Does OMC Really Benefit National Parliaments?

• Published date: 01 January 2006
• Date: 01 January 2006
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2006.00310.x
• Author: Tapio Raunio

Does OMC Really Benefit National

Parliaments?

Tapio Raunio*

Taking issue with the widely accepted ‘deparliamentarisation’ thesis, Francesco Duina

and Michael Oliver1argue that European integration may in fact also benefit the par-

liaments of EU member states. They argue that this happens in two ways. First, as EU

produces laws in policy areas previously not covered by domestic legislation, integra-

tion extends the regulatory ‘reach’ of national legislatures (precedent setting). Second,

through the recent introduction of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC),

national parliaments learn about solutions in other member states and are thus able to

produce better laws in their own countries (policy transfer).

Duina and Oliver acknowledge that both processes may in fact strengthen both

national executives and parliaments.2However, beyond this general statement they do

not deal with this crucial issue. Considering the increasing use of OMC in the EU, the

main question is does OMC benefit national parliaments.My answer is most likely not.3

There are basically two ways to approach this issue. The first is through a systemic

perspective, comparing the EU with other federal-type systems. The second is through

empirical studies that compare the role of national parliaments in supranational vis-à-

vis intergovernmental modes of EU decision-making. Comparisons with federal coun-

tries suggest that the challenge posed by OMC must be taken very seriously. The

multi-level political system of the EU resembles the cooperative or executive federal-

ism characteristic of many federal states. Literature on federalism indicates that coop-

erative federalism concentrates power in the executive branch. For example,in Australia

it has resulted in a proliferation of intergovernmental committees and working groups,

the meetings of which are characterised by low transparency and reliance on informal,

but still politically binding, procedures and decisions. State parliaments have often

voiced complaints about being sidelined in the negotiations.4In Germany the role of

the Länder in the implementation of federal laws has resulted in extensive intergov-

European Law Journal, Vol.12, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 130–131.

© 2006 The Author

Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

*Department of Political Science, University of Turku, Finland.

1‘National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration?’, (2005) 11(1)

European Law Journal 173–195.

2Op. cit. note 1 supra,at 184, 190.

3T. Raunio, Towards Tighter Scrutiny? National Legislatures in the EU Constitution. The Federal Trust

Online Paper 16/04, 2004.

4M. Painter, Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reform in Australia in the 1990s (Cambridge University

Press, 1998).