The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement

Date01 July 2016
Published date01 July 2016
AuthorDaniel Bodansky
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12154
The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement
Daniel Bodansky*
From start to f‌inish, the question of legal form or char-
acter was central to the Paris negotiations. The Paris
Agreement is a treaty within the def‌inition of the
every provision of the agreement creates a legal
obligation. It contains a mix of mandatory and non-
mandatory provisions relating to partiesmitigation
contributions, as well as to the other elements of the
Durban Platform, including adaptation and f‌inance.
One cannot def‌initively say how much the legally bind-
ing character of the Paris Agreement matters. Making
the agreement legally binding may provide a greater
signal of commitment and greater assurance of com-
pliance. But transparency, accountability and preci-
sion can also make a signif‌icant difference, and legal
bindingness can be a double-edged sword if it leads
States not to participate or to make less ambitious
commitments. Thus, the issue of legal character,
though important, is only one factor in assessing the
signif‌icance of the Paris outcome.
INTRODUCTION
From start to f‌inish, the question of legal form or char-
acter was central to the Paris negotiations. The f‌inal
issue decided at the 2011 Durban Conference, when the
negotiations began, concerned the legal form of the
instrument to be developed. And the last issue decided
in Paris, when the negotiations concluded, concerned
the legal character of one of the Paris Agreements pro-
visions. In both cases, the question of legal character
was resolved obliquely in Durban, by adopting a for-
mulation whose meaning no one understood, and in
Paris, by correcting an error in the text, which had con-
verted a provision intended to be non-binding into a
binding obligation, by using the verb shallrather than
should.
The obsession with the Paris outcomes legal character
may seem curious to scholars sceptical that interna-
tional law signif‌icantly affects State behaviour.
1
Whether or not the Paris Agreement is legally binding,
it lacks enforcement machinery and is not necessarily
justiciable, at least in some countries. Nevertheless,
States clearly thought the issue of legal form mattered,
and this belief itself became an important reality in the
negotiations, which signif‌icantly shaped the ultimate
result.
Confusion about the legal character of the Paris Agree-
ment is widespread, and ref‌lects a failure to distinguish
carefully between seven related but distinct issues: (i)
the legal form of the agreement itself, that is, whether it
is a treaty under international law; (ii) whether individ-
ual provisions of the agreement create legal obligations;
(iii) whether the provisions of the agreement are suff‌i-
ciently precise that they serve to constrain States; (iv)
whether the agreement can be applied by courts; (v)
whether the agreement is enforceable; (vi) whether the
agreement otherwise promotes accountability, for
example, through systems of transparency and review;
and (vii) the domestic acceptance process and legal sta-
tus of the agreement.
2
Even a scholar as knowledgeable
as Anne-Marie Slaughter, former president of the
American Society of International Law, confuses the
issues of legal form, enforceability and domestic
acceptance, when she writes that treaties must contain
enforceable ruleswith sanctions for non-compliance
and must be ratif‌ied by domestic parliaments so that
they become a part of domestic law. Because the Paris
Agreement is none of these things, she concludes that
it is essentially a statement of good intentionsrather
than law.
3
Similarly, another leading international law
scholar, Richard Falk, describes the Paris Agreement as
voluntaryand says that there is not even an obligation
to comply.
4
At least as a matter of international law,
none of these statements is true. The Paris Agreement
does qualify as a treaty within the meaning of interna-
tional law; it does create legal obligations for its parties;
and compliance with these obligations is not voluntary.
* Corresponding author.
Email: Daniel.Bodansky@asu.edu
1
J.L. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, The Limits of International Law
(Oxford University Press, 2005).
2
To some extent, some of the confusion results from using the term
‘legally binding’ in different ways. F. Sindico, ‘Is the Paris Agreement
Really Binding’, Strathclyde Centre for Environmental Law and
Governance, Policy Brief No. 03/2015 (2015).
3
A.-M. Slaughter, ‘The Paris Approach to Global Governance’,
Project-Syndicate (28 December 2015), found at: <https://www.
project-syndicate.org/commentary/paris-agreement-model-for-global-
governance-by-anne-marie-slaughter-2015-12>.
4
R. Falk, ‘Voluntary International Law and the Paris Agreement’ (16
January 2016), found at: <https://richardfalk.wordpress.com/2016/01/
16/voluntary-international-law-and-the-paris-agreement/>.Along simi-
lar lines, Falk says that the Paris Agreement raises ‘serious questions
as to whether anything at all had even been agreed’ and ‘went to great
lengths to avoid obligating the parties’. Ibid.
ª2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
142
RECIEL 25 (2) 2016. ISSN 2050-0386 DOI: 10.1111/reel.12154
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