Making ships cleaner: Reducing air pollution from international shipping

• Date: 01 November 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12220
• Author: Sophia Kopela
• Published date: 01 November 2017

RECIEL. 2017;26:231–242.    

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wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/reel

DOI: 10.1111/reel.12220

SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE

Making ships cleaner: Reducing air pollution from international

shipping

Sophia Kopela

© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Correspondence

Email: s.kopela@lancaster.ac.uk This article assesses the international legal framework for the reduction of air pollution

from international shipping and the measures adopted by the International Maritime

Organization (IMO). It sheds light on the difficulties and challenges in the IMO nego-

tiations, the ensuing compromises, and the role and interests of the various stakehold-

ers. It further identifies the inadequacies of the regulatory framework and the

challenges in its implementation, and explores the prospects for the adoption of fur-

ther measures to strengthen it. The article also evaluates unilateral measures adopted

by port and coastal States, especially with respect to jurisdictional issues in their mari-

time zones. Finally, it assesses the role of private and hybrid initiatives and standards

as part of a multi- actor governance system for tackling air pollution.

1 | INTRODUCTION

Air pollution from international shipping is known to have adverse ef-

fects on human health and on the environment, and to contribute to

global warming.1 Emissions of air pollutants from ships account for a

significant part of total global emissions.2 An increase of demand for

maritime transport3 and better understanding of the impacts of air

pollution from ships have enhanced the need and urgency for the de-

velopment of a robust regulatory framework for reducing air pollutant

emissions from ships. Given that maritime transport and shipping con-

cern global activities and that the air and atmosphere are shared re-

sources and part of the global commons, an international regulatory

framework is required to ensure an effective solution to the problem.

Adopting such a regulatory framework has been challenging due to

the cost implications for the shipping industry, the competitiveness of

maritime transport vis-à-vis other means of transport, and potential

impacts on trade.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been actively en-

gaged in discussions on how to tackle air pollution from ships, enhance

energy efficiency and ensure sustainable maritime transport for the future.

In November 1991, the IMO Assembly adopted Resolution A.719(17) on

Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships, which called on the Marine

Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) to draft a new Annex to the

1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships

(MARPOL)4 on prevention of air pollution.5 Annex VI was adopted in 1997

as a Protocol to the MARPOL Convention6 and entered into force on 19

May 2005. Annex VI was revised and amended in 2008 to strengthen the

legal regulation in the light of new technological innovations and the ex-

perience from implementing the relevant standards.7 This Annex currently

has88partieswhichrepresent96.16 percentofthegrosstonnageofthe

1European Environment Agency (EEA), ‘The Impact of International Shipping on European Air

Quality and Climate Forcing’ (EEA 2013) 38–39; A Miola et al, ‘Regulating Air Emissions from

Ships: The State of the Art on Methodologies, Technologies and Policy Options’ (European

Commission Joint Research Centre 2010)

erence_report_2010_11_ships_emissions.pdf> 12–14.

2The Third IMO Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Study estimated that in 2007–2012 SOx and NOx

emissionsfrominternationalshippingrepresentedapproximately12and13 percentofglobal

SOx and NOx emissions, respectively; IMO, ‘Third IMO GHG Study 2014’ (MEPC 67/INF.3) 14,

para 1.2. It has also been found that SOx emissions from ships are substantially higher than the

equivalent emissions from land transport and aviation; International Transport Forum (ITF)

and Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD), ‘Reducing Sulphur

Emission from Ships: The Impact of International Regulation’ (2016) (ITF/OECD report) 10.

3K Cullinane and S Cullinane, ‘Atmospheric Emissions from Shipping: The Need for Regulation

and Approaches to Compliance’ (2013) 33 Transport Reviews 377, 382.

4International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (adopted 2 November

1973, entered into force, as modified by the Protocol of 1978, 2 October 1983) 1340 UNTS

184 (MARPOL).

5IMO, ‘Assembly Resolution A.719(17), Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships’ (6 November 1991).

6Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from

Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto (MARPOL) (Annex VI on the

Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships) (adopted 26 September 1997, entered into force 19

May 2005) .

7IMO Resolution MEPC.176(58), ‘Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1997 to

Amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as

Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto’; and IMO Resolution MEPC.177(58),

‘Amendments to the Technical Code on Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine

Diesel Engines’ (adopted on 10 October 2008) in IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 58th

Session’ (MEPC 58/23/Add.1) Annex 13–14.

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world’s merchant shipping.8 The adopted measures mainly include

emission control limits of certain pollutants such as sulphur oxides (SOx),

nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter (PM) and volatile organic com-

pounds (VOCs). Annex VI was further amended in 2011 and 2016 to in-

clude measures for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from

international shipping. Contributing to global efforts to reduce atmos-

pheric pollution is a significant objective of the IMO, as reflected in its

Strategic Plan for 2016–2021.9 Negotiations continue for strengthening

the existing regulatory framework and adopting further measures, includ-

ing reducing emissions of other pollutants such as black carbon.

Some States have also adopted measures to minimize the impact

of air pollutants from vessels visiting their waters and their ports,10

while the shipping industry has also demonstrated willingness to im-

prove fuel efficiency and reduce fuel consumption through techno-

logical innovations. Private initiatives and standards have also been

introduced to provide incentives for the greening of shipping and raise

awareness of its environmental footprint.11

This article examines the international legal framework for the reduc-

tion of air pollution from international shipping and the measures adopted

by the IMO, and sheds some light on the difficulties and challenges in the

IMO negotiations, the ensuing compromises, and the role and interests

of the various stakeholders. It further identifies the inad equacies of the

regulatory framework and the challenges in its implementation, and ex-

plores the prospects for the adoption of further measures to strengthen

it. Even though GHG and non- GHG pollutants can have adverse impact

on the environment and global health, the IMO has conducted negotia-

tions for the reduction of air pollution and GHG emissions under sepa-

rate agenda items. This article focuses on the reduction of non- GHG air

pollutants from international shipping; however, some reference is made

to GHG emission measures to highlight potential interactions, especially

concerning the negotiations for the reduction of black carbon. The article

also evaluates unilateral measures adopted by port and coastal States,

especially with respect to jurisdictional issues in their maritime zones,

and finally assesses the role of private and hybrid initiatives as part of a

multi- actor governance system for tackling air pollution.

2 | THE GLOBAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

FOR THE REDUCTION OF AIR POLLUTION

FROM SHIPS

2.1 | IMO measures for the reduction of air pollution

from ships

Annex VI of MARPOL provides for mandatory technical measures to

reduce emissions of SOx, PM, NOx, ozone- depleting substances and

VOCs, and regulates shipboard incineration and the quality of fuel oil.

To facilitate compliance, the IMO has also adopted various guidelines

and circulars related to the interpretation and implementation of tech-

nical measures.

Emissions of SOx and PM are covered by Regulation 14 of Annex

VI of MARPOL, which provides for a maximum sulphur content of fuel

oils used by ships. There are no specific control limits for PM,12 in con-

trast to standards for these substances in the regulation of other

means of transport,13 but PM emissions are regulated indirectly via the

sulphur emission limits.14 The maximum sulphur content was deter-

mined at 4.50 percent m/m(by mass) prior to 1 January 2012, to

3.50 percentm/mafter1January2012and0.50 percentm/monand

after 1 January 2020. The 2020 effective date was subject to a feasi-

bility review on compliant fuel availability due before 2018. In October

2016, the Steering Committee entrusted with conducting the review

submitted its final report and found (by majority, with some dissen-

sion) that the fuel oil availability meets the terms of regulation and that

this finding should inform the decision of the MEPC regarding the im-

plementation of the reduction of the sulphur cap.15

The debate in the 70th session of the MEPC in October 2016

reflects some of the challenges and difficulties encountered by the

MEPC to achieve consensus and accommodate the diverse interests

of States and other stakeholders for the adoption of a regulatory

framework for air pollution from ships.16 The findings of the feasibil-

ity review were questioned and concerns were raised about whether

the capacity of compliant fuel was sufficient to accommodate the

global sulphur cap, and about the suitability of blended oils, espe-

cially related to safety concerns.17 Some State delegates and industry

representativesarguedthattheentryintoforceofthe 0.50 percent

sulphur content in 2020 was premature and would lead to market

distortion, diversion of cargo flows to other means of transport and

8See IMO, ‘Status of Conventions’

StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx>.

