97/277/EC: Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Only the English text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)

• Published date: 26 April 1997
• Subject Matter: Competition,Concentrations between undertakings
• Official Gazette Publication: Official Journal of the European Communities, L 110, 26 April 1997

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31997D0277

97/277/EC: Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Only the English text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)

Official Journal L 110 , 26/04/1997 P. 0053 - 0076

COMMISSION DECISION of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Only the English text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (97/277/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 57 (2) (a) thereof,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (1), as amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, and in particular Articles 8 (3) and 22 thereof,

Having regard to the Commission decision of 26 July 1996 to initiate proceedings in this case,

Having given the undertakings concerned the opportunity to make known their views on the objections raised by the Commission,

Having regard to the opinion of the Advisory Committee on Concentrations (2),

Whereas:

1. The procedure under consideration concerns a request from the Finnish Office of Free Competition pursuant to Article 22 of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (the Merger Regulation) to examine the acquisition of Tuko Oy by Kesko Oy. The request was received by the Commission on 26 June 1996. The operation was made known to the Office of Free Competition on 27 May 1996 by means of a press release sent from Kesko Oy. The request pursuant to Article 22 has therefore been made within the one-month period provided for in Article 22 (4).

2. After examination of the abovementioned request the Commission concluded that the request was admissible within the meaning of Article 22 of the Merger Regulation and that the concentration raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market. By decision of 26 July 1996, the Commission accordingly initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6 (1) (c) of the Merger Regulation.

I. THE PARTIES

3. Kesko Oy (Kesko) is a limited company incorporated in Finland. The share capital of Kesko is divided into exclusive shares and ordinary shares. Its ordinary shares are quoted on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Holders of ordinary shares are entitled to one vote on a holding of between 1 and 10 000 shares and an additional vote for each subsequent 10 000 shares. No holder of ordinary shares controls more than 7,08 % of Kesko's share capital (corresponding to 0,16 % of the votes).

4. The exclusive shares are, in principle, only held by Kesko retailers (K retailers), their pension fund and other organs close to the K retailers. The total number of exclusive shares make up 38 % of Kesko's total capital, but, since they carry six votes for the first 100 shares held and an additional vote for each subsequent 100 shares, the collective of K retailers in effect control the majority of votes in Kesko. This arrangement, whilst not conferring on the K retailers joint control within the meaning of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation, in effect precludes any third party from acquiring control of Kesko. According to the company charter of Kesko, all members of its Supervisory Board shall be K retailers. The Supervisory Board nominates all other decision-making and executive organs of Kesko.

5. Kesko and the K retailers who are, legally, independent entrepreneurs, are commonly referred to as 'the K block`. All K retailers are contractually bound to Kesko. They are active in the retail sales of daily consumer goods and/or speciality goods. Kesko's activities are also within the fields of daily consumer goods and speciality goods, as well as in the provision of numerous services relating to those activities.

6. Tuko Oy (Tuko) is a Finnish limited company, active in the wholesale and retail of daily consumer goods and speciality goods. In addition to its wholly-owned retail outlets, Tuko has contractual agreements with a large number of, legally, independent T retailers. Tuko and the T retailers are commonly referred to as 'the T block`.

II. THE OPERATION

7. On 27 May 1996 Kesko acquired 56,3 % of Tuko's share capital, thereby obtaining 59,3 % of the voting rights, and direct control of Tuko.

III. CONCENTRATION

8. The operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation.

IV. NO COMMUNITY DIMENSION

9. On the basis of the figures provided by the Office of Free Competition, the combined world-wide turnover of Kesko and Tuko exceeds ECU 5 billion. However, both Kesko and Tuko achieve more than two-thirds of their respective Community-wide turnover in Finland. It follows that the concentration has no Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1.

V. EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES

10. Kesko has argued that it is not within the Commission's competence to assess its acquisition of Tuko. In Kesko's view, the Commission would be excluded from assessing concentrations following a request pursuant to Article 22 (3) when the undertakings concerned realize more than two-thirds of their Community-wide turnover in the same Member State. However, Kesko's argument stems from a misinterpretation of the Interpretative Notes adopted at the same time as the Merger Regulation, which deal only with the intention of the Commission not to apply its residual powers pursuant to Article 89 of the Treaty of Rome if certain quantitative criteria are not fulfilled.

11. Article 22 (3) of the Merger Regulation requires that an effect on trade between Member States is shown. The acquisition of Tuko by Kesko will create foreclosure effects for new entrants, including potential entrants from other Member States, in particular on the Finnish markets for daily consumer goods. In addition, a large amount (about 30 %) of the products sold by both Kesko and Tuko originates outside Finland. The transaction will also affect trade between Member States in that suppliers from other Member States will, in effect, require access to Kesko's distribution channels to secure sufficient marketing of their products in Finland.

12. Moreover both companies are members of several international purchasing organizations, together with similar companies in other Member States. Since the spring of 1996, Kesko has also expanded its operations by opening retail outlets in Sweden.

13. It follows from the above that the change in the structure of the Finnish retail and wholesale markets for daily consumer goods will have an appreciable influence, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, on the pattern of trade between Member States (3).

VI. ASSESSMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 2 OF THE MERGER REGULATION

A. RELEVANT MARKETS

14. Kesko has argued that the current operation should be assessed at the wholesale rather than the retail level. The reason for this would be that the K retailers and T retailers are independent from the Kesko and Tuko companies and their central units. The assertion is based on the grounds that Kesko and Tuko basically provide purchasing, marketing, informatics, and other support services to the retailers, who nevertheless retain a large freedom of choice concerning supply sources, pricing policy, and other commercial matters, and indeed compete with each other as well as with other retailers.

15. Kesko's above argument cannot, however, be accepted. The assessment of the competitive impact of any concentration has to be based on all structural elements relating to the concentration, the parties thereto and the markets concerned. In this respect it is particularly appropriate to analyse the internal relationships of the Kesko group in the light of the major reorganization of this group, which was implemented in 1995. This analysis, see paragraphs 39 to 66, leads to the conclusion that the operation should be assessed at retail level since it is appropriate to consider Kesko, including the K retailers, as a centrally planned, structural feature of the Finnish retail market.

16. In addition to the assessment at retail level, an assessment will also be necessary at wholesale level, as regards cash-and-carry sales, as well as on the procurement markets for daily consumer goods.

17. According to the investigation, the concentration will primarily have an impact on the following markets:

(1) the retail market for daily consumer goods;

(2) the market for cash-and-carry sales of daily consumer goods;

(3) the markets for procurement of daily consumer goods.

1. The retail market for daily consumer goods

I. Relevant product market

18. The range of goods concerned includes principally food, drink, tobacco and non-food household consumables (that is, cleaning products, toiletries, disposable paper products, and healthcare products). A common characteristic of these products is that they all form part of a 'basket of daily consumer goods` that consumers expect to find in a supermarket environment. As the Finnish grocery retail sector has developed from small specialized stores (butchers, bakers, etc.) to the larger supermarket stores, consumer behaviour has developed accordingly. Therefore competition in Finland today takes place between supermarkets and other stores that are able to provide the kind of wide selection that enables the consumer to purchase most of the household necessities in a 'one-stop shop`, with attendant conveniences, such as parking facilities, trolleys, etc. (See also previous Commission decisions within this sector) (4).

19. Although the basket of goods supplied by different supermarkets may vary considerably in physical size, some smaller types of outlets...