Will China build a green Belt and Road in the Arctic?

• Published date: 01 April 2018
• Author: Nengye Liu
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12238
• Date: 01 April 2018

SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE

Will China build a green Belt and Road in the Arctic?

Nengye Liu

Correspondence

Email: nengye.liu@adelaide.edu.au This article aims to shed light on two questions: what are the implications of China’s

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for Arctic governance? And what are the environmen-

tal implications of the BRI for the Arctic? The article first discusses the interaction

between China’s BRI and Arctic policy, examining the vision that China would like

to use the BRI to shape Arctic governance. The article focuses on the environmental

components of the BRI. It explores whether China’s current regulatory regimes are

sufficient to help ensure a green Belt and Road in the Arctic.

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INTRODUCTION

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched by Chinese Presi-

dent Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013.

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It is arguably the largest

overseas investment drive ever launched by a single country.

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According to China’s State Council:

The Belt and Road means the Silk Road Economic Belt

and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. It runs

through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, con-

necting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end

and developed European economic circle at the other,

and encompassing countries with huge potential for eco-

nomic development. The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses

on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Eur-

ope (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and

the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West

Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South

Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century Maritime

Silk Road is designed to go from China’s coast to Europe

through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in

one route, and from China’s coast through the South

China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.

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The first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation con-

cluded in Beijing on 15 May 2017.

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This marks the first phase of

China’s BRI. China will continue to pursue the BRI in the coming years.

This is evidenced by the fact that the BRI was mentioned in amend-

ments to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (CPC)

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during the Party’s 19th National Congress (18–23 October 2017).

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China has been very active in the Polar Regions (Arctic and

Antarctica) in recent years. Beijing hosted the 40th Antarctic Treaty

Consultative Meeting from 22 May to 1 June 2017,

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marking the

first time the meeting was held in China. In the summer of 2017,

COSCO Shipping Specialized Carriers, a member of the COSCO

Group –China’s largest shipping company –started regularly using

the Northern Sea Route

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as a commercial shipping route to Europe.

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On 10 October 2017, China’s icebreaker, the Xuelong (Snow Dragon),

returned to base in Shanghai after 83 days on the Arctic rim and

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1

China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Xi Jinping’s Speech at Nazarbayev University, 7 Septem-

ber 2013’(8 September 2013) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn//ziliao_611306/zt_

611380/dnzt_611382/ydyl_667839/zyxw_667918/t1074151.shtml>(in Chinese).

2

‘China Encircles the World with One Belt, One Road Strategy’(Financial Times, 4 May

2017).

3

The State Council of People’s Republic of China, ‘Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initia-

tive’(30 March 2015) <http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_

281475080249035.htm>.

4

Xinhua, ‘Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation’<http://www.xinhuanet.com/

english/special/201705ydylforum/index.htm>.

5

China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular

Press Conference’(26 October 2017) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/

s2510_665401/t1504977.shtml>.

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The CPC National Congress takes place on a five-yearly basis, bringing together over

2,000 Party delegates with a view to approving the Party’s agenda for the coming five

years. S Fallon, ‘The 19th National Congress of China’s Communist Party’<https://www.

aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/Brief

ingBook45p/ChinaCongress>.

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China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘XL Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings’<http://

atcmxl.mfa.gov.cn/>.

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Arctic Council Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, Arctic

Marine Shipping Assessment Report 2009 (2009) 23 (AMSA 2009 Report): ‘The Northern Sea

Route is defined in Russian Federation law as a set of marine routes from Kara Gate (south

of Novaya Zemlya) in the west to the Bering Strait in the east. Several of the routes are

along the coast, making use of the main straits through the islands of the Russian Arctic;

other potential routes run north of the island groups.’

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‘COSCO Shipping Specialized Carriers Started 2017 Arctic Voyage’(2 February 2017)

<http://www.coscol.com.cn/News/Detail.aspx?ID=11319>(in Chinese).

DOI: 10.1111/reel.12238

RECIEL. 2018;27:55–62. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/reel

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