Trade Timing, Price Volatility and Serial Correlation

AuthorMing‐Chang Wang,Lon‐Ping Zu
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2011.00614.x
Published date01 November 2013
Date01 November 2013
European Financial Management, Vol. 19, No. 5, 2013, 911–934
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2011.00614.x
© 2011 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
j
Trade Timing, Price Volatility
and Serial Correlation
Ming-Chang Wang
Department of Business Administration, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan
E-mail: mcwang@ccu.edu.tw
Lon-Ping Zu
Department of Finance and Banking, Shih Chien University, Taiwan
E-mail: zu9876@pchome.com.tw
Abstract
This study sets up a multiple-period, competitive rational expectations model
to facilitate an examination into how informed traders time their trading on
private information so as to maximise their expected utility. We find that, in
equilibrium, informed traders may elect to tradelate on their information, a result
which contradicts other competitive rational expectations models in which it is
generally assumed that informed traders will trade immediately upon receiving
private information. Our results imply that price volatility will increase and
price changes may display positive serial correlation. This phenomenon helps to
explain the excess volatility puzzle of asset prices and medium-term continuations
(momentum).
Keywords: asymmetric information;informed trading;price volatility;rational
expectations model;serial correlation;trade timing
JEL classification: G11; G12; G14.
1. Introduction
The past three decades have witnessed persuasive empirical evidence challenging the
traditional view that securities are rationally priced to reflect all publicly-available
information; of the various issues raised in the recent literature, two anomalies are
discussed here. The first of these is the ‘excess return volatility puzzle’ reported by
Shiller (1981), which posits that stock market prices are far more volatile than could ever
be justified by a simple model in which prices are assumed to be equal to the expected net
present value (NPV) of future dividends. The second issue is the ‘momentum anomaly’
Weare greatly indebted to the anonymous referee for the helpful commends and suggestions.
This work has been supported by National Science Council, R.O.C., under Grant NSC99-
2410-H-158-004. Correspondence: Ming-Chang Wang.
© 2011 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Ming-Chang Wang and Lon-Ping Zu
912
first addressed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who demonstrate that superior returns
can be obtained by holding a zero-cost portfolio comprising of long positions in stocks
which have outperformed overa previous period (winners), and short positions in stocks
which have underperformed during the same period (losers).
Several explanations are proposed with regard to the first anomaly. For example,
Campbell and Kyle (1993) argue that excessive return volatility is attributable to noise
risk, whilst Wang (1993) demonstrates that excess volatility can be explained by the
information asymmetry that exists between different investors. Bansal and Yaron (2004)
attempt to explain excess volatility by modelling consumption and dividendgr owthrates
which, they propose, contain a small long-run predictable component and time-varying
consumption volatility.
Other papers place effort into the explanation of the momentum anomaly. In a
comprehensive surveyof behavioural f inance, Subrahmanyam(2007) documents that the
momentum anomaly is driven by cognitive biases on the part of investors,1with several
other studies arguing that the momentum anomaly is related to the business cycle.2
Korajcyzk and Sadka (2004) had previously argued that the momentum phenomenon
persisted as a result of the frictions in the price adjustment process which are attributable
to transactions costs. One of the primary goals of the present study is therefore to develop
a model to explain both of these anomalies.
In this paper, weintroduce a model with three dates and long-lived private information,
based upon an extension of the framework of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). In contrast
to the previous multi-period competitive rational expectations models,3whichinvariably
assume that informed agents will trade immediately upon receipt of private information,
informed traders in our model receive a private information signal prior to the market
opening, based upon which they must then decide when to trade on this information.
Informed traders will select the timing of their informed trades by considering two
effects on their expected utility, the f irst of which is the price impact of such informed
trades. Given that the resultant informed trades will move market prices towards the
fundamental asset value, this thereby reduces the trading profits available to informed
traders; this price impact is greater for early informed trading than for late informed
trading.
The second effect is the price risk relating to aggregate liquidity trades. Since the
variance in aggregate liquidity trades in the multi-period model increases over time, the
price risk for aggregate liquidity trades will be higher if informed traders elect to trade
on their information late, rather than early. Informed traders are logically considered to
be rational traders if they time their informed trades to maximise their expected utility.
In equilibrium, decisions on the optimal timing of trading by informed traders are
dependent upon the values of the model parameters; for example, we find that in
circumstances where the mass of informed traders is sufficiently large, and there is
sufficiently high precision of private information, rather surprisingly, informed traders
will elect to trade late on their information. The intuition is that for either of these two
conditions, the total amount of informed trades will be large, which will significantly
1See Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis et al. (1998).
2Examples include Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Ahn et al. (2003) and Avramov and
Chordia (2006).
3See Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Wang (1993) and
Hirchleifer et al. (1994).

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