The Religious Foundations of the European Crisis

• Published date: 01 March 2019
• Author: Josef Hien
• Date: 01 March 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12635

The Religious Foundations of the European Crisis*

JOSEF HIEN

1,2

1

University of Milan

2

WZB Berlin

Abstract

There has been much talk about ordoliberalism recently. Scholars and the press identify it as the

dominant economic instruction sheet for Germany’s European crisis politics. However, by

analyzing ordoliberalism only as an economic theory, the debate downplays that ordoliberalism

is also an ethical theory, with strong roots in Protestant social thought. It is this rooting in Protes-

tant social thought that makes Ordoliberalism incompatible with the socioeconomic ethics of most

of the European crisis countries, whose ethics originate in Catholic and Orthodox social thought.

This divergence is the source of a crisis of understanding between European nations and hinders a

collective response to the Euro crisis.

Keywords: religion; ordoliberalism; European integration

1.The Ordoliberalization of Europe

Ordoliberalism, a socio-economic theory originating in the Weimar crisis and for decades

only known to a handful of insiders on the international scene has become hotly debated

since the European crisis unfolded in 2010.

Mark Blyth assesses that ‘Germany’s response to the crisis, and the crisis itself both

spring from the same ordoliberal instruction sheet’(Blyth, 2013, p. 141). Hillebrand

comments that ‘Germany’s crisis policy [...] appears rational from an ordoliberal

perspective’(Hillebrand, 2015, p. 6). Nedergard and Snaith argue that ‘one crucial conse-

quence has been a strengthening of the ordoliberal governance in the European Union’

(Nedergaard and Snaith 2015) and Bulmer concludes that ‘ordo-liberalism has trumped

pro-europeanism’in Germany (Bulmer, 2014, p. 1244). Not only the austerity measures

implemented under German leadership, like the f‌iscal compact or the conditionality of

the loan facilities, are attributed to ordoliberal ideas but the entire setup of the currency

union. The independence of the European central bank, the def‌icit criteria and the absence

of economic government are interpreted as an ‘ordoliberalization’(Biebricher, 2014) of

Europe. Streeck claims that ‘European money, as conceived in the treaties’is ‘ordoliberal

and neoliberal money’(Streeck, 2015, p. 365) and Habermas adds that the economic and

* I would like to thank three anonymous referees and the editors of JCMS for their challenging and encouraging comments.

I also want to thank Maurizio Ferrera, Elin Hellquist, Piero Tortola, Claudia Ritzi, Wolfgang Merkel, Christian Joerges and

Dieter Plewhe for their suggestions. Finally I am grateful for comments from the participants of the work in progress

seminar of the democracy and democratization department of the WZB in Berlin, the seminar series organized by

Matthias Kortmann at the University of Munich, the audience and panel at EUACES in Bilbao and all participants of the

meetings of the REScEU team at the University of Milan. The article has been written within the framework of the

REScEU project (REScEU: Reconciling Economic and Social Europe: the role of ideas, values and politics) hosted by

the University of Milan and f‌inanced by the European Research Council (grant no. 340534). During most of the writing

time I have been guest at the WZB. For the generous hospitality, my desk and the access to the superb research

resources of the WZB I want to thank Wolfgang Merkel and Bernhard Weßels.

JCMS 2019 Volume 57. Number 2. pp. 185–204DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12635

© 2017 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

monetary union took shape ‘in accordance with the ordoliberal ideas of the stability and

growth pact’(Habermas, 2013, p. 5).

The debate on ordoliberalism differs from the usual ‘EU as a neo-liberal construct’

(Caporaso and Tarrow, 2009; Höpner and Schäfer, 2012) debate since its inf‌luence is

seen as closely intertwined with the ascendance of German power in Europe.

Ordoliberalism emerged in parallel to several other neo-movements in the crisis prone

interwar years in continental Europe. It differs from other neo-liberalisms in its skep-

ticism towards the self-regulation of markets. For ordoliberals, free market competition

can only be guaranteed through a strong state enforcing a set of rules and regulations,

an economic constitution, that prohibits the concentration of economic power in cartels

and monopolies but otherwise restrains the state from intervening in the economy.

During the past century ordoliberalism has become part of Germany’s ideational and

cultural collective memory. During the recent crisis German cultural institutions like

the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung have repeatedly defended ordoliberalism from

accusations to being the outcome of ‘whacky economics of Germany’s parallel

universe’(FAZ, 2013; Financial Times, 2014). Ordoliberalism is more ‘rules bent’

than its Anglo-Saxon neoliberal counterparts and in this insistence on rules and condi-

tionality commentators see the overlap with Germany’s approach to the European cri-

sis. Former Greek f‌inance minister Gianni Varoufakis blamed the German position

partly on wrongly guided ‘ordo-libertarians in Berlin, in Frankfurt, in Brussels’

(Varoufakis, 2013, p. 10). Ordoliberals themselves are more skeptical about their inf‌lu-

ence and think that ‘Germany may have followed ordoliberal thinking rather too little

than too much’during the crisis (Feld et al., 2015, p. 18).

The above cited discussion on ordoliberalism and its inf‌luence on German Euro policy

focuses on the institutional provisions of ordoliberalism and how they were implemented

(or not) in the European Union. Thereby, the debate sidelines the fact that ordoliberalism

was developed as an encompassing social theory with strong ethical propositions. This ar-

ticle concentrates on that omitted aspect. The central argument is that ordoliberal ethics

are rooted in German Protestant social thought. The cultural rooting of ordoliberalism

in German Protestantism creates strong irritations in countries that do not share the same

heritage. These are the crisis countries, culturally inf‌luenced by Catholicism and Ortho-

dox Christianity.

The contribution does not only aim at enhancing our understanding of ordoliberalism,

but also connects to a growing debate about the role of religion in European integration

(Foret, 2015; McCrea, 2010; Leu tean, 2014). The use of ordoliberal arguments with their

Protestant value base has reinforced the reference to religion as a marker of cultural supe-

riority in the European South to fend off German demands. It shows that the Christian

heritage of the continent, often heralded as a unifying element, can become a dividing

force during times of crisis.

The remainder of this article is divided into f‌ive sections. The f‌irst section lays out

the argument and research design. The second section analyzes the historical constitu-

tion of ordoliberalism as a German Protestant theory. The third part looks at how reli-

gious ethics feature in ordoliberal discourse of German policy-makers during the crisis.

The fourth part analyzes the reactions to these discourses by elites in Italy and Greece

with a special focus on their use of Catholic and Orthodox concepts. The f‌ifth part

concludes.

Josef Hien186

© 2017 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd