European Financial Management

Publisher:
Wiley
Publication date:
2021-02-01
ISBN:
1354-7798

Issue Number

Latest documents

  • Bank credit constraints for women‐led SMEs: Self‐restraint or lender bias?

    We test the existence of possible gender biases affecting firm behavior in demanding and obtaining bank credit using a cross‐country sample of European small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). We show consistent evidence that female‐led firms are more likely than their male counterparts to refrain from applying for loans. When they apply, female‐led enterprises do not seem to face gender discrimination from the lender. Interestingly, however, signs of gender bias appear to arise during the upside phase of the economy. Overall, our study provides support for policy actions aimed at reducing the frictions faced by women‐led SMEs when accessing credit markets.

  • Why do stock repurchases change over time?

    Recent studies have shown the time trends of firm stock repurchase behavior. We examine these time changes for stock repurchase through the lens of real activities earnings management. Managers appear more likely to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases since the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Furthermore, suspect firms that just missed analyst earnings per share forecasts have higher incentives to manipulate earnings through stock repurchases. The results are not driven by changes in corporate governance associated with the passage of SOX. Overall, our results suggest earnings management can be a significant determinant of the dynamics of stock repurchases.

  • Issue Information: European Financial Management 4/2020
  • Innovations in financing: The impact of anchor investors in Indian IPOs

    In 2009, the Securities Exchange Board of India allowed qualified institutional investors to anchor initial public offerings (IPOs) by participating in the issue at a price and allocation publicly disclosed preceding the issue. We study anchor investors (AIs) in Indian IPOs during 2009–2017. We find the share allotment and the number of AIs separately have significant impacts on valuation and underpricing; however, the net effect is nonsignificant. Further, AIs significantly influence other institutional investors' participation in the IPO and induce lower aftermarket volatility. Overall, our evidence suggests that AIs boost demand for and mitigate ex ante information uncertainty of IPOs.

  • Investment and asset securitization with an option‐for‐guarantee swap

    This article addresses the investment and financing decisions of entrepreneurs entering into option‐for‐guarantee swaps (OGSs). OGSs increase investment option value significantly. Entrepreneurs initially accelerate their investments and then postpone them as funding gaps grow. Guarantee costs increase with project risks when the funding gap is sufficiently small or large, but the opposite holds true otherwise. Investments are postponed when project risks, effective tax rates, or bankruptcy costs increase. Surprisingly, the higher the project risk, the more the entrepreneur will borrow, with a much higher leverage than predicted by classic models. Entrepreneurs can use OGSs to securitize their assets.

  • Estimating portfolio risk for tail risk protection strategies

    We forecast portfolio risk for managing dynamic tail risk protection strategies, based on extreme value theory, expectile regression, copula‐GARCH and dynamic generalized autoregressive score models. Utilizing a loss function that overcomes the lack of elicitability for expected shortfall, we propose a novel expected shortfall (and value‐at‐risk) forecast combination approach, which dominates simple and sophisticated standalone models as well as a simple average combination approach in modeling the tail of the portfolio return distribution. While the associated dynamic risk targeting or portfolio insurance strategies provide effective downside protection, the latter strategies suffer less from inferior risk forecasts, given the defensive portfolio insurance mechanics.

  • Banks' home bias in government bond holdings: Will banks in low‐rated countries invest in European safe bonds (ESBies)?

    This paper offers two new explanations for banks' home bias in government bond holdings: a sovereign‐based rating cap on corporates and the existence of a ‘bank tax.’ These are complementary to the four explanations offered in the literature: risk‐shifting, gambling for resurrection, moral suasion, and a means to store liquidity for financing future investment. Collectively, they cast doubt on the European Union's demand‐led approach to investment in European safe bonds (ESBies) by banks in low‐rated countries. Bank regulations such as constraints on large exposure or risk‐based capital on credit risk concentration will be needed if the objective is to break the so‐called ‘deadly embrace.’

  • Differences in CEO compensation under large and small institutional ownership

    I examine the influence of large and small institutional investors on different components of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, using US data for 2006–2015. An increase in large institutional ownership reduces total pay and current incentive compensation (i.e., options, stocks, bonus pay), whereas small institutional investors lower long‐term incentive pay (i.e., pension, deferred pay, stock incentive pay). These findings are consistent with managerial agency theory and the substitution of incentive pay by institutional monitoring. The effects are stronger for higher ownership levels and firms with weak governance, less financial distress, long‐tenured CEOs, multiple segments, and more free cash flow.

