justin Cox
3
|Todd Griffith
4
1
Department of Finance, College of
Business and Economics, Boise State
University, Boise, Idaho, USA
2
Master of Data Analytics Program, Jon
M. Huntsman School of Business, Utah
State University, Logan, Utah, USA
3
Department of Finance, Banking, and
Insurance, Walker College of Business,
Appalachian State University, Boone,
North Carolina, USA
4
Department of Economics and Finance,
Jon M. Huntsman School of Business,
Utah State University, Logan, Utah, USA
Correspondence
Todd Griffith, Department of Economics
and Finance, Jon M. Huntsman School of
Business, Utah State University, 3565 Old
Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322, USA.
Email: todd.griffith@usu.edu
Abstract
We examine the effects of a shortened settlement
cycle on liquidity. Our differenceindifference re-
sults show that securities listed on US stock ex-
changes become more liquid, relative to similarly
matched securities listed on the London Stock Ex-
change, after the standard settlement cycle in the
United States was reduced from T+3 to T+2. These
results hold across various lowand highfrequency
measures of liquidity and empirical model specifi-
cations. Furthermore, we find that securities that
are more difficulttoborrow experience the greatest
gains in liquidity. Our findings might provide in-
sights to regulators and exchange officials con-
sidering the adoption of a shortened settlement
cycle.
KEYWORDS
borrowing constraints, failurestodeliver, liquidity, trade
settlement
JEL CLASSIFICATION
D47, G10, G14, G20
Eur Financ Manag. 2022;28:12601282.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eufm1260
|
© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
We would like to thank the anonymous referee, Editor John Doukas, and The Center for Growth and Opportunity for
their valuable comments and suggestions, which have substantially improved the quality of this paper. The authors are
listed in alphabetical order.
1|INTRODUCTION
In financial markets, settlement refers to the seller's obligation to produce a certificate and
executed sharetransfer form to exchange with the buyer for a corresponding payment.
1
The
settlement cycle, or period, is the time between the transaction date and the settlement date.
2
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) dictates the allowable time within which to
settle a transaction in US financial markets. The settlement cycle is widely referred to as T+x,
representing the trade date (T) plus the number of business days (x). For most of the 20th
century, securities markets in the United States had a T+5 settlement timeframe. In 1995, the
SEC approved the move a T+3 settlement period, which lasted for over two decades. However,
the global creditandliquidity crisis of the late 2000s led the SEC and the Depository Trust and
Clearing Corporation (DTCC) to revisit the risks and costs associated with a prolonged set-
tlement cycle. On 5 September 2017, the SEC adopted Rule 15c61(a), which shortened the
standard settlement cycle for nearly all brokerdealer equity transactions from T+3 to T+2.
In this paper, we examine the effects of a shortened standard settlement cycle on firmlevel
liquidity. Most equity security transactions involve the services of specialized financial inter-
mediaries, such as brokerdealers or centralcounterparty members. These intermediaries essen-
tially conduct a twosided auction, as they stand ready to trade on the buy (long) or sell (short) side
of the market (O'Hara & Oldfield, 1986). Facilitating such trade requires capital.
3
When inter-
mediaries buy a security, they can service the trade using their own capital or borrow in the lending
market using the security as collateral. However, intermediaries cannot borrow the entire value of
the position. The difference between the security's value and collateral value, also known as
margin, must be financed with the intermediaries' own capital. Similarly, when intermediaries sell
a security, they can float the transaction with their own inventory or short sell by borrowing the
shares. Short selling, however, requires capital in the form of margin; it does not free up capital.
Since intermediaries do not typically carry large long positions in inventory, they must sell short to
meet sudden buying demands of market participants. Thus, financial intermediaries can face
borrowing constraints on both long and short positions.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) construct a theoretical model that links an asset's
market liquidity to intermediaries' funding constraints. The authors argue that the ease with
which funding can be obtained by traders affects market liquidity. If funding is tight, inter-
mediaries become reluctant to take on positions in highmargin securities, and as a result,
market depth declines for those securities. Furthermore, an intermediary's risk from holding a
security is a determinant of the bidask spread (Branch & Freed, 1977; Hamilton, 1978;
Tinic, 1972; Tinic & West, 1972; Stoll, 1978), which measures the size of the transaction cost. A
natural hedge for intermediaries is to incorporate the costs associated with default and in-
ventory risks into transaction fees (Glosten & Harris, 1988; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985;
Stoll, 1989).
4
Based on these arguments, we contend that the economic avenue through which
the settlement cycle affects security liquidity is the intermediaries' financing constraints.
1
Settlement cycles have evolved from delivering physical security certificates to delivering electronic sharetransfer
forms via an electronic settlement system. Clearing a transaction occurs between the trade date and settlement date,
which involves any modifications needed to facilitate settlement.
2
The transaction date marks the date that the buyer and seller agree to trade, whereas the settlement date marks the
date the seller delivers the security's certificate and the buyer transfers the appropriate funds.
3
https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72499/broy1.htm.
4
ComertonForde et al. (2010) argue that when intermediaries hold large positions or lose money, they widen the
spread between their quoted bid and ask prices.
BAIG ET AL.EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
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1261

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