Vulnerability and Response to the Risk of International Shipping: The Case of the Salish Sea
| Author | Alexander Gillespie |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12174 |
| Date | 01 November 2016 |
| Published date | 01 November 2016 |
Vulnerability and Response to the Risk of
International Shipping: The Case of the Salish Sea
Alexander Gillespie*
International shipping is rapidly increasing in the Sal-
ish Sea. This growth carries with it greater risks. The
question is what tools are available within interna-
tional maritime law to best manage these risks? The
answer to this question is the designation, by interna-
tional maritime law, of Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas (PSSAs) and their Associated Protective Meas-
ures (APMs). To date, 14 PSSAs exist, which have been
justified in large part by the vulnerability of the area
at hand. This article seeks to show how the concept of
vulnerability within the context of PSSA designation
has evolved and how the concept has been imple-
mented in the existing 14 PSSAs and their APMs. The
article will then juxtapose such developments against
the situation of the Salish Sea.
INTRODUCTION
International shipping is rapidly increasing in the Sal-
ish Sea. This growth carries with it greater risks of acci-
dents. The question is what tools are available within
international maritime law and policy to best manage
these risks? The international community has been
developing tools to mitigate against the various risks
posed by international shipping for the last six decades.
This article traces the evolution of these tools, and then
focuses on an option that is currently receiving signifi-
cant attention, namely the designation, by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO), of Particularly
Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) and their Associated Pro-
tective Measures (APMs). To achieve a PSSA, essen-
tially, two steps must be taken. First, the area must be
shown to be of particular sensitivity in ecological, social,
economic and/or scientific terms. Once a particular
sensitivity of an ocean area is shown, this must then be
overlaid with the vulnerability of the area to interna-
tional shipping traffic, from which appropriate APMs
may be proposed. The article is concerned with not only
the evolution of international responses to risk in this
area, but specifically, the second part of the PSSA equa-
tion, namely, the idea of what ‘vulnerability’is, and how
this has been interpreted by the IMO in the 14 PSSAs
that they have already designated with their associated
APMs. The article will then juxtapose such develop-
ments against the situation of the Salish Sea.
THE PROBLEM EMERGES
In 1967, the oil tanker Torrey Canyon struck Pollard’s
Rock between the Cornish mainland and the Isles of
Scilly. Some 32 million gallons of oil were spilt into the
ocean and polluted the coasts of England, Spain and
France. The cost of the clean-up (US$56 million) was
eclipsed the following year, when the World Glory oil
tanker experienced full failure, hitting the coast of
South Africa and spilling 11 million gallons of fuel on to
the shores of the Natal Bight. This accident cost US$110
million to clean up. Soon after, the oil tanker Othello
collided with a smaller vessel, spilling 438,000 barrels
of fuel off the coast of Sweden, causing US$22 million
of damage to fix. The MV Sea Star collided with another
vessel, also in 1972, spilling 31 million gallons of fuel in
the Gulf of Oman causing US$45 million worth of
damage.
1
THREE DECADES OF RESPONSES
AND THE CONTINUING
DIFFICULTIES
Although the global community, through the IMO, had
been trying to deal with operational discharges of oil
from ships as early as 1954,
2
it did not foresee the
emerging problem of tanker accidents and the massive
release of oil and its impact, in both ecological and eco-
nomic terms. When these accidents did occur, the glo-
bal community adopted two new conventions to help
establish liability for such accidents
3
and a fund to help
* Corresponding author.
Email: azg@waikato.ac.nz
1
B. Sovacool, ‘The Costs of Failure: A Preliminary Assessment of
Major Energy Accidents, 1907–2007’, 36:5 Energy Policy (2008),
1802; M. Grundlingh, ‘The World Glory Oil Spill Revisited’, 89:1 South
African Geographical Journal (2007), 14; J. Sheail, ‘Torrey Canyon:
The Political Dimension’, 42:3 Journal of Contemporary History
(2007), 485.
2
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil (London, 12 May 1954; in force 26 July 1958).
3
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Dam-
age (Brussels, 29 November 1969; in force 19 June 1975).
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317
RECIEL 25 (3) 2016. ISSN 2050-0386 DOI: 10.1111/reel.12174
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Review of European Community & International Environmental Law
pay for the resulting damage.
4
A third convention was
adopted, allowing countries to take measures on the
high seas, ‘to eliminate grave or imminent danger to
their coastline or related interests from pollution or
threat of pollution of the sea by oil’.
5
Two other conventions, namely the 1972 Convention on
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea (COLREGS)
6
and the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) Convention, supplemented the work of the
IMO in this area.
