The Minamata Convention: A Comprehensive Response to a Global Problem
| Date | 01 July 2014 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12079 |
| Author | Franz Xaver Perrez,Henrik Hallgrim Eriksen |
| Published date | 01 July 2014 |
The Minamata Convention: A Comprehensive
Response to a Global Problem
Henrik Hallgrim Eriksen and Franz Xaver Perrez
This article gives an overview of the negotiation
history and the main elements of the Minamata Con-
vention. It starts with a short description of the global
risks posed by mercury and the findings of the global
assessment of 2002 that led to the proposal by Norway
and Switzerland in 2003 to develop a legally binding
instrument on mercury. It then discusses the interna-
tional process that led to the adoption of a mandate to
negotiate such an instrument in 2009, followed by a
summary of the negotiation process. The article next
offers an overview of the key provisions of the Conven-
tion and provides an analysis of the main factors
behind the outcome. It also analyzes particular diffi-
culties of the negotiations connected to the concerns of
specific countries. The article concludes by highlight-
ing reasons why the negotiations were so successful.
INTRODUCTION
Mercury has been used for a long time because of its
unique properties, being a metal that is liquid at normal
temperatures. Some hazardous properties of mercury
have long been known, and the negative health effects
of direct exposure to mercury vapour were recognized
early. However, the recognition of the negative effects
on human health and the environment of the organic
methyl mercury compound has been more recent.
Organic mercury compounds were first described in the
1800s, and there were reports of methyl mercury poi-
soning in 1865.1However, it was only a century later,
following widespread contamination, that the severe
risk to human health and the environment of methyl
mercury was recognized. The most notable event was
the catastrophic pollution in Minamata, Japan, where
industrial releases of methyl mercury caused the epi-
demic known as the ‘Minamata disease’ in the 1950s
and onwards.2
Scientific research further developed the understanding
of the risks of methyl mercury at lower levels of expo-
sure, particularly with regard to the risks of impaired
brain development in children and foetuses.3This
research also made it clear that risks from mercury were
not limited to the vicinity of local releases, which had
happened in Minamata. Through long-range transport
and bioaccumulation in fish, risks to human health and
environment could be present all around the world.
Moreover, it was widely recognized that the anthropo-
genic releases of mercury into the environment had been
increasing significantly since pre-industrial times. As
mercury is an element and is not broken down in the
environment, there was growing concern that these
releases would contribute to a growing pool of
bioaccessible mercury in the environment.
Risk reduction measures for mercury in the 1990s were
increasingly adopted in national legislation, including
in the European Union (EU). At the international level,
there were initiatives under the North Sea Conferences
and the OSPAR Convention for the North-East Atlantic4
to reduce or eliminate mercury releases.5Importantly,
the combination of increasing global releases and
potential severe risks to human health and the environ-
ment spurred the initiative to undertake a global assess-
ment of mercury by the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP).
This article will give an overview of the process that led
from the global mercury assessment of 2002 to the
adoption of the Minamata Convention in 2013, analyze
the key provisions of the Convention and conclude by
highlighting reasons for the success of the negotiations.
1J.R. Barrett, ‘An Uneven Path Forward: The History of Methylmer-
cury Toxicity Research’, 118:8 Environmental Health Perspectives
(2010), A352.
2N. Iriguchi, Minamata Bay 1932 (Nippon Hyoron Sha, 2012), at x,
xiii, xiv, 59, 65–67, 115 and 133–134.
3P. Grandjean et al., ‘Cognitive Deficit in 7-year-old Children with
Prenatal Exposure to Methylmercury’, 19:6 Neurotoxicology and
Teratology (1997), 417.
4Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic (Paris, 22 September 1992; in force 25 March
1998). On the North Sea Conferences, see: <http://www.ospar.org/
content/content.asp?menu=00590624000000_000000_000000>.
5The Hague Declaration in 1990 committed to a 70% reduction in
releases between 1985 and 1995. See Ministerial Declaration of the
Third International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea
(The Hague, 8 March 1990). Mercury was also identified as a haz-
ardous substance under the OSPAR Convention, with the aim to stop
releases by 2020. See OSPAR Commission, Summary Record
OSPAR 98/14/1, Annex 34, at 9.
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RECIEL 23 (2) 2014. ISSN 2050-0386 DOI: 10.1111/reel.12079
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195
THE UNEP MERCURY
ASSESSMENT
In 2001, at the 21st session of the UNEP Governing
Council (UNEP GC), the United States proposed a study
on mercury, stressing that it should not prejudge any
actions. The EU and Iceland supported such an assess-
ment, and there was also a strong call for such action
from the Arctic Council. Norway, Iceland, the Nether-
lands and the Czech Republic agreed, but also proposed
that the assessment should cover other heavy metals of
concern.6Such a broadening of the mandate did not
gain sufficient traction, and this split was to influence
the later discussions on action. The decision on
mercury assessment7asked for UNEP to undertake a
global assessment of mercury and its compounds, to
report on the results of the assessment to the 22nd
UNEP GC, and to consider whether there is a need for
assessments of other heavy metals of concern. The deci-
sion included a preambular clause underlining the need
to take preventive actions to protect human health
and the environment, mindful of the precautionary
approach.