9IMO, ‘Assembly Resolution A.1097(29), Strategic Plan for the Organisation (for the Six- Year

Period 2016 to 2021)’ (25 November 2015) para 7.3.

10See, for example, Directive 2016/802/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of

11 May 2016 relating to a reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels (codification)

[2016] OJ L132/58.

11See R Taudal Poulsen et al, ‘Buyer- Driven Greening? Cargo- Owners and Environmental

Upgrading in Maritime Shipping’ (2016) 68 Geoforum 57, 62.

12IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 57th Session’ (MEPC 57/21) para 4.26.

13See, for example, Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and Council of

20 June 2007 on type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passen-

ger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and mainten-

ance information [2007] OJ L171/1, which provides for PM emission limits.

14ITF/OECD report (n 2) 10–11.

15IMO, ‘Review of Fuel Oil Availability as Required by Regulation 14.8 of MARPOL Annex VI

– Final Report of the Steering Committee’, submitted by the Steering Committee coordinator

(MEPC 70/5/6).

16IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session’ (MEPC 70/18) para 5.53. States operating

open registries supported the views expressed by the industry concerning the financial bur-

den and oil availability implications of the measures; see IMO, ‘Effective Implementation of

the0.50 m/mSulphurContentunderRegulation14.1.3ofMARPOLAnnexVI’,submittedby

Japan, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Panama, Republic of Korea, Vanuatu, Baltic and International

Maritime Council (BIMCO), Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), International

Bunker Industry Association (IBIA), International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and World

Shipping Council (WSC) (MEPC 70/5/2). States operating open registries have generally been

reluctant to accept strict measures for reducing of air pollution from international shipping

due to the financial burdens to the shipping industry.

17IMO, ‘Review of Fuel Oil Availability as Required by Regulation 14.8 of MARPOL Annex VI

– Result of Multi- stakeholder Study by EnSys/Navigistics’, submitted by BIMCO and

International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) (MEPC

70/5/5 and MEPC 70/INF.9); see also ‘Statement by Observers BIMCO and IPIECA’, in IMO,

‘Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session’ (MEPC 70/18/Add.1) Annex 22, clarifying some

issues related to these studies. See also statements by Cook Islands and Intercargo, in ibid.

    

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KOPELA

an increase in transport costs.18 The potential economic impact on

developing States was also stressed, especially related to risks to liv-

ing standards.19 Other delegations supported the findings of the re-

view regarding the availability of fuel oil, and stressed the urgency of

the problem especially related to health impacts, the beneficial expe-

rience from existing Emission Control Areas (ECAs) and the fact that

there was still time for the industry to adjust.20 The Committee de-

cided to retain 1 January 2020 as the effective date for the imple-

mentationofthe0.50 percentm/msulphurcontent.21 Concerns had

been raised regarding the IMO’s resolve to respond promptly to the

urgency of the problem, especially in the face of regional attempts to

adopt and enforce stricter meas ures.22 The decision to retain the ini-

tial deadline for stricter stand ards was regarded as a landmark and a

clear indication, as noted by the organization itself, that the IMO is

committed to ‘meet[ing] its environmental obligations’.23

NOx emissions are covered by Regulation 13 and the NOx Technical

Code.Marinedieselenginesof over130 kilowatt(kW)outputpower

are required to comply with the NOx control requirements. The ship

construction date determines the application of the levels (Tiers) of

limit control, which are calculated on the basis of the rated speed of

the engine.24 Tiers I and II have global application, whereas Tier III ap-

plies to ships in ECAs. Tier I, which has low reduction emission projec-

tions, applies to vessels constructed between 2000 and 2011, while

TierII(reductionofemissionsofaround15–20 percentincomparison

to Tier I25) applies to vessels built after 2011. The strictest NOx reduc-

tioninTierIII(around80 percentincomparisontoTierI)onlyapplies

to vessels which have been constructed after 1 January 2016 for the

North American and US Caribbean ECAs and for other ECAs the year

of the designation of such areas or later, if so prescribed.26 Regulating

existing vessels has been particularly controversial and challenging in

the IMO due to cost implications, and NOx emissions continue to pose

a problem as the existing measures cover only a section of the operat-

ing merchant fleet. As will be discussed below, some States are consid-

ering further regulation to reduce NOx emissions.

Measures have also been adopted for ozone- depleting substances

and VOCs. Regulation 12 provides for the prohibition of installations

that contain certain ozone- depleting substances, based on the date

of the construction of the ship. VOCs are addressed by Regulation

15, which provides for the use of a vapour emission control system in

tankers in certain ports or terminals; tankers carrying crude oil are also

required to have a VOC Management Plan.

An important measure for the reduction of air pollution is the designa-

tion of ECAs for SOx and/or NOx to allow for stricter standards to tackle

higher localized air pollution and reflect local circumstances.27 Stricter

standards for SOx

28 and NOx

29 emissions are prescribed for designated

areas. To date, four areas have been designated as ECAs: the Baltic Sea

(SOx and NOx), the North Sea (SOx and NOx),30 the North America area

(SOx, NOx and PM)31 and the US Caribbean Sea area (SOx, NOx and PM).32

2.2 | Implementation and enforcement of

IMO measures

The success of the adopted measures and reduction of air pollution

will depend on their effective implementation, namely compliance by

shipowners and ship operators, and enforcement in cases of non-

compliance. This is also important for ensuring a level playing field and

for ensuring that there will be no unfair market advantage for non-

complying companies,33 as shipping companies are concerned that

‘weak enforcement [of the new sulphur content limit] may incentivise

some companies not to comply to achieve competitive advantages’.34

States and representatives of the industry have also stressed the sig-

nificance of effective and uniform implementation of the new sulphur

content limit to ensure that there is accuracy in the market demand so

that the marine fuel oil supply chain can plan effectively on how to

meet global demand.35

18On this point, see MEPC 70/5/2 (n 16); this document stresses the financial impact and

significantincreaseofcostsfor theindustrybytheimplementation ofthe0.50 percentsul-

phur content. See also MEPC 70/18 (n 16) para 5.53.

19MEPC 70/18 (n 16) para 5.53.22.

20ibid; see also IMO, ‘Study on Effects of Entry into Force of the Global 0.5% Fuel Oil Sulphur

Content Limit on Human Health’, submitted by Finland (MEPC 70/INF.34).

21IMO Resolution MEPC.280(70), ‘Effective Date of Implementation of the Fuel Oil Standard

in Regulation 14.1.3 of MARPOL’ in MEPC 70/18/Add.1 (n 16) Annex 6.

22During the discussions in MEPC 70, States referred to the ‘reputational risk to the

Organisation should it decide to delay to 2024’; MEPC 70/18 (n 16) para 5.51.4. There was

also reference to the impact of any delay on the perception of the shipping sector ‘not to be

seen to be out of step’; ibid para 5.53.3.

23IMO, ‘IMO Sets 2020 Date for Ships to Comply with Low Sulphur Fuel Oil Requirement’ (28

October 2016)

2020sulphur.aspx>.

24MARPOL Annex VI (as amended) (n 7) Regulation 13, paras 3–5: Tier I ship construction

date on or after 1 January 2000 and prior to 1 January 2011; Tier II on or after 1 January

2011; Tier III on or after 1 January 2016. Emission limits are also provided for marine diesel

engines installed on ships constructed on or after 1 January 1990 but prior to 1 January 2000

(ibid paras 7.1–7.5) ‘provided that an approved method for that engine has been certified by

an administration of a party and notification of such certification has been submitted to the

organisation by the certifying administration’.