7
Both the SOLAS and the COLREGS
are long-standing international instruments. The for-
mer dates back to 1929, and was substantially updated
in 1948 and 1960, leading to significant advances in the
law. For example, in 1960, radars were made compul-
sory on all vessels engaged in international travel. The
COLREGS was more operational, but it too was evolv-
ing. For example, the COLREGS resulted in the first vol-
untary, international traffic separation scheme, which
came into existence in the Strait of Dover in 1967. When
these two instruments were updated in the early 1970s,
the international community created the most import-
ant rules that would form the basis of the ongoing glo-
bal response to managing the risks presented by
international shipping. In particular, the 1972 COL-
REGS established multiple rules, ranging from external
lighting on vessels, visibility, through to look-outs. The
two rules offering protective measures which have had
the greatest impact on the prevention of accidents have
been Rule 6 on speed and Rule 10 on traffic separation
schemes. For example, following the sequence of acci-
dents noted above, in 1972, the IMO agreed that
approved traffic separation schemes would now be
mandatory and no longer voluntary.
8
Similar rules in
the COLREGS overlapped with the SOLAS Convention,
which has now expanded to 12 continually amended
chapters, which cover everything from life-saving
equipment required on vessels, through to the carriage
of dangerous goods. Most notably, Chapter V of the
SOLAS, which relates to Safety of Navigation, contains
35 different regulations. The specific regulations which
are important here are Regulation 10 (Ships Routeing),
Regulation 11 (Ship Reporting Systems) and Regulation
12 (Vessel Traffic Services).
Despite the efforts of the international community in
the early part of the 1970s and the resulting interna-
tional law providing for safer vessel management, the
problems proliferated. In 1976, the La Coruna
grounded and spilled 21 million gallons of oil off Spain.
In that same year the Argo spilled 7.5 million gallons of
oil causing a slick 100 miles long and 70 miles wide,
southeast of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. The cost
for this clean-up was US$267 million. In 1977, the oil
tanker Hawaiian Patriot caught fire and spilled
723,000 barrels of oil into the north Pacific, costing
US$54 million to clean up. In 1978, the oil tanker
Amoco Cadiz experienced steering failure and ran
aground spilling 68 million gallons of oil and creating a
slick 18 miles wide and 80 miles long. The slick landed
on 130 miles of French coastline and cost US$111 mil-
lion to clean up. When the Atlantic Empress and the
Aegean Captain collided at sea off Tobago in the Carib-
bean, 276,000 tons of oil was spilled, which cost over
US$120 million to clean up.
9
This further collection of accidents resulted in the
1978 International Conference on Tanker Safety. This
1978 conference led to the drafting of a Protocol to the
1973 MARPOL Convention, creating the MARPOL 73/
78 Protocol.
10
The original 1973 International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MAR-
POL)
11
had created the idea of ‘Special Areas’,which
would control the discharge of specific pollutants from
operational ractices, but both the types of pollutants
andriskscovered,andthelownumberofratifications
that the original instrument had received. The 1978
Protocol sought to change this situation. In terms of
the most immediate changes, the 1978 additions to
MARPOL introduced the concept of protective loca-
tion of segregated ballast tanks. This meant that,
henceforth, ballast tanks were to be positioned in an
area where the impact of a collision or grounding was
likely to be greatest, thus greatly reducing the amount
of cargo spilled if an accident occurred. In terms of
longer-term contributions to reducing vulnerability
from the impacts of commercial shipping, the MAR-
POL 73/78 included annexes for the rules for the cre-
ation of Special Areas, under which additional rules
for the control of oil, noxious liquid substances, gar-
bage and air pollution were settled. At the same time,
the IMO was requested to investigate ‘sea areas
around the world which are in special need of
4
Convention for the Establishment of an International Fund for Com-
pensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, 18 December 1971; in
force 16 October 1978).
5
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Brussels, 29 November 1969; in
force 6 May 1975), Article 1.
6
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Colli-
sions at Sea (London, 20 October 1972; in force 15 July 1977) (‘COL-
REGS’).
7
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (London, 1 November 1974; in
force 25 May 1980) (‘SOLAS’).
8
Note that the IMO moved towards mandatory traffic separation
schemes following the double collision incident in the Dover Strait in
1971. See IMO, Resolutions from the Seventh General Assembly on
Routeing Measures, A.205(VII), A.226(VII) and A.227((VII) (20
November 1973). The 1972 COLREGS removed any uncertainties in
this area.
9
L. Carter, ‘The Amoco Cadiz Incident Points to the Elusive Goal
of Tanker Safety’, 200:4341 Science (1978), 514; M. Spaulding,
‘Hindcast of the Argo Merchant Spill’, 9:5 Ocean Engineering
(1982), 455.
10
Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (London, 17 February 1978;
in force 2 October 1983) (‘MARPOL 73/78’).
11
The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (London, 2 November 1973). Regulation 10 of Annex I lists
the Special Areas. The regions that were identified in 1973 as such
Special Areas were the Mediterranean, Baltic, Black and Red Seas,
as well as the Gulf of Aden and what is known as the ‘Gulfs area’.
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ALEXANDER GILLESPIE RECIEL 25 (3) 2016
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