In 2003, the Global Mercury Assessment was presented
to the 22nd UNEP GC, who accepted the assessment’s
finding ‘that there is sufficient evidence of significant
global adverse impacts from mercury and its com-
pounds to warrant further international action to
reduce the risks to human health and the environment’
and decided to launch a Programme for International
Action on Mercury to facilitate and conduct technical
assistance and capacity-building activities to support
the efforts of countries to take action on mercury
pollution.8
THE CALL FOR A LEGALLY
BINDING INSTRUMENT
ON MERCURY
The Global Mercury Assessment underlined the inter-
national dimension of the mercury problem and
the need for strengthened international action. In
response, Norway and Switzerland identified the need
for a comprehensive legally binding instrument on
mercury, and decided to propose this course of action to
the UNEP GC in 2003.9Although Norway was the first
to take the initiative, it was not a member of the UNEP
GC in 2003 and therefore needed a UNEP GC member
as co-sponsor to be able to formally submit its proposal
to negotiate a legally binding instrument on mercury.
Norway and Switzerland had a history of longstanding
close cooperation on international chemicals policy and
Switzerland immediately agreed to co-sponsor the pro-
posal.10 The EU, who had implemented a comprehen-
sive body of legislation to control emissions and the
use of mercury, similarly supported this early call
for a legally binding instrument, and for the Nordic
EU-members, mercury was an important priority.
Other key supporters were the African Group and some
Latin American countries.11 The proponents for a legally
binding approach to mercury argued that in light of
the global dimension of the problem, including
transboundary externalities and trade implications,
voluntary actions alone would be insufficient to reduce
use and emissions, and that a legally binding instru-
ment would be the most robust and most effective
framework for concrete action, including international
cooperation and support.
However, the UNEP GC was not able to agree on a
mandate for such negotiations in 2003. Several coun-
tries, including the United States, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand, opposed a legally binding approach
and advocated focusing resources on voluntary action.
They argued that a legally binding instrument would
require a lot of time and resources to negotiate and
implement, that it would be more costly and less effec-
tive than direct voluntary action, that more time would
be needed to assess the effectiveness of UNEP’s volun-
tary mercury programme, that a voluntary approach
would be ‘the way of getting things done on the ground’
and that therefore valuable resources would better be
used for more immediate and effective programmes,
such as strengthening the UNEP’s mercury pro-
gramme.12 Moreover, China and India argued that a
6C. Bai et al., ‘Summary of the 21st Session of the UNEP Governing
Council and Second Global Ministerial Environment Forum, 5–9 Feb-
ruary 2001’, 16:6 Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2001), at 9.
7UNEP GC, Decision 21/5, Mercury Assessment (9 February 2001).
8UNEP GC, Decision 22/4, Chemicals (7 February 2003), found at:
<http://www.chem.unep.ch/mercury/mandate-2003.htm>, at section
V, operative paragraphs 1 and 4 and Annex. Switzerland objected to
the name ‘Mercury Programme’, as this could eliminate possibilities
for further action on other heavy metals under the same framework.
See S. Ganzleben et al., ‘Summary of the 22nd session of the UNEP
Governing Council and Fourth Global Ministerial Environment Forum,
3–7 February 2003’, 16:30 Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2003), at 6.
9Draft UNEP GC Decision proposed by Norway and Switzerland, on
file with the authors.
10 P. Poldervaart, ‘Mercury Convention: Persistence Makes a Break-
through Possible’ (2010), found at: <http://www.bafu.admin.ch/
dokumentation/umwelt/09249/09365/index.html?lang=en>.
11 S. Andresen, K. Rosendal and J.B. Skjærseth, ‘Why Negotiate a
Legally Binding Mercury Convention?’, 13:4 International Environ-
mental Agreements (2013), 425, at 425, 431 and 434; N.E. Selin and
H. Selin, ‘Global Politics of Mercury Pollution: The Need for Multi-
scale Governance’, 15:3 Review of European Community and Inter-
national Environmental Law (2006), 258.
12 See S. Andresen et al., n. 11 above, at 432; UNEP, Views Submit-
ted by Governments, Intergovernmental Organizations and Non-
governmental Organizations on the Progress Made on a Mercury
Programme (UN Doc. UNEP/GC.23/INF/19, 23 December 2004);
S. Ganzleben et al., n. 8 above, at 6.
HENRIK HALLGRIM ERIKSEN AND FRANZ XAVER PERREZ RECIEL 23 (2) 2014
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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