25H Winnes et al, ‘NOx Controls for Shipping in EU Seas’ (June 2016)

eu/publicatie/nox_controls_for_shipping_in_eu_seas/1819> 7.

26IMO Resolution MEPC.251(66), ‘Amendments to Regulations 2, 13, 19, 20 and 21 and the

Supplement to the IAPP Certificate under MARPOL Annex VI and Certification of Dual- Fuel

Engines under the NOx Technical Code 2008’ in IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 66th

Session’ (MEPC 66/21) Annex 12, para 5.1. On the negotiations concerning the postpone-

ment of the effective date for Tier II implementation and the resultant compromise, see

Winnes et al (n 25) 10–12.

27See Appendix III to Annex VI of MARPOL (n 4) regarding the criteria and process for the

designation of ECAs.

28The SOxrestrictionsarethe following:1.50 percentpriorto 1July2010,1.00 percent on

andafter1July2010and0.10 percentonandafter1January2015.MARPOL(n4)AnnexVI,

Regulation 14, para 4.

29MARPOL Annex VI (as amended) (n 7) Regulation 13, para 5.

30ibid Regulation 14, paras 3–4. The Baltic and North Sea NOx Emission Control Areas were

approved in MEPC 70 (see MEPC 70/18 (n 16) para 5.59), with an effective date of 1 January

2021.

31IMO Resolution MEPC.190(60), ‘North American Emission Control Area’ in IMO, ‘Report of

the MEPC on its 60th Session’ (MEPC 60/21) Annex 11.

32IMO Resolution MEPC.202(62), ‘Designation of the US Caribbean Sea Emission Control

Area and Exemption of Certain Ships Operating in the North American Emission Control Area

and the US Caribbean Sea Emission Control Area under Regulations 13 and 14 and Appendix

VII of MARPOL Annex VI’ in IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 62nd Session’ (MEPC 62/24)

Annex 14.

33ITF/OECD report (n 2) 8.

34J Lister et al, ‘Orchestrating Transnational Environmental Governance in Maritime Shipping’

(2015) 34 Global Environmental Change 185, 190; they refer to the Trident Alliance, ‘a rapidly

growing coalition of mainly Scandinavian shipping companies that seeks to promote strong

[sulphur emission control area] enforcement’.

35MEPC 70/5/2 (n 16).

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Regulation 4 on Equivalents allows for flexibility in complying with

the relevant standards in order to enhance cost- effectiveness and to

allow for technological developments to be taken into account.36 Ships

can comply with the regulations by either using compliant fuels (includ-

ing alternative fuels) or by using abatement technologies. There are

various studies reviewing the possible means of compliance to identify

their advantages and disadvantages, especially with respect to costs.37

Effective implementation of the measures will depend on the availabil-

ity of compliant fuel (including alternatives such as liquefied natural

gas) and the facilitation of the use of alternative means of energy by

ports, especially onshore power facilities.38 The role of ports is very

important with respect to ensuring that vessels calling at their port are

provided with quality fuels compliant with IMO requirements39 and

that alternative means of energy such as onshore power supply (‘cold

ironing’) are available.40 The MEPC also discussed – but rejected – the

use of emissions averaging schemes under Regulation 4 on

Equivalents.41 This proposal relied on requests of the shipping industry

to reduce compliance costs and allow for flexibility,42 but concerns

were expressed that such systems were in essence market- based

mechanisms,43 and that they could lead to market distortion, weaken

the integrity of the measures and potentially impair the environment of

another State.44

By means of enforcement, Annex VI provides for surveys, certifica-

tion and inspections in ports including sampling. All ships of 400 gross

tonnage and above are required to be subjected to survey and are re-

quired to have an International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate.45

Ships are also required to register ‘details of fuel oil for combustion

purposes delivered to and used on board’ in the bunker delivery note,

and keep representative samples of the fuel received on board.46 With

respect to NOx, engines need to be certified according to the NOx

Technical Code. All new engines need to be certified with the issue of

an Engine International Air Pollution Prevention Certification by the

engine builder following assessment.47

Flag States are primarily responsible for enacting and enforcing

measures for vessels flying their flag, but given the problems related

to flags of convenience/open registries, the responsibility to ensure

compliance with the requirements of MARPOL Annex VI falls on

coastal and mainly port States. The legislative and enforcement jur-

isdictional competence of the coastal and port States, however, is

not without problems. The United Nations Convention on the Law

of the Sea (LOSC) refers to ‘pollution from or through the atmos-

phere’ in Articles 212 (on legislation) and 222 (on enforcement).48

Both provisions lack details, and only refer to the obligations of flag

States and of coastal States in their territorial sea in general terms

without establishing either minimum standards or limits to the com-

petence of the coastal State.49 There is some uncertainty whether

these provisions regulate vessel- source air pollution exclusively or

whether the general jurisdictional framework regarding vessel-

source pollution in Articles 211 and 220 would also be applicable,

especially concerning the jurisdictional competence of the coastal

State in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which is not mentioned

in Articles 212 and 222 LOSC. Article 212 only refers to the obliga-

tions of the coastal and flag State, whilst its wording and the travaux

préparatoires indicate that this was meant to primarily cover air traf-

fic pollution.50 This may indicate that the general jurisdictional

framework of Articles 211 and 221 would also apply in instances of

vessel- source air pollution. Regulation 11(6) of MARPOL Annex VI

provides that the vessel- source pollution jurisdictional framework

also applies to Annex VI.51

The coastal State can enact national legislation, giving effect to

MARPOL rules in its territorial sea. Provided that MARPOL Annex VI

rules can be perceived to be ‘generally accepted’ this would also apply

to construction, design, equipment and manning (CDEM) standards.52

The coastal State also has the power to enact legislation for the pre-

vention and control of marine pollution in its EEZ, provided that this

gives effect to ‘generally accepted international rules and standards’.53

The LOSC does not clarify the meaning of this phrase but, as noted by

Molenaar, ‘this qualification is met when the criteria “widespread and

36MARPOL Annex VI (as amended) (n 7) Regulation 4. Equivalents are required to be ‘at least

as effective in terms of emissions reductions as that required by this Annex’. Guidelines have

been adopted with respect to specific equivalent methods; see, e.g., IMO Resolution

MEPC.259(68), ‘2015 Guidelines for Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems’ in IMO, ‘Report of the

MEPC on its 68th Session’ (MEPC 68/21/Add.1) Annex 1; and IMO Resolution MEPC.198(62),

‘2011 Guidelines Addressing Additional Aspects to the NOx Technical Code 2008 with

Regard to Particular Requirements Related to Marine Diesel Engines Fitted with Selective

Catalytic Reduction in MEPC 62/24’ (n 32) Annex 6.

37Cullinane and Cullinane (n 3) 391–395; and EEA (n 1) 34.

38ITF/OECD report (n 2) 37–38.

39See, for example, information on the port of Singapore in IMO, ‘Bunker Quality Management

Framework in the Port of Singapore’, submitted by Singapore (MSC 94/INF.8).

40See IMO, ‘Promoting the Use of Onshore Power Supply’, submitted by Community of

European Shipyards’ Associations (MEPC 69/5/8); this document refers to regulation in

Californiawhichprovidesthatby202080 percentofthesourceofvessels’powermustcome

from onshore power supply. Directive 2014/94/EU of the European Parliament and of the

Council of 22 October 2014 on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure [2014] OJ

L307/1 also provides for the progressive development of onshore power connections in the

ports by 2025.

41See IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 65th Session’ (MEPC 65/22) para 4.34.

