The influence of cultural tightness–looseness, religiosity, and the institutional environment on tax evasion behaviour: A cross‐country study
| Published date | 01 January 2024 |
| Author | Hakim Ben Othman,Khaled Hussainey,Nejia Moumen |
| Date | 01 January 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12420 |
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12420
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The influence of cultural tightness–looseness,
religiosity, and the institutional environment
on tax evasion behaviour: A cross‐country
study
Hakim Ben Othman
1
|Khaled Hussainey
2
|Nejia Moumen
3
1
Department of Finance, Accounting,
Control and Audit, ICN Business School
and CEREFIGE‐Université de Lorraine,
Nancy, Grand Est, France
2
Faculty of Business and Law, University
of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK
3
Department of Business Administration,
Tunis Business School, University of
Tunis and Interdisciplinary Laboratory in
Management University—Entreprise
(LIGUE), University of Manouba,
Manouba, Tunisia
Correspondence
Hakim Ben Othman, Department of
Finance, Accounting, Control and Audit,
ICN Business School, CEREFIGE,
Université de Lorraine, F‐54000 Nancy,
France.
Email: hakim.benothman@icn-
artem.com
Abstract
We examine whether the strength of norms and
tolerance for deviations play a role in explaining
cross‐country differences in tax evasion (TEVA). We
also investigate the effects of religiosity, legal enforce-
ment, voice and accountability, and the stability of
political systems on TEVA across 48 countries over the
period 1997–2018. Results show that the higher the
voice and accountability and the lower the degree of
cultural tightness–looseness, the rule of law, and
political stability, the higher the degree of TEVA across
nations. The results are important for policymakers to
assess the likelihood of TEVA from a holistic
perspective.
KEYWORDS
cross‐country study, cultural tightness–looseness, political
stability, religiosity, rule of law, tax evasion, voice and
accountability
JEL CLASSIFICATION
H26, M14, M48, Z1, Z12
Eur Financ Manag. 2024;30:346–374.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/eufm346
|
© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
We are grateful to the editor (John A. Doukas) and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions that
have helped to improve the quality of the paper. We thank Dr. Kais Baatour, member of the Institute for Globally
Distributed Open Research and Education (IGDORE, Sweden) and the Business Analytics and Decision Making
Laboratory (BADEM), Tunis Business School, University of Tunis & University of Kairouan for his support in providing
the database on cultural tightness–looseness and suggesting the relevant references on the cultural dimension and
religiosity to outline the theoretical background of the study. All errors or omissions are our responsibility.
1|INTRODUCTION
Tax evasion (TEVA) has been one of the major concerns for national authorities throughout the
world.Theneedforinformationaboutthesizeoftheshadoweconomy,
1
as a core assessment of
TEVA, are warranted by its economic and political relevance. According to Petersen et al. (2010),
production activities within the shadow economy are to some extent associated with financial crimes
such as TEVA or transfer fraud. In fact, given its unobservable feature, the shadow economy is not
subject to national accounting and does not usually belong to the direct and indirect tax bases. If
economic agent activities are shifted from the public authorities' scrutiny to the shadow economy,
observable market income also switches into unobservable shadow income, and as it is the tax and
social security contribution bases are reduced—TEVA is henceforth taking place.
Medina and Schneider (2018)'s estimates of the shadow economy showed huge variability
among countries while reaching a remarkably large size with an average value of 31.9% of the
GDP. The largest ones are Zimbabwe and Bolivia with more than 60% of the GDP (60.6% and
62.3%, respectively). The lowest ones are Austria and Switzerland with less than 9 (8.9% and
7.2%, respectively). Segregated by regions, nations belonging to the Organization for Economic
Co‐operation and Development (OECD) are by far the lowest with values below 20%. The Latin
American and Sub‐Saharan African nations are the highest with average values above 35%.
Given these variations among nations, it is essential to understand why some nations display
higher levels of TEVA compared to others. Various studies suggest that many reasons could explain
taxpayers' attitudes toward enacted tax rules, yet not all taxpayers are influenced similarly by these
reasons. Besides some economic rationality that can shape TEVA decisions, it is argued that other
metrics like economic structure, law enforcement, culture, and tax morale are likely to impact tax
evasive behaviour. They may even explain why compliance rates are remarkably high in many
nations (Brink & Porcano, 2016). Richardson (2006) identified three major groups of factors that
influence the likelihood of TEVA, namely attitudinal (e.g., perceived burden), demographic (e.g., firm
size, ownership), and institutional (e.g., legal enforcement) factors.
Assessments of national culture's consequences for TEVA are by far seldom. Despite some efforts
in examining how major cultural dimensions (mainly Hofstede, 1981) predict TEVA (e.g., Ermasova
et al., 2019;Gabor,2012;Mohdalietal.,2017;Richardson,2006,2008;Tsakumisetal.,2007), no study
—to the best of our knowledge—considers the effects of tightness–looseness aspect of culture while
controlling simultaneously for attitudinal, economic, institutional, and political factors of TEVA. On
the one hand, Gelfand et al. (2006)arguedthatcross‐cultural studies mostly rely on cultural
dimensions despite their weak theoretical foundation and their inconclusive empirical evidence.
Their common feature is the focus on individual attitudes as opposed to the rare emphasis on the role
of external norms in explaining cross‐country differences in social behaviour. New perspectives are
then needed to supplement this approach (Gelfand et al., 2006).
On the other hand, recent scandals of TEVA and financial reporting frauds (e.g., Panama
papers, Cum/ex trades in Germany, Guptas in South Africa) yielded important changes in the
regulations governing Accounting and corporate governance (TAX3
2
research committee,
2019). It generated a large debate about TEVA morale, the enforcement of tax rules, and how
the political environment may encourage or impede such behaviour. Recall that despite the
fundamental role of politics in shaping the fiscal policy of one country, the effects of political
1
Unreported income from the production of legal goods and services encompasses all economic activities that would generally be subject
to taxes, they reported to the tax agencies (Schneider & Buehn, 2017).
2
TAX3 is a special committee mandated by the European Parliament to investigate financial crimes, TEVA and tax avoidance.
BEN OTHMAN ET AL.EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
|
347
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