Social Dialogue in European Professional Football

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2010.00545.x
• Author: Richard Parrish
• Date: 01 March 2011
• Published date: 01 March 2011

eulj_545213..229

Social Dialogue in European

Professional Football

Richard Parrish*

Abstract: Social dialogue refers to discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint

actions involving organisations representing the two sides of industry, namely employers

and workers. The constitutional basis for social dialogue is located within Articles 153–

155 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In July 2008, a social

dialogue committee in European professional football was established. This article

assesses the significance of this move and argues that the committee has the long-term

potential to transform industrial relations in European football based on the conclusion of

binding collective agreements. In the shorter term, the committee performs two functions:

first, as a means of effecting a change in governance standards in European football and

as a lobbying technique for the social partners in terms of their relationship with the EU;

second, as a venue for a negotiated settlement between the rival interests operating within

the EU’s sports policy subsystem.

I Introduction

The establishment in July 2008 of a social dialogue committee in European professional

football illustrates how the balance of power in football industrial relations has shifted.

A professional footballer was at one time considered the servant of the club, his

commercial freedoms restricted by the operation of a maximum wage and a transfer

system which formed part of a control mechanism of management over labour. These

restrictions were incrementally lifted, most notably by the European Court of Justice in

Bosman.1Even though in modern football the master and servant analogy rings rather

hollow, a player’s contractual relationship with his employer still cannot be considered

‘normal’. Players are not only contractually bound to their club, they are also subject

to the rules of the national and international governing bodies of football. Within this

network of contractual relations lies the source of potential conflict involving the

triangular relationship between players, clubs and governing bodies.

This article explores how this conflict has been managed within the EU’s sports

policy subsystem, a maturing subsystem which first emerged at the time of the 1995

Bosman judgment. Specifically, it examines the behaviour of two rival advocacy coa-

litions operating within this subsystem: the football business coalition and the sporting

* Professor of Sports Law, Edge Hill University. The author would like to thank Professor Barrie Houlihan,

Ken Foster and Samuli Miettinen for comments supplied on an earlier draft.

1Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995]

ECR I-4921 (Bosman).

European Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, March 2011, pp. 213–229.

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autonomy coalition. Each coalition possess the ability to impose costs upon one

another. With litigation delivering uneven and uncertain results for the coalitions,

evidence suggests that a negotiated settlement is favoured by both parties and this is

being actively promoted by the European Commission. This article examines whether

the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’s (TFEU’s) provisions on social

dialogue can sustain a lasting agreement between the coalitions and foster a new era of

cooperative industrial relations within the professional football sector.

II The EU Sports Policy Subsystem

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) asserts that policy changes as a result of

the actions of actors (advocacy coalitions) operating within policy subsystems.2The

objective of each coalition is to convert their belief system into favourable policy

outcomes, both in terms of extracting higher budgetary allocations for specific pro-

grammes and also securing favourable regulatory settlements from policy makers,

regulators and judicial bodies. A coalition’s belief system is structured into deep core

beliefs, policy core beliefs and secondary policy core beliefs. Advocacy coalitions

develop strategies to translate their beliefs into public policy through the exploitation

of key resources and venues such as litigation, lobbying, funding research, commis-

sioning opinion polls, mobilising support, skilful leadership, and the use and control of

information. A well-resourced coalition is better placed to effect policy change. A

precursor for policy change within a subsystem is change in the belief system of a

coalition or changes in the resources available to a coalition. The ACF emphasises that

such change is prompted by events external to the subsystem, a process of policy-

oriented learning and negotiation in circumstances in which a continuation of the status

quo is considered unsatisfactory by the competing coalitions.

Within the EU’s sports policy subsystem operate two rival coalitions. The football

business coalition is composed of a range of economic interests including professional

clubs, organised player interests, commercial media companies, investors and agents

whose deep core beliefs reflect an essentially free market ethos. Football, it is claimed,

is an economic activity, the commercial potential of which is eroded by restrictive

practices employed by the football governing bodies. Consequently, their policy core

beliefs reflect a desire for EU law to protect economic stakeholders from product and

labour market restrictions and for these stakeholders to be afforded greater represen-

tation within the decision-making arenas of the sports governing bodies. These beliefs

are discernable from complaints lodged by these parties before national courts and EU

enforcement authorities (detailed below). Beliefs are not always consistently pursued.

For example, football clubs have historically resisted normalising players’ contracts

with regular employees, instead preferring the operation of a transfer system which

restricts labour market mobility.3Critics of stakeholder analyses in policy studies cite

2P. Sabatier, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe’, (1998) 5(1)

Journal of European Public Policy 104.

3This tension is highlighted by the issuance of two media releases by FIFPro and by the European Club

Association concerning the operation of Art 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of

Players. See FIFPro Media Release, ‘FIFPro denounces clubs’ agreement and supports Ribery’ (8 July

2009). See also ECA Media Release, ‘Article 17: ECA dismisses FIFPro allegations and protests against

inducement to breach contracts’ (14 July 2009).

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