To Bribe or Not to Bribe? Determinants in the Indian Context

AuthorSubodh P. Kulkarni,Amit Gupta,Nagarajan Ramamoorthy
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/emre.12053
Published date01 December 2015
Date01 December 2015
To Bribe or Not to Bribe? Determinants in
the Indian Context
Nagarajan Ramamoorthy1,Subodh P. Kulkarni2, and Amit Gupta3
1School of Business Administration, University of Houston-Victoria, Sugar Land, TX, USA
2School of Business, Howard University, Washington, DC, USA
3Management Consultant, New Delhi, India
In the present study, using a sample of 113 MBA students from a premier management institute in India, we
examined the influences on the propensity to bribe. As hypothesized, the results of the logistic regression model
indicated that individuals’ perception of distributive injustice in their organization resulted in an increased
propensity to bribe. Contrary to our hypothesis, individuals’ perception of procedural fairness increased the
probability of propensity to bribe.Additionally, the hypothesis that the propensity to bribe would increase when the
financial benefits accrue to the individual rather than the organization and its members received marginalsupport.
The results also showed that the propensity to bribe increased when the bribe-giver had greater concern for the
employees of the organization; and the propensity to bribe decreased when the bribe-giver exhibited greater
concern for customers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our study for research and practice.
Keywords: bribe; organizational justice; distributive justice; procedural justice; equity theory; stakeholders;
bribery
Introduction
Bribery is a significant economic and ethical concern
almost all over the world. Bribery has been defined as ‘a
payment or other favors to induce others to act in favor
of the bribe givers’ (Shahabuddin, 2002, p. 366). Smith
(2010, p. 441) defines bribery as ‘to privilege decisions
in favor of one actor, or to evade the principle that
procedures be neutral between competing firms, appli-
cants, and others.’Although bribery and corruption have
been used interchangeably in the literature, the former
refers to actions or behaviors from the perspective of the
individual giving a bribe, while the latter refers to
actions or behaviors from the perspective of the individ-
ual receiving the bribe (Moore, 2008). In this paper, we
use the term bribery as the propensity of an individual to
engage in an act of giving a bribe to another individual or
organization in order for the receiver of the bribe to act
in a manner that benefits the individual or the indivi-
dual’s (bribe giver’s) organization.
Regardless of the distinction, bribery and corruption
have economic consequences not just for nations but
also for firms and the ultimately consumers. Bribery and
corruption increase the cost of doing business by
increasing the costs of goods and services that ultimately
get passed on to consumers (Wu, 2009). Studies show
that it adds about 5% to the costs of doing business in
Asian countries including an increase in the risk
premium (Kraar, 1995). Bribery is of great economic
significance, especially in developing countries such as
India. According to Transparency International’s Cor-
ruption Perception Index, India is ranked 85th out of 175
countries in 2014 with at least 55% of Indians having
experienced bribery in some form.
Furthermore, bribery also involves significant ethical
decision making (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Trevino
and Youngblood, 1990). Consistent with the views of
Trevino (1986), we argue that the decision to bribe poses
an ethical dilemma for individuals where various value
systems are at conflict. In particular, we argue that indi-
viduals may confront three types of value conflicts while
engaging in bribery: (1) the conflict between self-
interest seeking and the maximization of owners’ inter-
ests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989);
(2) the conflict between the pursuit of economic perfor-
mance and well-being of the organization and its
Correspondence: Nagarajan Ramamoorthy, School of Business Admin-
istration, University of Houston-Victoria,14000 University Blvd., Sugar
Land, TX 77479, USA. Tel: +1-281-275-8857. E-mail: drnags@yahoo
.com
European Management Review, Vol. 12, 247–259 (2015)
DOI: 10.1111/emre.12053
© 2015 European Academy of Management

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