42This was proposed by the United States; see IMO, ‘Guidelines for Equivalent Methods:

Regional Emissions Averaging’, submitted by the United States (BLG 17/11/3); IMO,

‘Outcome of BLG 17 – Guidelines for Equivalent Methods: Regional Emissions Averaging’,

submitted by the United States (MEPC 65/11/3). See also IMO, ‘Report of Correspondence

Group’ (BLG 17/11) Annex 3.

43See IMO, ‘Comments on the Outcome of BLG 17’, submitted by China (MEPC 65/11/4).

44MEPC 65/22 (n 41) para 4.35. See also IMO, ‘Equivalents under Regulation 4 of MARPOL

Annex VI and Emissions Trading’, submitted by the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC) (BLG

17/11/4).

45MARPOL (n 4) Annex VI, Regulations 5 and 6 (amended).

46ibid Regulation 18, paras 5–8; and Appendix V.

47IMO, ‘NOx Technical Code 2008’ (MEPC 58/23/Add.1) Chapter 2.

48United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered

into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (LOSC) art 212, 222.

49See comments by AE Boyle, ‘Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea’ (1985) 79 American

Journal of International Law 347, 354: ‘atmospheric pollution is clearly subjected to a negli-

gible level of international control and such regulations as are adopted need not conform to

any particular pattern, whether of minimum standards or otherwise’.

50See MH Nordquist et al (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary

Vol. 4 (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 208–213. See also the discussion in H Ringbom, EU Maritime

Safety Policy and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 431–432, who points out that

Articles 212 and 222 ‘have been largely ignored in practice when the jurisdictional limits on

the regulation of ship emission have been discussed, including at the discussions held within

the EU’.

51See EJ Molenaar, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution (Kluwer 1998) 506–

510, on the impact of this Regulation on the jurisdictional competence of States.

52LOSC (n 48) art 211(4) and art 21(2).

53ibid art 211(5).

    

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representative participation in the convention, provided it included

that of states whose interests were specifically affected” are ful-

filled’.54 MARPOL Annex VI has fewer State parties (88 ratifications)

than other MARPOL Annexes, but those State parties represent

96.16 percentofworld tonnageand itcan beargued thatthegreat

majority of flag States have accepted the rules adopted by the IMO on

air pollution reduction. Annex VI can thus be accepted as generally

accepted international rules and standards.55 This means that the

coastal State can enforce MARPOL Annex VI rules not only against

vessels flying flags of parties to MARPOL Annex VI but also against

non- parties.56

The enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State in the territorial

sea and the EEZ is more limited. In the territorial sea, the coastal State

can take action for the violation of its national laws reflecting MARPOL

Annex VI standards, provided that it does not hamper the right of in-

nocent passage.57 Enforcement in the EEZ is more restricted, based on

a gradual strengthening of the enforcement actions depending on the

violation; with respect to violation of air emission standards, only the

first stage could be justified, namely to ‘require the vessel to give infor-

mation regarding its identity and port of registry, its last and its next

port of call and other relevant information required to establish

whether a violation has occurred’.58

The port State can inspect and take enforcement action against

non- compliant vessels in its ports and impose sanctions and fines for

lack of appropriate documents, violation of emission limits, non-

compliant fuel on board (after sampling), malfunction of abatement

mechanisms and detain the vessel until the ‘situation has been brought

to order in accordance with the requirements of this Annex’.59 The

IMO has adopted Guidelines for on- board sampling and verification of

the sulphur content of the fuel oil used on board ships60 to ensure

uniformity in enforcement, enhance compliance and avoid undue de-

lays. The port State can also take enforcement action for violation of

MARPOL Annex VI rules and standards when the violation has taken

place in its territorial sea and EEZ,61 but not when the violation has

taken place on the high seas. A possible exception to this – though

limited in practice – may be the analogical application of Article 218,

provided that emissions can be equated with discharges under this

article.62 Coordination and harmonization of the measures adopted by

the ports in a region via the adoption of regional Memoranda of

Understanding (MOUs)63 have been instrumental in ensuring applica-

tion of the measures, avoiding non- compliance and maintaining a level

playing field among ports. Despite these coordination mechanisms,

various challenges remain, such as discrepancies in inspection rates

and in the quality of inspections among ports and among MOUs, and

weaknesses of mechanisms for reviewing port State inspection.64

A key problem with respect to enforcement concerns the detec-

tion of violations. A study by the International Transport Forum (ITF)

and the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development

(OECD) noted that ‘bunker fuel delivery notes are notoriously subject

to irregularities and fraud’ and stressed the limitations of sampling in

the ports with respect to potential violations which may have taken

place before the vessel entered the port.65 Detection is particularly

problematic when the ship is navigating both in- and outside ECAs and

therefore carries different types of fuel, making it difficult for port of-

ficers to detect potential violations in ECAs. There are various ways of

monitoring the emissions of vessels in coastal waters, such as planes,

drones and sniffers especially in areas of increased traffic;66 these

have been used by States, but they are costly methods, geographically

limited and not always commercially available.67 Suggestions have

been made for the use of big data solutions (i.e., speed, ship and en-

gine characteristics), automatic identification system data, monitoring

equipment on board to transmit information to relevant authorities or

satellite systems to monitor smoke stacks.68 The MEPC has agreed to

consider further measures to promote consistent implementation of

the0.50 percentsulphurlimit,suchasmeasurestofacilitatedetection

of non- compliance by port officers, the development of a standard for-

mat for reporting non- availability of compliant oil and other mechan-

isms to encourage verification for compliant fuels supplied to ships.69

A further problem noted by the ITF/OECD study with respect to

enforcement is the limited number of sanctions for detected cases and

the low fines. The study notes that ‘sanctions hardly ever surpass the

cost savings of ship operators due to non- compliance’ so there is no

54Molenaar (n 51) 183. See also W van Reenen, ‘Rules of Reference in the New Convention on

the Law of the Sea, in Particular in Connection with the Pollution of the Sea by Oil from

Tankers’ (1981) 12 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3, 8–13; P Birnie, A Boyle and

C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2009)

389.

55Y Tanaka, ‘Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping and

Jurisdiction of States’ (2016) 25 Review of European, Comparative and International

Environmental Law 333, 339.

56Birnie et al (n 54) 389; Molenaar (n 51) 184; van Reenen (n 54) 13–16.

57LOSC (n 48) art 222, 220(2) and Part II, Section 3.

58ibid art 220(5)–(6) provides for physical inspection and proceedings, including detention

only for violations ‘resulting in a substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pol-

lution of the marine environment’ and ‘discharge causing major damage or threat of major

damage to the coastline’, respectively. See Tanaka (n 55) 229.

59MARPOL (n 4) Annex VI, Regulations 10–11 MARPOL. The general provisions of MARPOL

art 5, 6(2) and 7(1) also apply with respect to port States.

60MEPC 70/18 (n 16) paras 5.10–5.15; IMO, ‘Guidelines for Onboard Sampling for the

Verification of the Sulphur Content of the Fuel Oil Used on Board Ships’ (MEPC.1/Circ, 864,

9 December 2016).

61LOSC (n 48) art 220(1).

62Molenaar argues that Article 218 also applies to emissions in violation of MARPOL Annex

VI rules by virtue of Regulation 11(6) MARPOL Annex VI, but acknowledges that ‘proving that

emission violations have occurred beyond the maritime zones of the port’s coastal state

seems even more difficult than for discharge violations’. This would probably apply among

parties to MARPOL and the LOSC (due to the uncertain status of this provision in custom;

Molenaar (n 51) 508–509.

63See T Keselj, ‘Port State Jurisdiction in Respect of Pollution from Ships: The 1982 UN

Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Memoranda of Understanding’ (2010) 30 Ocean

Development and International Law 127. See the IMO website, with links to regional MOUs

. The Paris MOU list of

detentions shows that vessels have been detained for non- compliance with SOx measures; see

.

