To the Rescue of National Parliaments: A Reply to Raunio

• Published date: 01 January 2006
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2006.00311.x
• Date: 01 January 2006

To the Rescue of National Parliaments:

A Reply to Raunio

Francesco Duina and Michael J. Oliver*

In his commentary to our recent article in this journal,1Tapio Raunio raises a set of

important questions about our claim that the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)

has benefited national parliaments in the European Union. There are two primary

objections. First, he notes that the intergovernmental character of the EU has primar-

ily benefited the executive branches of the member states rather than the legislative

ones, and that OMC itself (as an intergovernmental process) is no exception. He notes,

for example, that national administrators, and not legislators, participate in OMC.

Second, he doubts whether OMC ultimately influences domestic policy making. These

are sharp observations. As it turns out, however, we both agree and disagree with

Raunio—an apparently contradictory stance unless one realises the complex nature of

OMC.

Let us take each claim in turn. We acknowledge that OMC has ‘concentrated power’

in the executive, rather than the legislative, branches of the member states: much of

OMC involves officials from national administrations and governments, and data and

insights are generated without participation from national parliaments. A strengthen-

ing of the executive function, however, does not necessarily result in a weakening of its

legislative counterpart, as Raunio seems to assume. It is conceivable, in fact, that OMC

benefits both executive and legislative functions. It is also possible that it benefits the

executive while weakening some aspects of the legislative and strengthening others. Our

view is that this latter combination best captures the impact of OMC.

Specifically, we suggest that, while OMC may have deprived national parliaments of

access to important information that might impact the ability of legislators to deliber-

ate, it also has put national parliaments in a position to produce laws of a higher quality

than what would have been possible otherwise. This, as we argue in our article,2

has solidified and affirmed national parliaments in their role of regulators in society—

especially in areas where their legitimacy has been doubted. We propose that in the case

of OMC members of the executives should be seen as allies, if not foot soldiers, of

national parliaments: they attend meetings,produce reports, exchange information and,

yes, produce policy proposals with possible legislative consequences. If the result is

better legislative output, we can state that national parliaments have gained. If, in the

European Law Journal, Vol.12, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 132–133.

© 2006 The Authors

Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

* Department of Sociology, Bates College, Lewiston, USA, and École Supérieure de Commerce de Rennes,

France and University of Plymouth Colleges, Jersey, UK.

1F. Duina and M. J. Oliver, ‘National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Inte-

gration?’, (2005) 11 ELJ 173–195.

2Duina and Oliver, op. cit. note 1 supra,at 176–178, 184.