Heroin and other opioids

• Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EU body or agency), Europol (EU body or agency)
• Pages: 104-124

104

Key points

Europe’s opioid problem

 Opioid use still accounts for the largest proportion of

the harms associated with illicit drug consumption in the

EU, including high rates of morbidity and mortality. It is

estimated that there are about 1.3 million problem users

of opioids, mainly heroin, in the EU. e retail value of the

heroin market was estimated to be at least EUR7.4billion

per year in 2017.

 ere is evidence of apotential threat from increased

heroin availability in Europe. Opium production estimates

in Afghanistan are at historically high levels, seizures are

increasing in Turkey, some large consignments have been

detected within the EU and intelligence assessments

suggest increased activity levels along major tracking

routes into Europe. Taken together, these indicate

apotential for increased heroin availability.

 Vigilance is required to identify any availability-driven

increases in heroin use. Currently, demand indicators still

point to an overall stable and ageing population of heroin

users, and the volume of heroin seizures in the EU is

relatively stable but small in relation to both consumption

and production estimates. However, monitoring systems

may be relatively insensitive to new recruitment into heroin

use. It is important, therefore, to be alert for other signs of

increased availability.

 Synthetic opioids, such as methadone, buprenorphine,

tramadol and fentanyl derivatives, are also available on

the drug market in the EU and represent agrowing threat.

ey now account for around one in ve new opioid-related

treatment demands. Because of the ways in which they

are produced, sourced and used, synthetic opioids pose

additional challenges from regulatory, law enforcement and

health perspectives.

 Turkish OCGs continue to maintain control over the

wholesale importation of heroin into Europe. is is

because of their long-standing presence and capacities

in key production and tracking areas. In addition, other

OCGs, including Dutch, British, Western Balkan, Iranian and

Pakistani groups, are also major players in dierent parts of

Europe. An overlap often exists between OCGs involved in

heroin supply and those involved in the tracking of other

drugs, precursors, weapons and other illicit commodities.

Developments in production and

tracking

 ere are signs of production spreading to new

countries, including some in the EU. is is suggested by

morphine seizures outside Afghanistan and the recent

detection of heroin production in some EU countries. In

part, this development appears driven by dierences in

precursor costs and availability.

 Attempts to divert acetic anhydride, the main heroin

precursor, appear to be increasing within the EU. It is

far cheaper to source in the EU than in areas nearer to

opium-producing countries and there is evidence of it being

tracked from the EU, mostly by land but sometimes also

by maritime container, along the Balkan route to heroin

production areas.

 Sources of synthetic opioids are diverse. Conventional

tracking approaches, diversion from medical use and

online purchase are all important for synthetic opioids.

e last is especially relevant to non-controlled opioids

appearing as NPS. Although uncommon, some production

in the EU has also been detected.

CHAPTER 4

Heroin and other opioids

EU DRUG MARKETS REPORT

105

 e Balkan route still remains the key corridor for heroin

entry into the EU. is means that, in terms of organised

crime activities and anti-tracking measures, Turkey

remains of central importance for actions to disrupt the

tracking of heroin to the EU market.

 Evidence suggests that heroin tracking on the

Southern route to the EU may be increasing while activities

on the Northern route decline. Important changes appear

to be taking place on the Southern route, particularly

in relation to tracking through the Suez Canal. is is

occurring against abackground of agrowth in domestic

heroin problems in some African countries.

 Recently seizures of very large heroin consignments,

both by land and particularly at sea, have been made

along tracking routes towards the EU. Iran is reported as

adeparture country for many of these.

 High-potency synthetic opioids pose challenges for law

enforcement and health. Synthetic opioids are increasingly

traded online and dispatched by post. For some synthetic

opioids this means that small-volume packages can

account for alarge number of potential consumer

doses. Not only does this increase the challenges for

law enforcement but the high potency of some synthetic

opioids also results in an increased risk to both consumers

and others, who may be accidentally exposed to these

substances.

Implications for action to address

current threats and increase

preparedness

In order to respond eectively to current and emerging

threats in the area, there is aneed to take the following

actions.

■Build on the lessons learnt from successful cocaine

interdiction strategies at major ports. To address the

relative rarity of large heroin seizures at EU borders,

Member States need support to develop further

risk analysis and proling capacity at land border-

crossing points and at smaller European ports located

on potential heroin-tracking routes into the EU,

particularly on the Balkan route.

■In particular, respond to the growing threat resulting

from the tracking of large quantities of heroin and

acetic anhydride by means of container shipping.

is requires investment in monitoring, investigating

and targeting of OCGs active in this area, and

strengthening of screening programmes for both

inward- and outward-bound containers and vehicles.

■Improve the understanding of the dynamics of heroin

tracking within, and to, the EU through better

monitoring of, sharing information about and forensic

analysis of heroin production sites, as well as the

origins of large seizures of heroin, morphine and acetic

anhydride.

■Give greater priority to the Southern route by increasing

operational capacities and threat assessment. Eorts

are particularly needed in aected African countries to

strengthen the monitoring and interdiction of heroin in

major ports and respond to any resulting displacement

in tracking activities.

■Raise stakeholder awareness and develop new

regulatory and investigative tools to prevent the

diversion of acetic anhydride. is requires better

monitoring and back-tracking investigations by law

enforcement agencies in close coordination with other

relevant agencies that have arole in drug precursor

control.

■Recognise the potential threat posed by synthetic

opioids by scaling up information sharing about,

analysis of and forensic proling of seizures, internet

sales, production sites and the diversion of opioids

from legal or quasi-legal sources. Continuing

engagement with producer countries such as China,

India and Russia is also needed.

■Improve eorts and develop new tools to identify

and provide early warnings of trends in the use of

synthetic opioids, or new recruitment into heroin

use, to facilitate the more rapid development and

targeting of appropriate supply- and demand-related

interventions.

■Raise stakeholders’ awareness that responding to

opioid-related problems should remain apolicy priority

and that vigilance is required because athreat exists

that arapid change in consumption patterns of either

established drugs, such as heroin, or newer synthetic

opioids is possible and could result in signicant for

individuals and society.

CHAPTER 4

I

Heroin and other opioids