Canada: soft power won't do it in Afghanistan--or Darfur.

• Author: Wright, David
• Position: Defense and Security

Would that we had a simpler world: one in which conflicts end cleanly, the UN Security Council authorizes intervention by well meaning peacekeepers, and former antagonists step back, lay down their arms and welcome them. And the peacekeepers are accompanied by aid workers and civil-society experts who rebuild democratic governments and viable economies. And everyone lives happily ever after.

Sadly, the world does not work like that. Conflicts tend not to end cleanly. The choices governments must make in dealing with international crises are very difficult, often between a bad alternative and a worse one. The risks of intervention are huge in terms of both human life and political life. And of course there are risks of inaction, too; but those are much harder to measure.

In Canada, there is considerable debate about our current deployment of 2,300 soldiers in southern Afghanistan. Casualties are mounting and the purpose of the mission, with its focus on security in the dangerous Kandahar area, is being challenged. Another debate continues in Canada over the world's failure to take meaningful action in Darfur and what should be done about it.

Let me start with some very basic questions:

1. Should force ever be used to confront leaders who are killing their own people?

2. Should democratic countries ever use military force as part of their efforts to combat terrorism?

3. Should Canada ever be engaged militarily abroad in the pursuit of its own interests and values?

Unhesitatingly, I say yes to all these questions.

But that's the easy part. The harder part lies in deciding on what military engagements are to be taken: Where and for how long? With what mandate? With what mission? With what resources?

In 1999, when NATO countries debated the decision to take military action to combat then-Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, I remember we asked one of these very basic questions: "Can a dictator be permitted to kill his own people?" NATO answered that question by launching air strikes against Milosevic. It decided "in practice" to act, even though it could not agree on the "theory." The then-19 members of the alliance had differing reasons in deciding to act. There was no unifying legal basis for their action. The UN Security Council had not explicitly authorized the use of force: Russia would have vetoed it. Yet NATO acted--rightly and successfully, in my view.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan said at the time: "No government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights and fundamental...