The Bright Side of Discretionary Accruals: Evidence from Finance and Innovation

AuthorKeming Li,(Grace) Qing Hao
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12068
Published date01 September 2016
Date01 September 2016
The Bright Side of Discretionary
Accruals: Evidence from Finance and
Innovation
(Grace) Qing Hao
College of Business, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
E-mail: Qhao@uta.edu
Keming Li
Department of Accounting, Computing and Finance, Texas A&M University-San Antonio, USA
E-mail: keming_li@hotmail.com
ABSTRACT
We nd cross-sectional evidence that a nancially constrained rm with
patentable innovation opportunities can use discretionary accruals to reveal
information about the rms prospects and facilitate its nancing activities.
Specically, using rms with patents in the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) patent database, we nd that among nancially constrained rms, higher
discretionary accruals are associated with more capital being raised, greater
research and development (R&D) expenditures, more patents, more patent
citations, and better operating performance in the future. These positive
relationships are driven by rms that raise equity capital, especially those that
raise equity capital from employees.
Keywords: discretionary accruals, innovation, research and development (R& D),
patent, financial constraint, equity financing
JEL classification: G30, G32, M41
The authors are grateful to three anonymous referees, John Doukas (the Editor), Jay Ritter
and Dave Diltz for helpful comments and suggestions. The authors also thank Wendy
Jennings for editorial assistance. Grace Hao would like to acknowledge financial support
from the College of Business Administration at the University of Texas at Arlington.
European Financial Management, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2016, 540575
doi: 10.1111/eufm.12068
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1. Introduction
The earnings management literature nds that managers use discretionary accruals
opportunistically in various contexts.
1
In contrast, empirical evidence is relatively scant
regarding managersuse of discretionary accruals to reveal information about a rms
prospects and the reduction of information asymmetry between managers and investors.
2
A notable exception is the study by Linck, Netter and Shu (2013, LNS hereafter), who
nd that among nancially constrained rms with investment opportunities,
discretionary accruals prior to their investments in tangible assets are informative
instead of manipulative.
However, no study has demonstrated that the ndings in LNS can be generalised to
investments in intangible assets, such as research and development (R&D). This is an
important issue as innovation can bring rapid change and growth to economies, and it has
long been recognised as an important driver of economic growth. Given the increasingly
important role of R&D (e.g., Chan et al., 2001), it is important to determine whether
managers of innovative, nancially constrained rms are able to use positive
discretionary accruals to signal good prospects. Prior research indicates that interpreting
rm performance from reported earnings is more difcult for R&D-intensive rms (Joos
and Plesko, 2005; Franzen et al., 2007), as R&D has higher levels of information
asymmetry due to the intangible and long-term nature of the projects. Therefore, we
expect that managers of innovative, nancially constrained rms have a greater incentive
to send out signals of growth prospects. One possible mechanism of signaling is
discretionary accruals.
Using a panel of rms that have patents in the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) patent database, we examine the information content of past performance
matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) among nancially constrained
rms with patentable innovation opportunities. We have several ndings. First,
nancially constrained rms with innovation opportunities have signicantly higher
discretionary accruals than unconstrained rms. In addition, among nancially
constrained rms with innovation opportunities, the level of discretionary accruals is
positively related to future external nancing, R&D investments, the number of patents,
the number of patent citations, and operating performance. In contrast, we do not nd
1
When managers use their discretion to mislead investors, discretionary accruals are
regarded as opportunistic. Studies have found evidence of opportunistic earnings
management around the following corporate events: initial public offerings (Aharoney
et al., 1993; Teoh et al., 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a), seasoned equity offerings (Teoh et al.,
1998b; Rangan, 1998), share repurchases (Gong et al., 2008), stock-for-stock mergers
(Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004), management buyouts (Perry and Williams, 1994),
reverse leveraged buyouts (Chou et al., 2006), and when earnings would fall short of
expected dividend thresholds (Daniel et al., 2008).
2
We are only aware of a few empirical studies nding that discretionary accruals reect
economic value instead of being opportunistic and value irrelevant, for example,
Subramanyam (1996), Louis and Robinson (2005), and Linck et al. (2013). However, a
number of theoretical studies, such as Chaney and Lewis (1995), Guay et al. (1996), Demski
(1998), and Arya et al. (2003), suggest that rms can use discretionary accruals to make their
earnings more informative than cash ows.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The Bright Side of Discretionary Accruals 541
such positive relationships among unconstrained rms. More importantly, we further
determine that the positive relationships between discretionary accruals and future
innovation activities are driven by constrained rms that raise equity capital, especially
from employees. The results are robust to controlling for rm characteristics such as size,
asset growth, protability, cash ow volatility and institutional ownership, as well as
endogeneity. The ndings suggest that discretionary accruals not only are informative
about rmsfundamentals, but also play an important role in facilitating rmscapital
raising activities and growth.
At rst glance, our nding of a positive association between discretionary accruals and
future innovation activities may seem to be at odds with the existing ndings in the
literature that the use of discretionary accruals prior to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)
tend to be manipulative and opportunistic (Teoh et al., 1998b; Rangan, 1998). However,
two important differences between our study and the studies on SEOs help to reconcile
the seemingly conicting ndings. First, a signicant portion of the equity issuance
proceeds in our sample are not raised through the type of equity issuance examined in the
SEO literature. Since 1996 is the starting year for mandatory electronic lings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), we examine a subsample of nancially
constrained rms that went public since 1996. Among these rms, we hand check the
SEC lings by those that issue equity. We nd that in 97.36% of the cases, the rm issues
equity to their employees in employee benet plans (SEC S-8 form). While SEOs seek to
raise equity capital from outside investors, equity issuance to employees is supposed to
retain and incentivise employees in addition to raising capital. We argue that rms have
no incentive to manage their earnings upward opportunistically before this type of equity
issuance and will discuss this in more detail later. Consequently, discretionary accruals
prior to this type of equity issuance are more likely to be truthful and informative
regarding the rmsgrowth prospects.
The second difference between our study and the studies on SEOs focuses on
nancially constrained rms with patentable innovation opportunities. Studies on
earnings management prior to SEOs typically examine all rms, regardless of whether
they are nancially constrained rms, R&D-intensive rms, or whether the rm has
patentable innovation opportunities. It is possible that the rms in our sample use
discretionary accruals differently than other rms, which contributes to the different
ndings. For example, nancially constrained technology companies may be more likely
to use their own stocks to compensate and incentivise their employees, which, as
discussed previously, can have important implications for the information content of
their discretionary accruals.
3
Our study makes three contributions. First, our study contributes to the literature on
nance and innovation (e.g., Brown et al., 2009; Hall and Lerner, 2010; Hsu et al., 2014),
and more broadly the literature on nance and economic growth (e.g., Levine, 2005).
Given the critical value of innovation and the negative effect of nancial constraints on
3
Another potential explanation is mentioned by He and Tian (2013). A major tool for real
earnings management is to cut R&D expenditures. However, real earnings management and
accrual-based earnings management are shown to be substitutes (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008). If
nancially constrained, R&D-intensive rms can use discretionary accruals to substitute the
need to cut R&D expenditures, then these rms may benet from higher discretionary
accruals.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
542 (Grace) Qing Hao and Keming Li

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