Revolt by Referendum? In Search of a European Constitutional Narrative

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2009.00477.x
• Author: Cormac Mac Amhlaigh
• Date: 01 July 2009
• Published date: 01 July 2009

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Revolt by Referendum? In Search of a European

Constitutional Narrative

Cormac Mac Amhlaigh*

Europe’s constitutional voyage hit extremely stormy waters in the first decade of the

new century. As is well known, the Nice reforms weathered the storm but the Consti-

tutional Treaty (CT) was sunk by the French and Dutch electorate. Many of its

proposed reforms were resurrected in the Lisbon Treaty, which the Irish electorate

rejected in a referendum in June 2008. The Irish Government agreed to (re)run a

referendum on a Lisbon ‘with bells’,1which Europe’s elites hoped would result in the

‘right answer’ this time, as was the case with Ireland’s initial rejection of the Nice

Treaty. However, the problems with re-running Lisbon are greater than with Nice.2

This ‘repeat referendum’ methodology to EU constitutional reform is clearly problem-

atic, not least in the sense that it seems to undermine one of the founding democratic

ideals upon which the European polity is based.3

The problems with EU constitutional reform run deeper than the vicissitudes of the

Irish electorate’s mood swings. It is no secret that a significantly large number of other

Member State governments could not have been confident of a ‘yes’ vote had similar

referenda been held Europe-wide. This is symptomatic of a growing inability of

national governments to ‘sell’ the idea of Europe to their citizens with any success.4

That this inability occurs in traditionally Europhile Member States is particularly

troubling.

* School of Law, University of Edinburgh. The majority of this article was written during a Visiting

Research Fellowship at the School of Law, Queen Mary University of London. I would like to thank

Kenneth Armstrong, Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Mike Wilkinson for comments on earlier drafts. The usual

disclaimer applies. Comments welcome at cormac.mac.amhlaigh@ed.ac.uk.

1B. Laffan, Ireland and the EU Post-Lisbon, Notre Europe Working Paper, December 2008, p 10.

2For example, there was a general election between the two Nice referenda and the subsequent government

ran on a ticket of voting again on Nice, adding a patina of legitimacy which a Lisbon II will not enjoy. See

Laffan, ibid, pp 4–5.

3Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union lists democracy as one of the founding principles of the

Union.

4One of the most pronounced aspects of the French, Dutch and Irish referenda was the fact that in all three

countries there was a parliamentary majority in favour of ratification.

European Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4, July 2009, pp. 552–563.

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