The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the european union and its field of application to the member states: some considerations as regards Italy

• Author: Angela Di Stasi
• Pages: 131-156

THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS FIELD

OF APPLICATION TO THE MEMBER STATES:

SOME CONSIDERATIONS AS REGARDS ITALY

Angela DI STASI

Full Professor of European Union Law and International Law

University of Salerno (Department of Legal Sciences)

Director of the Observatory on European Area of Freedom,

Security and Justice

Director of the Journal Freedom, Security & Justice:

European Legal Studies

SUMMARY: 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.—2. THE FIELD OF APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER

OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE MEMBER STATES.—3. THE

EXCLUSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU LAW IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT

OF JUSTICE. SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE MOST RECENT CASES AS REGARDS ARTICLE 51

PARA.1 OF THE CHARTER.—4. THE APPLICATION IN ITALY OF THE CHARTER: A DIFFICULT

«TEST» FOR THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE COURTS?—5. TOWARDS A NEW CONSTITU-

TIONAL «COMMUNITY PATH» TO RE-FOUND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The following paper aims to use the issue of the f‌ield of application of

the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter

denoted the Charter) as a privileged «observation point» to analyze the

subtle limit which separates the EU competences from one of its member

State (Italy).

It is well known that, by the creation f‌irst of the European Eco-

nomic Community and then of the European Union, member States

have experienced the transition from a state sovereignty which in the

classical constitutionalist doctrine of European States, «was consid-

ered one and indivisible within a European society characterized by

an institutional pluralism of sovereign and independent States», to a

sovereignty limited in the technical-legal meaning of the expression

«as being submitted to a double exercise of such sovereignty, one at a

132 ANGELA DI STASI

national level (uti singuli), and the other one at a community level (uti

socii o uti universi)» 1.

This phenomenon, which has found a strong support, at a constitu-

tional level, almost in all the Constitutional Charters of the European

countries, in the Italian Constitution, has had as a f‌irst consequence the

«extended» use of art. 11, in which the text concerning the «limitations

of sovereignty» has been «adapted» to the needs of European integration,

and then interpreted, in conjunction with the novated art. 117 f‌irst para-

graph, as referring to the exercise of legislative power (also) according to

the «obligations deriving from the EC legal order» 2.

The granting, devolution, delegation or conferral of the legislative, exe-

cutive or judicial powers (according to the expressions used in the differ-

ent Constitutions of the European countries) to the European Union for

the fulf‌illment of the integration purposes, however, was bound to show,

over the last years, elements questioning the whole of the already men-

tioned factors both inside and outside the EU 3.

In the classical conceptions of sovereignty, as it is well known, no ex-

ternal exercise of competences is provided, because the sovereign state

represents the unique point of reference of legal relations, either deriving

from the performance of the internal competences and of the internation-

al ones 4.

Now, bearing in mind that the sovereignty (as summa potestas, to

quote Bodin) 5 implies a character of totality and absoluteness of the le-

gal order, it is diff‌icult to assume that it can be divided, a concept that is

conf‌licting with its logic structure 6. The delicate relationship sovereign-

ty-competences has been often represented as a «zero sum game», insofar

as the growth of the powers of the Community/European Union causes

1 Our translation from M. PANEBIANCO and A. DI STASI (eds.), L’Euro-G8. Contributo alla teoria

dello stato euro-globale, Torino, 2006, pp. 15 and 17.

2 See in particular, the judgment of the Constitutional Court, judgment no. 129/2006, f‌iled

on 28th March 2006. See for all, U. VILLANI, Limitazioni di sovranità, «controlimiti» e diritti fon-

damentali nella Costituzione italiana, in Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2017, no. 3, pp. 489-514.

3 In the Constitución espanola (art. 93) it is provided, as fundamental principle for the par-

ticipation in the European Union, that: «Mediante la ley orgánica se podrá autorizar la celebración

de tratados por los que se atribuya a una organización o institución internacional el ejercicio de

competencias derivadas de la Constitución. Corresponde a las Cortes Generales o al Gobierno,

según los casos, la garantía del cumplimiento de estos tratados y de las resoluciones emanadas de

los órganos internacionales o supranacionales titulares de la cesión» (emphasis added). Article 2

of the Fundamental Law 1/2008 states that Spanish rules relating to the fundamental rights and

liberties recognised by the Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Charter of

Fundamental Rights of the European Union. See S. RIPOL CARULLA, «The Charter of Fundamental

Rights of the European Union in the Spanish Off‌icial Journal-BOE», in Revista de Derecho Co-

munitario Europeo, no. 34, 2010, pp. 845-864.

4 See K. MILLS, «Reconstructing Sovereignty: A Human Rights Perspective», in Netherland

Quarterly of Human Rights, no. 3, 1997, pp. 267-290.

5 J. BODIN, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, transla-

tion by J. H. Franklin, Cambridge, 1993.

6 See B. DE WITTE, Sovereignty and European Integration. The Weight of Legal Tradition, in

Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, no. 1, 1995, pp. 145-173.