64Tanaka (n 55) 342.

65ITF/OECD report (n 2) 41.

66ibid.

67ibid.

68EEA (n 1) 19–24; this study reviews certain monitoring activities which provide information

on ship movement and fuel consumption. See also ITF/OECD report (n 2) 41.

69MEPC 70/18 (n 16) para 5.55. See also MEPC 70/5/2 (n 16).

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deterrent to comply with the regulation.70 As noted in the European

Union (EU) Directive on reduction of the sulphur content of fuels,

there is a need for ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties’ to

‘deprive those responsible of the economic benefits derived from their

infringement and that those fines gradually increase for repeated in-

fringements’.71 Denmark, for example, has not prescribed a max imum

for the penalty but requires the equalization of the penalty to the cost

advantage of the ship in the specific voyage.72

The IMO Audit Scheme, which became mandatory in January

2016,73 may provide a further tool to enhance implementation and

compliance with MARPOL Annex VI. The Sub- Committee on

Implementation of IMO Instruments has a broad mandate to assess

and review the implementation of IMO instruments by States with the

view to identifying challenges and difficulties, and to consider pro-

posals for assisting States to comply with these instruments.74 This

auditing process may provide targeted assistance to States regarding

implementation of the relevant rules,75 but it can also feed back to the

MEPC concerning needs for further regulatory measures.

2.3 | Negotiations for further measures:

challenges and prospects

Recent negotiations in the MEPC concern the adoption of technical

guidelines to enhance the implementation of the regulatory frame-

work, and further measures to tackle emissions and improve fuel oil

quality. An interesting issue in these discussions concerned whether

the IMO could or should regulate not only the receivers of the fuel

(ships) but also the supply chain in order to enhance the quality of fuel

oil. Proposals, supported by the industry,76 provided for the ‘develop-

ment of appropriate measures to mandate quality control prior to fuel

oil being delivered to a ship and providing possible actions to ensure

proper enforcement of fuel oil quality control’.77 Sponsoring States

argued that ‘quality control of bunker fuel prior to delivery to ships is

necessary to address compliance problems related to fuel oils’, and

that the responsibility should not be only on the purchaser of fuel oil.78

This is an issue which has also been discussed in the IMO’s Maritime

Safety Committee as it also relates to safety considerations.79 In the

relevant discussions in MEPC 67, States were divided on whether the

Committee should adopt non- mandatory guidelines80 or mandatory

measures as an amendment to Annex VI.81 The key argument against

mandatory measures concerned the fact that the relationship between

the ship and the bunker supplier is regulated by a commercial contract

which provides effective guarantees in cases of breach of contract

(provision of non- compliant fuel). Opponents of mandatory measures

argued that the State should not intervene in this private/market-

based relationship.82 It was also noted that mandatory measures

would be problematic with respect to enforcement, due to the com-

plexity in the fuel oil supply chain for ships.83 The Committee decided

to discontinue this discussion as the majority of States were against

mandatory regulation.84 However, it decided to develop guidance on

best practice with respect to three stakeholders’ conduct: fuel oil pro-

viders, fuel oil purchasers/users and member States/coastal States,85

which will also reflect aspects of the provision of compliant quality fuel

oil. Whereas technical guidelines and circulars are important means for

clarifying uncertainties in the mandatory rules and facilitating compli-

ance, guidance on best practice is a weak instrument for regulating

behaviour as it can be ignored – as it has happened in practice – by the

relevant actors without consequences.86

An issue of concern for some States is the current regulation of

NOx. It has been suggested that the current framework is inadequate

as it regulates mainly new vessels.87 This issue has not been discussed

in the IMO recently, but the EU is considering further measures to

regulate NOx emissions for existing vessels. The following measures

have been suggested: slow steaming with a NOx levy as an alternative

compliance option and use of revenues for abatement measures; a

70ITF/OECD report (n 2) 42.

71Directive 2016/802/EU (n 10) preamble, paras 29 and 43.

72ITF/OECD report (n 2) 42.

73MEPC 66/21 (n 26) paras 6.3–6.7.

74IMO Resolution A.1070(28), ‘IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code)’ (A 28/

Res.1070).

75Technical problems may be referred to the Technical Cooperation Committee (see Articles

42–46 of the Convention on the IMO (adopted 6 March 1949, entered into force 17 March

1958) 289 UNTS 3) and its Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme, which can provide

further assistance to States.

76IMO, ‘Comments on Application of Regulations 14 and 18 of MARPOL Annex VI on Bunker

Fuel Quality’, submitted by IBIA and BIMCO (MEPC 66/4/26). They stress the importance of

the fuel quality for crew health, ship safety and environmental protection; shipping industry

associations were co- sponsors of IMO, ‘Application of Regulations 14 and 18 of MARPOL

Annex VI on Bunker Fuel Quality’, submitted by Liberia et al (MEPC 67/4/9); see also IMO,

‘Comments on Application of Regulations 14 and 18 of MARPOL Annex VI on Bunker Fuel

Quality’, submitted by the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) (MEPC

67/4/10); IMO, ‘Application of Regulations 14 and 18 of MARPOL Annex VI on Bunker

Quality’, submitted by IBIA (MEPC 67/4/14).

77See IMO, ‘Application of Regulations 14 and 18 of MARPOL Annex VI on Bunker Fuel

Quality’, submitted by Liberia, the Marshall Islands, the International Association of

Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) and the International Association of Dry Cargo

Shipowners (INTERCARGO) (MEPC 66/4/16/Rev.1); MEPC 67/4/9 (n 76).

78MEPC 67/4/9 (n 76) paras 4–5; the sponsors of this document stressed that ‘several parties

to MARPOL Annex VI have already put in place effective quality control measures over local

bunker fuel suppliers, which may serve as a good basis for further work in development of

such procedures’.

79See statement by Cook Islands, IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 67th Session’, Annex 19.

See also IMO, ‘Safety Implications Arising from the Supply of “Out of Specification” Marine

Fuels’, submitted by ICS and International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA) (MSC 93/INF.8).

80IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 67th Session’ (MEPC 67/20) para 4.26; see IMO,

‘Comments on Documents MEPC 67/4/9, MEPC 67/4/10 and MEPC 67/4/14, Application

of Regulations 14 and 18 of MARPOL Annex VI on Bunker Fuel Quality’, submitted by the

United States (MEPC 67/4/24).

81MEPC 67/20 (n 80) para 4.27; see also ibid Annex 19 (Statements by Cook Islands and

IPTA). Shipping and port associations supported by States operating open registries were

mainly in favour of regulating the supply chain and thus shifting the burden to oil providers.

82See MEPC 67/4/24 (n 80).

83IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 68th Session’ (MEPC 68/21) para 3.52.9; IMO, ‘Report of

the Correspondence Group on Fuel Oil Quality’, submitted by the United States (MEPC

68/3/4) Annex 1 (Coordinator’s summary).

84IMO, ‘Report of the MEPC on its 69th Session’ (MEPC 69/21) paras 5.19–5.20. See also

IMO, ‘Report of the Correspondence Group on Fuel Oil Quality’, submitted by the United

States (MEPC 69/5/3); and IMO, ‘Report of the Correspondence Group on Fuel Oil Quality

– Collation of Comments’, submitted by the United States (MEPC 69/INF.7).

85MEPC 69/21 (n 84) paras 5.12–5.22.

86See comment by IPTA in MEPC 67/20 (n 80) Annex 19.

87Winnes et al (n 25) 7–8; K Folkert Boersma et al, ‘Ships Going Slow in Reducing their NOx

Emissions: Changes in 2005–2012 Ship Exhaust Inferred from Satellite Measurements over

Europe’ (2015) 10 Environmental Research Letters 074007.

