Editorial

• Author: Annick Masselot
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00360.x
• Date: 01 March 2007
• Published date: 01 March 2007

Editorial

Annick Masselot*

Originally, the competence of the EC in the field of gender equality, embodied in Article

119 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 141 EC after amendments), was exclusively

restricted to the scope of employment law and social policy. On the basis of this

provision, the concept of sex equality has developed into an extensive and complex

body of rules and case law that has transcended the mere economic motives set out by

the founding Member States. It is now accepted that gender equality is a fundamental

principle of European Union law and forms part of its human rights protection. The

fundamental principle of sex equality has been incorporated in the successive versions

of the EC/EU Treaty and more recently in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for

Europe.

On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, it is important to pause

and consider the state of gender equality law in the EU. Nowadays it is widely believed

that sex equality law is ‘completed’ and that it does not require further attention. This

belief is not only erroneous but also dangerous, as it might lead to the regression of the

gender equality acquis. Despite half a century of EC actions in the field of gender

equality,1de facto equality between men and women is still amiss. The continuing

inequalities in employment (for instance, gender pay gap, job segregation, and dis-

missal on grounds of pregnancy) and elsewhere (for example, domestic violence, traf-

ficking in women, and democratic participation) are constantly noted by the European

Commission2and national observers.3However, the conclusion that gender equality

law does therefore not work is unfounded. The action of the EC in the field of gender

equality has, until recently, been limited to employment and social policy. As a result,

any attempt to evaluate the success or failure of sex equality law must be confined to

* Senior Lecturer in European Law at the University of Leeds Law School, Deputy Director of the Centre

for the Study of Law and Policy in Europe, and Marie Curie Fellow (2007–2010) at the National Centre

for Research on Europe (University of Canterbury, New Zealand).

1Some might argue that the EC action in the field of gender equality did not start until 1975 with the

judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA (No. 2) [1976] ECR 455

and the adoption of Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the

laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women,

OJ L/45 [1975] and Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the

principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and

promotion, and working conditions, OJ L/39 [1976].

2Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and

Social Committee of the Region: on Equality between Women and Men—2006, COM(2006) 71 Final;

Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic

and Social Committee of the Region: A Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men 2006–2010,

SEC(2006) 275.

3See for instance Equal Opportunity Commission, Pay and Income—Women and Men in Britain (2003):

<http://www.eoc.org.uk/PDF/wm_pay_and_income_2003.pdf>.

European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2, March 2007, pp. 149–151.

© 2007 The Author

Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

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