Enforcing CITES: The Rise and Fall of Trade Sanctions

• Date: 01 November 2013
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12037
• Author: Peter H. Sand
• Published date: 01 November 2013

Enforcing CITES: The Rise and Fall of

Trade Sanctions

Peter H. Sand

Among the most innovative – albeit least well known –

features of the Convention on International Trade in

Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)

regime is the use of trade sanctions for noncompliance

with the treaty. Though not foreseen at all in the origi-

nal text of the Convention, a unique system of ‘collec-

tive retorsion’ was gradually developed through a

series of resolutions by the Conference of the Parties,

by way of trade embargoes – that is, multilateral rec-

ommendations to suspend trade in CITES-listed speci-

mens with the country concerned. Since 1985, this

scheme – now codified in the 2007 Guidelines on Com-

pliance with the Convention – has been enforced

against at least 43 recalcitrant States (parties and

non-parties). This article reviews the historical

evolution of the CITES sanction scheme in practice

over the past three decades, and its effectiveness in

achieving compliance. The legality and legitimacy of

the scheme is assessed in light of the Convention, other

relevant international instruments and general rules

of international law.

INTRODUCTION: ENFORCEMENT

OF COMPLIANCE ON THE

CITES AGENDA

The mandate of the 1973 Convention on International

Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

(CITES) placed the treaty in disputed territory –

namely the borderland of environmental conservation

and trade regulation.1This article reviews the practical

experience of the CITES regime in applying one of its

most potent regulatory and enforcement instruments:

the use of trade embargoes, in the form of recommen-

dations to suspend trade in CITES-listed species.

Enforcement issues have long been a ‘constant concern’

for the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to CITES.2In

1981, it had mandated a ‘Technical Expert Committee’

(established in 1979; renamed ‘Technical Committee’ in

1983) to ‘identify problems with enforcement of the

Convention and provide guidance to the secretariat and

the parties on measures that may be undertaken to

remedy these problems’.3After the abolition of the

Committee in the course of a re-organization in 1987,4

enforcement matters were left to the CITES Standing

Committee and the Secretariat, with advisory input

from ad hoc meetings (2004 and 2009) of an ‘Enforce-

ment Expert Group’ reporting to the Standing Commit-

tee.5Over the past few years, however, the problem

of illegal wildlife trafficking – and its connection

with organized crime and political security threats – has

come to the forefront. Following a series of Memoranda

of Understanding with other international institutions

(including INTERPOL) and regional networks active

in this field,6and through participation in the Interna-

tional Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime created

in 2010,7the CITES Secretariat also intensified its

cooperation with the United Nations Commission on

Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,8at whose

1‘International cooperation is essential for the protection of certain

species of wild fauna and f‌lora against over-exploitation through

international trade.’ Convention on International Trade in Endangered

Species (Washington, DC, 3 March 1973; in force 1 July 1975)

(‘CITES’), preamble. See P.H. Sand, ‘Whither CITES? The Evolution

of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of Trade and Environment’,

8:1 European Journal of International Law (1997), 29; and W.

Wijnstekers, The Evolution of CITES: A Reference to the Convention

on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and

Flora,9

th edn (International Council for Game and Wildlife Conserva-

tion, 2011).

2CITES Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP16), Compliance and

Enforcement (2000/2013).

3CITES Resolution Conf. 3.5 (Rev. CoP4), Technical Expert Com-

mittee (1981/1983).

4See R. Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species:

The CITES Treaty and Compliance (Earthscan, 2002), at 49–50.

5See Report of the CITES Enforcement Expert Group (SC58 Doc.23/

Add, 2009). On the promotion and coordination of enforcement at the

national level, see D. Kaniaru and E. Mrema (eds.), Enforcement of

and Compliance with MEAs: The Experience of CITES, Montreal

Protocol and Basel Convention, Vol. 1 (United Nations Environment

Programme (UNEP), 1999), 1, at 93–149; and the proceedings of the

International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforce-

ment (1990–2011), found at: <http://www.inece.org>.

6For a list of MoUs concluded, see P.H. Sand, ‘Endangered Species,

International Protection’, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclo-

pedia of Public International Law, Vol. 3 (Oxford University Press,

2012), 423, at 427.

7Co-f‌inanced by the World Bank Development Grant Facility. See

International Consortium on Combating Wildlife (CoP16 Doc.15

(Rev.1), 2013).

8The commission services the UN Convention Against Transnational

Organized Crime (New York, 15 November 2000; in force 29 Sep-

tember 2003) and the UN Convention Against Corruption (New York,

31 October 2003; in force 14 December 2005). See M.E.

Zimmermann, ‘The Black Market for Wildlife: Combating Transna-

tional Organized Crime in the Illegal Wildlife Trade’, 36:5 Vanderbilt

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Review of European Community & International Environmental Law

RECIEL 22 (3) 2013. ISSN 2050-0386

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