    

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KOPELA

stand- alone NOx levy with no earmarking of revenues; and a NOx levy

with revenues used to fund abatement measures.88 Despite sugges-

tions for regulated slow steaming as part of the measures for air pollu-

tion and climate change,89 the IMO has refrained from providing for

this. With respect to levies, in contrast to discussions on the reduction

of GHG emissions, economic instruments for air pollutants have only

been marginally discussed.90 In the process of the revision of Annex VI,

the Bulk Liquids and Gases (BLG) Sub- Committee con sidered eco-

nomic instruments such as emissions trading, differentiated fairway

dues and other similar schemes to be implemented on a voluntary basis

and within the EEZ of coastal States as part of Regulation 4 on

Equivalents,91 but it did not recommend their introduction in the re-

vised Annex VI.92 This was not further discussed in the MEPC.

The MEPC has also been working on measures to enhance energy

efficiency and reduce GHG emissions. A number of measures have been

adopted, namely the Energy Efficiency Design Index for new ships, the

Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan and a mandatory data collec-

tion system.93 In October 2016, the MEPC further approved a ‘Roadmap

for developing a comprehensive IMO strategy on the reduction of GHG

emissions from ships’,94 with a view to contributing to the international

efforts for tackling climate change in light of the objective endorsed in

the Paris Agreement to ‘hold the increase in the global average tem-

perature to well below 2°C above pre- industrial levels’.95

Negotiations on the reduction of GHG emissions have been con-

tentious, especially related to the application of the principle of com-

mon but differentiated responsibilities, a fundamental principle of the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and its

interaction with the IMO principles of no more favourable treatment

and universality.96 In contrast to the negotiations on GHG reduction

from ships, there have been no discussions for the potential applica-

tion of differential treatment to measures for the reduction of non-

GHG air pollutants from international shipping. The measures adopted

apply universally to all vessels, in line with the principles of the IMO of

non- discrimination and no more favourable treatment. However, the

potential impact of such measures upon trade and the interests of de-

veloping States – notably remote small island States – has been raised

as an issue to be taken into consideration, especially related to cost-

effectiveness and flexibility in the implementation.

The relationship between measures to reduce emissions of GHGs

and air pollutants should be explored further, and an integrated ap-

proach is required especially related to joint benefits of the measures

and trade- offs of mitigation policies.97 This is an issue which has been

raised by the shipping industry, whose representatives have noted that

the regulatory framework is piecemeal and more coordination of the

measures is needed.98 For example, operational measures such as slow

steaming could have beneficial effects for both air pollution and climate

change. On the other hand, the impact of the potential use of alternative

fuels on climate change and GHG emission reductions should also be

taken into account with respect to compliance with air pollution mea-

sures. The data collection system adopted for GHG emissions could also

include other air pollutants to provide a clearer view of the extent of the

problem99 and the potential need for further measures. Similarly, any

market- based mechanisms for the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2)

emissions should take into account air pollu tants and their impact.100

The intersection between measures to reduce air pollutants and

to tackle climate change can be demonstrated in the recent negotia-

tions in the MEPC to address the problem of black carbon. Black car-

bon has been found to have health and environmental impacts and to

contribute to atmospheric warming and climate change.101 The im-

pacts are particularly severe for the Arctic as the warming effect is

higher than CO2 ‘as it absorbs incoming and snow- reflected radiation

and accelerates snow and ice melting when deposited to those sur-

faces’.102 Reduction of black carbon – a short- lived climate pollutant

compared to the long lifespan of CO2 – can have a ‘near immediate

climate benefit and a slowing of Arctic ice melt’.103 The contribution of

shipping to global black carbon emissions is estimated at

88Winnes et al (n 25) 36–60. This study examined policy alternatives and assessed them vis-

à-vis certain criteria (i.e., environmental effectiveness, costs, political feasibility, etc.) and

shortlisted the aforementioned three options as more appropriate.

89See J Faber et al, ‘Regulated Slow Steaming in Maritime Transport’ (CE Delft 2012)

www.cedelft.eu/publicatie/regulated_slow_steaming_in_maritime_transport/1224>; see

also .

90D Harrison et al, ‘Economic Instruments for Reducing Ship Emissions in the EU’ (Nera

Economic Consulting 2005). See IMO, ‘Information on a Study on Emission Trading for

Sulphur and Nitrogen Oxides’, submitted by Sweden (MEPC 57/INF.5).

91IMO, ‘Report to the Maritime Safety Committee and the MEPC’ (BLG 11/16) paras 5.35–

5.37, 5.56.5; see also the United Kingdom’s proposal for an emission trading scheme; IMO,

‘Changes to MARPOL Annex VI Necessary to Permit the Use of Economic Instruments to

Reduce Emissions from Ships’, submitted by the United Kingdom (BLG 11/5/17).

92MEPC 57/21 (n 12) para 4.26.9; see IMO, ‘Urgent Matters Emanating from BLG 12 –

Review of MARPOL Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code’, Note by the Secretariat (MEPC

57/4/23) para 11.5.

93IMO Resolution MEPC.203(62), ‘Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1997 to

Amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as

Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto (Inclusion of Regulations on Energy

Efficiency for Ships in MARPOL Annex VI)’ Annex 19, in MEPC 62/24 (n 32). The Regulations

provide for the Energy Efficiency Design Index for new ships, and for a Ship Energy Efficiency

Management Plan for all ships. See also IMO Resolution MEPC.229(65), ‘Promotion of

Technical Cooperation and Transfer of Technology Relating to the Improvement of Energy

Efficiency of Ships’ in MEPC 65/22 (n 41) Annex 4; and IMO Resolution MEPC.278(7),

‘Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Data Collection System for Fuel Oil Consumption for

Ships)’ in MEPC 70/18 (n 16) Annex 3.

94MEPC 70/18 (n 16) Annex 11 and discussions in paras 7.6–7.23.

95Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ( adopted

22 April 2016, entered into force 4 November 2016)

background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf> art 2(1).

96See the more recent discussions in the MEPC for the adoption of the Roadmap and com-

ments on CBDR, MEPC 70/18 (n 16) para 7.11; see also S Kopela, ‘Climate Change, Regime

Interaction and the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility: The Experience of

the International Maritime Organisation’ (2014) 24 Yearbook of International Environmental

Law 70.

97EEA (n 1) 54, 56; IMO, ‘A Goal- Based Approach to Air Emissions’, submitted by ICS (MEPC

56/4/14) paras 4–5.

98Lister et al (n 34) 190.

99Suggested by Winnes et al (n 25) 38. An integrated measurement, reporting and verification

system for GHG and air pollutant emissions has also been suggested by EEA (n 1) 7, ‘to pro-

vide better information on the co- benefits and trade- offs on related policies in Europe’.

100EEA (n 1) 56.

101IMO, ‘Investigation of Appropriate Control Measures (Abatement Technologies) to Reduce

Black Carbon from International Shipping’, Note by the Secretariat (BLG 17/INF.7) 7.

102ibid 8; see also C Cavazos- Guerra et al, ‘Clean Air and White Ice: Governing Black Carbon

Emissions Affecting the Arctic’ in K Keil and S Knecht (eds), Governing Arctic Change: Global

Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 233–234.

103ibid 231–232.

