which has been a particul ar interest of this journal.
To get a grasp of the overall
constitution of the European community of debt, we will start from its key constituents:
(1) integrated capital markets,
(2) interdependent welfare states,
and (3) the reformed
The proliferationof transnational debt relationswithin and beyond Europe is the result
of processes of ﬁnancial andmonetary integration by means of law and governance. The
major turning point in this proc ess was the liberalisation of capit al movements, which
complemented the free movem ent of goods and services, labo ur and enterprise, and
changed theconditions for coordinationof monetary policies at the Europeanlevel. It thus
had an effect on both ‘layers’of the European economic consti tution.
microeconomic constitution of the internal market came to spur the transnationalisation
of private debt, the macr oeconomic constitutio n was set for monetary union , which
furthered the transnationalisation of public debt.
At the same time, national welfare regimes became increasingly interlinked, although
less so by way of building a ‘Europeanwelfare state’through EU level socialpolicies than
through developments both in the micro- and macroeconomic constitution.
free movement of capitaland establishment affects the capacity of Member States to raise
taxes (tax base mobility), the right to free movement for workers and persons is
increasingly being discussed in its effects on public spending (welfare migration). At the
same time, Member State budgets are restricted by the requirements of monetary union,
See, for example, I. Bantekas andV. Renaud, ‘On the Odiousness of Greek Debt’, (2016) 22 European Law
Journal, 539–565; D. Adamski, ‘Economic Policy Co ordination as a Game Involving Economic Stability
and National Sovereignty’, (2016) 22 EuropeanLaw Journal,180–203; U. Šadl and M.R. Madsen, ‘Did the
Financial Crisis ChangeEuropean Citizenship Law? An Analysis of Citizenship Rights AdjudicationBefore
andAfter the Financial Crisis’,(2016)22EuropeanLaw Journal,40–60; A. Johnston,‘R egulating Hedge Fun ds
for Systemic Stability: The EU’sApproach’, (2015) 21 European Law Journal,758–786; N. Dorn, ‘Legal
“Elasticity”and “Sidestepping”in EuropeanCrisis Management of Financial Markets’,(2015)21European
Law Journal,787–802; F.W. Scharpf, ‘After the Crash: A Perspective on MultilevelEuropean Democracy’,
(2015) 21 European Law Journal, 384–405; M.A. Wilkinson, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism in the European
Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?’, (2015) 21 European Law Journal,313–339; A. Somek,
‘Delegation and Authority: Authoritarian Liberalism Today’,(2015)21Europe an Law Journal,340–360;
D. Wilsher, ‘Law and the Financial Cris is: Searching for Europe’s New Gold St andard’, (2014) 20
European Law Journal, 241–283; A.J. Men éndez, ‘Editorial: A European Unio n in Constitutional
Mutation?’, (2014) 20 European Law Journal,127–141; C. Offe, ‘Europe Entrapped’,(2013)19European
Law Journal, 595–611; N. Scicluna, ‘EU Constitutionalism in Flux: Is the Eurozone Crisis Precipitating
Centralisation or Diffusion?’,(2012)18European Law J ournal,489–503; R. Colliat, ‘A Critical Genealogy
of European Macroeconomic Governanc e’, (2012) 18 European Law Journal,6–23; S. Pagliari, ‘Who
Governs Finance? The Shifting Public–Private Divide in the Regulation of Derivatives, Rating Agencies
and Hedge Funds’, (2012) 18 European Law Journal,44–61; P.D. Amri and B.M. Kocher, ‘The Political
Economy of Financial Sector Sup ervision and Banking Crises: A Cros s-Country Analysis’, (2012) 18
European Law Journal,24–43; and M. Ojo, ‘The Changing Rol e of Central Banks and the Role of
Competition in Financial Regulation during (and in the Aftermath of) the Financial Crisis’, (2011) 17
European Law Journal,513–533.
J. Snell, ‘Free Movement of Capital: Evolutionas a Non-Linear Process’, in P. Craigand G. de Búrca (eds.),
The Evolutionof EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford UniversityPress, 2011), 547–574.
Cf. D.M. Trubekand L.G. Trubek, ‘Hard andSoft Law in the Constructionof Social Europe:The Role of the
Open Method of Co-ordination’,(2005) 11 European Law Journal,343–364, at 345–346.
Cf. F. Scharpf, ‘Monetary Union, FiscalCrisis and the Preemption of Democracy’,(2011)MPIfG Discussion
Paper 11/11,available at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp11-11.pdf, at 34.
For the distinction between micro-and macroeconomic layersof the European economic constitution, see K.
Tuori and K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis:A Constitutional Analysis(Cambridge UniversityPress, 2014).
C. Hayand D. Wincott, The PoliticalEconomy of EuropeanWelfare Capitalism(Palgrave Macmillan,2012), at
European Law Journal Volume 22