Anti-Bribery Compliance Incentives: Scope of Applicability

AuthorFabian Teichmann
PositionAttorney-at-Law and Public Notary, Teichmann International (Schweiz) AG
European Journal of Economics, Law and Social Sciences
IIPCCL Publishing, Graz-Austria
Vol. 2 No. 1
January, 2018
ISSN 2519-1284
Acces online at
Anti-Bribery Compliance Incentives: Scope of Applicability
Dr. Dr. Fabian Teichmann
Teichmann International (Schweiz) AG
Incentives could help to eliminate bribery in multinational corporations. In particular, bonus
and malus payments could incentivize employees to comply with anti-bribery rules. However,
it has not been investigated yet what the scope of applicability of such incentives could be. This
      
and discusses under which circumstances employees should be rewarded for following rules
and blowing the whistle.
Keywords: Bribery, Corruption, Compliance, Incentives.
Anti-Bribery Compliance Incentives: Scope of Applicability
As it has been argued that anti-bribery incentive systems could, under certain
           
corporations, it has to be assessed in which situations their use was particularly
          
approach had to be chosen. Hence, 10 semi-structured expert interviews were
then compared and contrasted with the existing literature.
Environmental Factors
     
characterized by a corrupt environment, a weak implementation of formal rules, a
lack of control, bad culture, or a lack of sanctions, anti-bribery incentives could be
particularly useful. This approach is in line with the literature review, which referred
       
resources, centralization, reputation, history and levels of political competition as
        
The idea that anti-bribery incentives could be particularly useful in countries in
which bribery is a major problem and anti-bribery compliance is still in its early
stages is reasonably intuitive. In particular, it has been emphasized that, if there exists
a historical acceptance of paying bribes, anti-bribery incentives should prove useful.
This is very much in line with the existing literature on corruption, which suggests
that historical factors play an important role in determining the levels of bribery in
       
by capital-intensive resources, centralization and political structures, and reputation

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