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1–2 percent,104 but it has been found that ‘ships emit more particu-

late matter and black carbon per unit of fuel consumed than other

fossil fuel combustion sources due to the quality of fuel used’.105 Black

carbonemissionsfromshippingrepresent2.5 percentofArcticblack

carbon emissions, but taking into account the potential opening of

navigational routes in the Arctic, studies predict a significant increase

by 2050 if no measures are taken.106 Discussions in the IMO have

focused on three key aspects: (i) developing a definition; (ii) consider-

ing measurement methods; and (iii) investigating appropriate meas-

ures to reduce emissions.107 Some progress has been made with the

adoption of a definition of black carbon as a first step for the develop-

ment of measurement methods and data collection.108 A measure-

ment and reporting protocol for voluntary data collection of black

carbon has been developed,109 and information has been provided to

the Pollution, Prevention and Response (PPR) Sub- Committee con-

cerning various studies conducted in line with this protocol.110

Coordination with other international organizations and bodies, such

as the Arctic Council and the Convention on Long- Range

Transboundary Air Pollution, which are considering measures to tackle

black carbon should be part of the discussions in the MEPC.111 Key

issues in the negotiations which will need to be balanced include the

need for further data on black carbon emissions to ensure an informed

decision, the need to act swiftly due to the urgency of the problem

and the need for the measures to be ‘proportionate, cost- effective

and have demonstrable benefits’.112 The PPR Sub- Committee has

agreed to identify the most appropriate method for measuring black

carbon by 2018 and to investigate appropriate control measures to be

considered by the MEPC by 2019.113

3 | UNILATERAL MEASURES TO TACKLE

AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS BY COASTAL

AND PORT STATES

Given that the impact of air pollutants from ships on human health and the

environment is particularly felt by populations living in ports and coastal

cities, States have adopted measures to tackle air pollution from ships in

their maritime zones and ports. In most instances, these measures are in

implementation of the global IMO regulatory framework, but some States

have been proactive in their approach and have adopted stricter standards.

The EU has enacted legislation regulating the sulphur content of

marine fuels which in some instances goes beyond the global regula-

tory framework established by the IMO. Directive 2005/33 provided

strictersulphuroxideemissionsstandards(1.5 percentsulphur)forthe

North Sea in pollution control zones, which included the territorial sea

and the EEZ of Member States.114 The North Sea was designated by

the IMO as an ECA shortly after the Directive was adopted, but the EU

legislation was implemented earlier than the entry into force of IMO

regulation.115 Stricter limits for the maximum sulphur content were

alsoprovided forpassengerships (1.50 percent)in theterritorial sea

and the EEZ.116 The preamble to Directive 2012/33 noted that ‘pas-

senger ships operate mostly in ports or close to coastal areas and their

impacts on human health and the environment are significant’ and the

aim is to ‘improve air quality around ports and coasts’.117 This discrep-

ancywill disappearonce theglobal 0.5 percentsulphur limitwill be-

come effective in 2020. The Directive also provided for 2020 as the

effectivedate for the 0.50 percent limit; ifthe IMO had decided to

postpone the entry into force of this limit until 2025 there would have

been a discrepancy between the global and regional standards. It could

be argued that this EU policy played a role in the consensus achieved

in the MEPC to retain 2020 as the effective date despite strong dis-

agreements, in order to avoid fragmentation of the standards and to

ensure global regulation upon which the industry relies.118

California has also adopted legislation preceding the global legal frame-

work and the designation of the area off its coast as an ECA. In 2009, it

enactedregulationsrequiringamaximumsulphurcontentof1.5or0.5 per-

cent(formarinegasoilormarinedieseloil,respectively)and0.1 percentby

January 2012 for vessels operating within 24 naut ical miles off its coast-

line.119 With the designation of the North American ECA, which prescribed

amaximumof1 percentbyAugust2011and0.1 percentbyJanuary2015,

the Californian standards were validated by the IMO.

104DA Lack et al, ‘Light Absorbing Carbon Emissions from Commercial Shipping’ (2008) 35

Geophysical Research Letters.

105BLG 17/INF.7 (n 101) 7.

106JJ Corbett et al, ‘Arctic Shipping Emissions Inventories and Future Scenarios’ (2010) 10

Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 9689.

107MEPC 62/24 (n 32) para 4.20; the work plan was based on IMO, ‘Work Plan for the

Reduction of Black Carbon Emissions from International Shipping’, submitted by Norway

(MEPC 62/4/10).

108MEPC 68/21 (n 83) para 3.26.

109MEPC 70/18 (n 16) para 5.4.

110IMO, ‘Mitigation of Black Carbon Emissions by Ships in Arctic Waters’, submitted by

Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), Pacific

Environment and CSC (PPR 4/9/5). See IMO, ‘Report to the MEPC’ (PPR 4/21) para 9.3.1.

111IMO, ‘Report to the Maritime Safety Committee and the MEPC’ (BLG 16/16) para 15.8; see

Cavazos- Guerra et al (n 102) 255.

112See MEPC 68/21 (n 83) paras 3.23–3.29; IMO, ‘Report to the MEPC’ (PPR 3/22) paras

8.1–8.6; IMO, ‘Report of PPR Sub- Committee to MEPC’ (PPR 4/21) para 9. See IMO,

‘Consideration of Black Carbon Emissions’, submitted by the IPIECA and the Oil Companies

International Marine Forum (BLG 16/15/3), listing key questions that should be addressed by

the Sub- Committee in its consideration of black carbon; see also IMO, ‘Mitigation of Black

Carbon Emissions by Ships in Arctic Waters’, submitted by FOEI, WWF, Pacific Environment

and CSC (PPR 4/9/5) para 11.

113PPR 4/21 (n 110) para 9.18.

114Directive 2005/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2005

amending Directive 1999/32/EC [2005] OJ L191/59 art 4a(2)(b).

115The effective date for the amendment of MARPOL was 22 November 2007 whereas the

EU’s implementation date was 11 August 2007; see Ringbom (n 50) 427–428. He points out

that ‘the implementation of the regional rules was very closely linked to the existence of a

corresponding international rule’; ibid 429.

116Directive 2012/33/EU amending Council Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the sulphur

content of marine fuels [2012] OJ L191/1 art 1(6)(d). This Directive has been replaced by

Directive (EU) 2016/802 (n 10), which also includes the relevant provision on passenger ves-

sels (art 6(5)). For an assessment of this aspect of Directive 2012/33 in the light of interna-

tional law, see Ringbom (n 50) 264.

117Directive 2012/33/EU (n 116) preamble, para 14, replaced by Directive 2016/802 (n 10)

preamble, para 27.

118See MEPC 57/21 (n 92) para 4.9. The European Commission noted that the EU was com-

mitted to a global solution but ‘should it not be possible for the Organisation to maintain the

established timelines, the Commission retained the right to initiate appropriate action to pro-

tect the environment’; ibid.

119Fuel Sulfur and other Operational Requirements for Ocean- Going Vessels within California

Waters and 24 Nautical Miles of the California Baseline, 13 CCR, Section 2299.2

www.arb.ca.gov/ports/marinevess/ogv/ogvrules.htm>; the regulation does not apply to ves-

sels exercising the right of innocent passage. For an overview of the scheme and background

information, see SP Broder and JM Van Dyke, ‘The Urgency of Reducing Air Pollution from

Global Shipping’ in A Chircop (ed), The Regulation of International Shipping: International and

Comparative Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 278.

    

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KOPELA

The scope of legislative and enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal

and port State, and thus the limits of unilateral action, are not very clear.

The coastal State can adopt standards that are stricter than international

standards in its territorial sea, but these standards should not apply to the

CDEM of the vessel, unless they are giving effect to ‘generally accepted

international rules or standards’.120 Emission standards, similarly to dis-

charge standards, are generally perceived not to be CDEM standards.121

Standards related to the content of fuel are more difficult to classify.

Molenaar argues that ‘the regulation of the sulphur content in fuel oil and

fuel oil quality must be regarded as an equipment standard, as it concerns

a requirement to ensure that an emission standard is met’.122 The key

differentiating factor, however, between regulation of the content or

quality of fuel oil and CDEM standards is that the former does not pre-

scribe the use of equipment or construction/design of the vessel, nor can

fuel itself be regarded as equipment. Compliance with fuel standards may

require the use of equipment (i.e., separate tanks to carry different types

of fuel) or design- and construction- related methods (i.e., abatement

techniques such as exhaust system or certain types of engine design),123

but these, as in the case of emissions standards, are incidental as a means

of enhancing cost- effectiveness and flexibility in the implementation.

