Accountable Multilevel Governance by the Open Method of Coordination?

• Published date: 01 July 2007
• Author: Arthur Benz
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00381.x
• Date: 01 July 2007

Accountable Multilevel Governance by the

Open Method of Coordination?

Arthur Benz*

Abstract: In multilevel governance arrangements policies are coordinated across levels,

usually in negotiations or networks of executives and representatives of special interests.

Actors committed in such arrangements can hardly be held accountable by parliaments

or citizens, and this is one of the main reasons for the democratic deficit of the EU. With

the open method of coordination (OMC) the EU introduced a new mode of multilevel

governance. The article focuses on the question whether problems of accountability can

be solved by this mode. It is argued that the OMC framework includes two types of

coordination. Whereas the dominating ‘deliberative’ mode does not improve account-

ability, the ‘competitive’ mode seems to be more promising. It supports transparency,

reduces the costs of control for parliaments and stimulates public discussion on policies.

However, multilevel coordination by policy competition at the lower levels of government

does not work effectively under all conditions, and this therefore has to be carefully

investigated.

I Introduction

In research on multilevel governance, the open method of coordination (OMC) has

raised considerable attention. Scholars have acknowledged the invention of this

new mode of governance as an indication of the ongoing dynamics of European

integration.1The OMC is said to demonstrate the flexibility of European multilevel

governance, since it provides the Council and the Commission with a new device to

influence national or sub-national policies even when they have no formal compe-

tencies. On the other hand, empirical studies have given reasons for rather critical

* Professor of Political Science, University of Hagen.

1For example, S. Borrás and K. Jacobsson, ‘The Open Method of Co-ordination and New Governance

Patterns in the EU’, (2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy 185; J. Caporaso and J. Wittenbrink, ‘The

New Modes of Governance and Political Authority in Europe’, (2006) 13 Journal of European Public

Policy 471; B. Eberlein and D. Kerwer, ‘New Governance in the European Union, A Theoretical Per-

spective’, (2004) 42 Journal of Common Market Studies 121; A. Héritier, ‘New Modes of Governance in

Europe: Policy-Making without Legislating’, in A. Héritier (ed.), Common Goods. Reinventing European

and International Governance (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp. 185–206; D. Hodson and I. Maher, ‘The

Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Coordination’, (2001)

39 Journal of Common Market Studies 719; J. S. Mosher and D. M. Trubek, ‘Alternative Approaches to

Governance in the EU: EU Social Policy and the European Employment Strategy’, (2003) 41 Journal of

Common Market Studies 63; S. Regent, ‘The Open Method of Coordination. A New Supranational Form

of Governance?’, (2003) 9 European Law Journal 190.

European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, July 2007, pp. 505–522.

© 2007 The Author

Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

assessments regarding the implementation of this mode of governance and its impacts

on policy making and on the political system of the EU. In view of the limited effects

of this method, it can be doubted that it is really worth further research and contri-

butions to the huge amount of literature that is dedicated to it.

This article neither intends to add a new critical study on the OMC to this literature

nor does it present an additional empirical study. It is focused on the problem of

democratic legitimacy and accountability which has been raised in many contributions

to the discussion. There is no need to recapitulate what has been already written by

other scholars on the predominance of executives and experts and the limited role of

national parliaments and the European Parliament (EP). However, this discussion so

far has failed to elucidate the mechanisms of the OMC’s mode of multilevel gover-

nance. For this reason, empirical studies have correctly revealed the democratic deficit

caused by the OMC but they have not adequately explicated the potentials of this

method to improve accountability of executives to their parliaments and the electorate

in a system of multilevel governance.

Speaking about mechanisms—and not mechanism—I want to point out that the

OMC implies at least two different modes of governance. They have been enmeshed in

the formulation of the concept of the European Council at Lisbon and they have never

been clearly sorted out. In most cases of its application, the OMC has turned into a

kind of deliberative policy making (or coordination by discourse) in multilevel gover-

nance. The other mode of policy competition has remained in the background and has

rarely been explicitly implemented in practical policy making.

As regards accountability, I argue that the deliberative mode in fact causes serious

problems. However, one should ask whether the competitive mode of multilevel gov-

ernance can help to overcome these problems. I will show in the ensuing sections that

there are theoretical reasons in support of a positive answer to this question. Yet, policy

competition works only under particular conditions that cannot be easily fulfilled in the

multilevel political system of the EU. Hence, my conclusion does not deviate too much

from the sceptical views of the OMC predominating in the literature. However, it

clarifies the conditions under which a revision of the method could support account-

ability in multilevel governance.

II Accountability Problems in Multilevel Governance

The OMC has been introduced as a device to stimulate policy changes in the Member

States without the EU using its powers to regulate or to control national implementa-

tion and without transferring powers from national or sub-national governments to the

European level. It should have been obvious from the outset that such a kind of

coordination between the EU and the Member States beyond existing competencies

and formal procedures must raise concerns regarding democratic legitimacy. Indeed,

empirical studies have confirmed the exclusion of national parliaments and the Euro-

pean Parliament and the predominance of executives in the coordination process.2The

2K.A. Armstrong, ‘How Open is the United Kingdom to the OMC Process on Social Inclusion?’, in J. Zeitlin,

P. Pochet and L. Magnusson (eds), The Open Method of Coordination in Action. The European Employment

and Social Inclusion Strategies (Peter Lang, 2005), pp. 287–310; C. de la Porte and P. Pochet, ‘Participation

in the Open Method of Coordination. The Cases of Employment and Social Inclusion’, in Zeitlin, Pochet

and Magnusson, ibid., pp. 353–390; K. Jacobsson, ‘Trying to Reform the “Best Pupils in the Class”? The

Open Method of Co-ordination in Sweden and Denmark’, in Zeitlin, Pochet and Magnusson, ibid., p. 206.

European Law Journal Volume 13

© 2007 The Author

506 Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.