Climate of Consensus: Managing Decision Making in the UN Climate Change Negotiations

• Date: 01 April 2015
• Author: Antto Vihma
• Published date: 01 April 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12093

Climate of Consensus: Managing Decision Making

in the UN Climate Change Negotiations

Antto Vihma*

The United Nations climate change negotiations have

been constantly hampered by procedural disputes and

unclear decision making. This article explores ideas for

reforming the decision making of the Conference of the

Parties (COP) and the importance of COP decisions. It

argues that scholars have tended to overlook the impor-

tance of COP decisions in global climate governance as

a whole, on the one hand, and the weak practices of

the COP’s decision-making process, on the other. The

article underscores that while majority voting is not

politically viable – although voting on a limited set of

issues is potentially useful – decision making can be

significantly improved by enhancing the current prac-

tices of consensus building. The article calls for the

strategic leadership role of the COP Presidency to be

recognized and its best practices institutionalized. The

primary goal of this article is to contribute to the wider

ongoing debate on the possibilities and limitations of

the regime established by the United Nations Frame-

work Convention on Climate Change.

INTRODUCTION

In the yearly aftermath of United Nations (UN) climate

change meetings, many reporters, academics, negotia-

tors and civil society organizations usually criticize the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC) for another disappointing outcome.

Some call for a reform of the UN model of multilateral

negotiations; others argue for abandoning the talks

altogether or moving the negotiations elsewhere.1These

suggestions enter the expert and public consciousness

alike via the mass media. Indeed, the UNFCCC negotia-

tions have been constantly hampered by procedural

disputes and unclear decision making.2Over the years,

the climate negotiations have been characterized by

controversies over agendas, transparency, decision-

making procedures and interpretations of the consen-

sus requirement, as well as various other procedural

issues.3The climate negotiations have also intensified

on many levels since they were launched in the 1990s:

there has been a gradual increase in sessions, sub-

groups, decisions, ministers, participation by heads of

State and government, documents and money in the

UNFCCC system.4Meanwhile, global greenhouse gas

emissions have increased rapidly.5The 2° Celsius target

is in danger of slipping out of reach.6Taken together,

these factors raise questions about how to enhance the

efficiency of the UN climate negotiations – and espe-

cially how best to manage or reform the decision-

making procedures of the UNFCCC.

In this article, I explore ideas for reforming the decision

making of the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties

(COP) and the importance of COP decisions. I argue

that while their legal implications are highly contextual,

COP decisions are growing in importance. The

decision-making process of the COP, however, remains

problematic. This article underscores that while major-

ity voting in the decision making does not seem politi-

cally viable – although voting on a limited set of issues

is possible and potentially useful – it can be signifi-

* Corresponding author.

Email: antto.vihma@f‌iia.f‌i.

1Many prominent analysts have raised these issues. See, e.g., D.G.

Victor, Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies

for Protecting the Planet (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Several

policy makers have voiced their frustration since the Copenhagen

meeting in 2009 in particular. For a forthright example, see the

remarks by Mohammed Nasheed, the President of the Maldives, at

the Durban meeting in 2011: ‘The current negotiation process is

stupid, useless and endless. It is based on this principle: two Parties

reach an agreement, a third one comes alone and says it doesn’t

agree and it reduces the ambition of the others.’ ‘UN Climate Talks

“Stupid, Useless and Endless” ’, The News (14 October 2011),

found at: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID

=72410&Cat=1>.

2J. Werksman, Procedural and Institutional Aspects of the Emerging

Climate Change Regime: Do Improvised Procedures Lead to Impov-

erished Rules? (Foundation for International Environmental Law and

Development, 1999).

3J. Depledge and P. Chasek, ‘Raising the Tempo: The Escalating

Pace and Intensity of Environmental Negotiations’, in: P. Chasek and

L. Wagner (eds.), The Roads from Rio: Lessons Learned from

Twenty Years of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations (Routledge,

2012), 19; K. Kulovesi, ‘A New Chapter in the UN Climate Change

Negotiations? First Steps under the Durban Platform for Enhanced

Action’, 3:1 Climate Law (2012), 181; J. Depledge, ‘Looking Back and

Looking to Others: Insights on the Organization of the Climate

Change Negotiations’ (unpublished, 2010); A. Vihma and K. Kulovesi,

Strengthening the Global Climate Negotiations: Improving the Eff‌i-

ciency of the UNFCCC Process (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2012),

found at: <http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2012-

902>.

4See J. Depledge and P. Chasek, n. 3 above.

5United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emissions

Gap Report 2013 (UNEP, 2013).

6Ibid., at 4.

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Review of European Community & International Environmental Law

RECIEL 24 (1) 2015. ISSN 2050-0386 DOI: 10.1111/reel.12093

© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

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