  • Trust, regulation, and contracting institutions

    This paper demonstrates that trust directly influences contracting efficiency. We document that trust reduces demand for contract regulation and positively relates to a high‐quality contracting environment, supporting a substitution hypothesis. Furthermore, contract regulation no longer leads to poor contracting outcomes. These findings suggest that lack of trust significantly explains inefficient contracting institutions. Based on interaction effects, we note that trust could complement formal enforcement in countries with weak regulation. As regulation increases, trust substitutes for contract regulation. Overall, trust positively promotes efficient contracting by reducing burdensome regulation and providing an alternative to formal contract enforcement.

  • Keeping it real or keeping it simple? Ownership concentration measures compared

    We analyze the distributional properties of ownership concentration measures and find that measures come from different underlying statistical distributions. Consistent with theory, some measures that are classified to represent a monitoring dimension have a positive influence on firm performance; other measures that are interpreted to represent a shareholder conflict dimension are negatively related to firm performance. However, other measures deviate from this pattern, and therefore, we cannot conclude that simple measures can replace complicated measures. Some measures are more suitable for analyzing the relationship between management and owners, whereas other measures are more suitable for analyzing the relationships among owners.

Featured documents

  • Bank credit constraints for women‐led SMEs: Self‐restraint or lender bias?

    We test the existence of possible gender biases affecting firm behavior in demanding and obtaining bank credit using a cross‐country sample of European small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). We show consistent evidence that female‐led firms are more likely than their male counterparts to...

  • Target information asymmetry and takeover strategy: Insights from a new perspective

    We examine the relation between information asymmetry and firm value around a merger and acquisition (M&A). Owing to the due diligence and intense scrutiny around M&A announcements, acquisitions are significant shocks to a target's information asymmetry. We find that M&A announcement‐per...

  • Differences in CEO compensation under large and small institutional ownership

    I examine the influence of large and small institutional investors on different components of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, using US data for 2006–2015. An increase in large institutional ownership reduces total pay and current incentive compensation (i.e., options, stocks, bonus pay),...

  • More than Just Contrarians: Insider Trading in Glamour and Value Firms

    This study examines the patterns of, and long‐run returns to, directors’ (insiders’) trades along the value‐glamour continuum in all stocks listed on the main London Stock Exchange and analyses what these directors’ trades add to a naïve value‐glamour strategy. We consider alternative definitions...

  • Envy‐Motivated Merger Waves

    This study examines whether top managerial executive envy plays an important role in merger waves. Since managerial benefits, especially compensation, always increase with firm size, the envy hypothesis conjectures that top executive officers rush into acquisitions due to their envious psychology...

  • Managerial incentives for attracting attention

    This paper studies the mechanisms which motivate managers to engage in cheap talk and attract the market's attention in a credible way. We consider stock split announcements, voluntary earnings forecasts, and press releases issued by firms to the media as proxies for managerial cheap talk. We show...

  • Financial Hedging and Firm Performance: Evidence from Cross‐border Mergers and Acquisitions

    Using a sample of 1,369 cross‐border acquisitions announced by Standard & Poor's 1500 firms between 2000 and 2014, we find strong evidence that derivatives users experience higher announcement returns than non‐users, which translates into a US$ 193.7 million shareholder gain for an average‐sized...

  • Private Equity Lemons?Evidence on Value Creation in Secondary Buyouts

    This paper analyses whether secondary buyouts have a value creation profile and offer equity returns different from those of primary buyouts. Using a sample of 2,456 buyout transactions (including 448 secondary buyouts), we find no evidence that secondary buyouts generate lower equity returns or...

  • The Revealed Preference of Sophisticated Investors

    Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) have shown that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) best represents the revealed preferences of any investor who can invest in mutual funds (i.e., all investors). This claim seems overly broad, as it applies to all asset classes. However, we show that hedge fund...

  • Agency‐Based Asset Pricing and the Beta Anomaly

    I argue that delegated portfolio management can cause the equilibrium relation between CAPM beta and expected stock returns to become flat, instead of linearly positive, and propose an alternative to the widely used Fama and French (1993) 3‐factor asset pricing model which incorporates this agency...