Different conclusions have been reached based on a purposive

interpretation of Article 21(2) LOSC and the scope of CDEM stand-

ards. Ringbom stresses the impact of these standards upon innocent

passage, the measures’ intrusiveness and the possibility for a re-

quirement of ‘changes to the ship’s equipment’, and concludes that

‘it is probably safer to consider fuel quality requirements as being

analogous to CDEM standards for the purpose of establishing the

jurisdictional limits of coastal state laws in the territorial sea’.124 On

the contrary, a EU- commissioned study argues that CDEM should

be interpreted narrowly in Article 21(2) and thus not cover fuel con-

tent standards, as they pose an exception to the general principle of

coastal state sovereignty in the territorial sea.125 It is true that fuel

standards may have CDEM- related implications, but as long as the

CDEM elements are not prescribed, fuel standards should not be

regarded as CDEM but emission- related standards.126 By contrast,

measures related to equipment or engine- related requirements are

CDEM standards,127 and the coastal State would not be able to reg-

ulate stricter than ‘generally accepted’ standards. The stricter

regulation of sulphur fuel content for passenger vessels by the EU in

the territorial sea would thus be in line with the LOSC, though ad-

mittedly different views exist. Enforcement in the territorial sea

would depend on the legality of prescriptive jurisdiction and would

have to be in line with the obligation not to hamper innocent

passage.128

In the EEZ, the coastal State can ‘adopt laws and regulations for the

prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to

and giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards

established through the competent international organisation’.129 The

coastal State can thus only legislate and enforce international standards

(i.e., MARPOL Annex VI) in its EEZ, and not nationally prescribed stand-

ards. In this respect, the application of the aforementioned measures ad-

opted by the EU in the EEZ would contravene international law.

However, States have broader legislative and enforcement powers in

their ports, and port State jurisdiction has been used to counterbalance

the limitations of flag State jurisdiction but also the inadequacies of inter-

national rules.130 Ports are part of the territory of the State where the

latter exercises sovereignty. Therefore, jurisdiction can be exercised on

the basis of the territoriality principle for activities which take place in the

port. Ports can also take enforcement action for violation of their national

laws in the territorial sea and EEZ,131 though this will need to be in line

with the legislative competence of the coastal State in the territorial sea

and the EEZ. Therefore, enforcement of the EU legislation concerning

sulphur content of passenger vessels for violations in the EEZ cannot take

place in ports, since, as argued above, coastal States cannot legislate

more strictly than international standards in the EEZ.132

States can regulate entry into their ports by prescribing nation-

ally determined entry requirements for the ‘prevention, reduction

and control of pollution’.133 However, there are limitations to the

legislative and enforcement jurisdiction of the port State, especially

related to the extraterritorial effects of these measures. A distinc-

tion can be drawn between regulating condition- related standards

(i.e., CDEM) and operation- related standards and other activities.134

120LOSC (n 48) art 211(4) and 21(2). See also ibid art 42(1)(b) with respect to straits used for

international navigation.

121Molenaar (n 51) 21–22, 502. This would include, for example, the measures provided for

ozone- depleting substances (Regulation 12(2)) and NOx (Regulation 13) of MARPOL Annex VI.

122Molenaar (n 51) 67, 432, 511.

123See Ringbom (n 50) 434, regarding the CDEM- like features of fuel standards; he argues

though that despite these characteristics, they do not amount to CDEM standards within the

meaning of LOSC (n 48) art 21(2).

124Ringbom (n 50) 434–435. He refers to LOSC (n 48) art 24(1) with respect to hampering

innocent passage.

125BMT Murray Fenton Edon Liddiard Vince Limited, ‘Study on the Economic, Legal

Environmental and Practical Implications of a European Union System to Reduce Ship

Emissions of SO2 and NOx’ No 3623 (2000) (BMT Study) Appendix 4, para 70; this study

concluded that a ‘measure limiting the sulphur content of marine bunkers should be seen as

an emission standard which has merely consequential (and often very minor) effects on

CDEM matters’; it also refers to the possibility of a different interpretation for CDEM for

Article 211(6)(c), but it does not favour this discrepancy.

126Similarly, BMT Study (n 125) para 70.

127Molenaar (n 51) 67.

128LOSC (n 48) art 220(2) and 24(1).

129ibid art 211(5) (emphasis added).

130See C Ryngaert and H Ringbom, ‘Introduction: Port State Jurisdiction: Challenges and

Potential’ (2016) 31 International Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law 379; S Kopela, ‘Port

State Jurisdiction, Extraterritoriality, and the Protection of Global Commons’ (2016) 47 Ocean

Development and International Law 89, 89–90.

131LOSC (n 48) art 220(1). Molenaar refers to this as ‘quasi- territorial jurisdiction’; see EJ

Molenaar, ‘Port State Jurisdiction: Toward Comprehensive, Mandatory and Global Coverage’

(2007) 38 Ocean Development and International Law 225.

132Ringbom (n 50) 374–375 invokes various reasons related to the legality of the port State

measures and argues that from a port State perspective the scope of the Directive is in com-

pliance with the law of the sea, referring to Article 220(1); however, this provision necessi-

tates that the prescriptive jurisdiction in the territorial sea and EEZ is in line with the LOSC for

the port State to assume enforcement jurisdiction, which, as admitted by Ringbom, is not the

case with this Directive. He also invokes the international legitimacy of the rule with respect

to international standards, the ‘host State’ argument and finally the indeterminacy of the en-

forcement measures. He argues, however, that extension of the requirement to cover the

high seas would be a major challenge with respect to the justification of a jurisdictional link.

133LOSC (n 48) art 211(3). It is generally accepted that there is no customary right of entry of

foreign vessels into the ports of a foreign State; see L de La Fayette, ‘Access to Ports in

International Law’ (1996) 11 International Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law 1; AV Lowe,

‘The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law’ (1977) 14 San Diego Law Review

597.

134See B Marten, Port State Jurisdiction and the Regulation of International Merchant Shipping

(Springer, 2014) 59–62; Kopela (n 130) 95–98.

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A port State may enact laws requiring vessels to comply with CDEM

standards both as entry requirements and rules to comply with while

in port. Despite the fact that there is an extraterritorial effect in

these measures, as the vessel will need to comply with them even

when outside a State’s maritime zones, the measure relates to a con-

tinuous activity which also takes place in port and the extraterritor-

ial effect is ‘incidental’ due to the static nature of the measures.135

Despite the fact that – as argued above – regulation of the content

of bunker fuel is not a CDEM standard (though it may have CDEM-

like elements), a port State could adopt and enforce measures re-

quiring the carrying of certain types of fuel on board, as the breach

in this instance will arise in the port. By contrast, the port State

cannot regulate activities or operations (such as emission stand-

ards, the use of certain type of fuel oil or of abatement techniques)

in areas outside its national jurisdiction. Marten argues that State

practice favours an expansive approach to port State jurisdiction

based on the right of a State to regulate entry into its ports.136

There is, however, a continuing debate concerning the extraterritor-

ial effect of port State jurisdiction (especially related to the limits

between territoriality and extraterritoriality) and other jurisdic-

tional bases, such as the effects doctrine or the principle of com-

mon concern, have been suggested as justifying such an

expansion.137

The use of market- based instruments, such as environmentally differ-

entiated shipping dues payable in ports,138 charges, levies, taxes or a cap-

and- trade system linked to emissions in a specific region or specific

voyages,139 may also raise concerns of extraterritorially. Whereas a State

can adopt economic instruments covering emissions in its ports and its

territorial sea, measures referring to costs for emissions beyond the terri-

torial sea may not be covered by the territoriality principle as the port

State may be seen to enforce unilateral standards and regulate the activ-

ities of the vessels (i.e., use of bunker fuel and emissions) beyond its juris-

dictional competence.140 In the ATAA case – which concerned the legality

of the inclusion of aviation emissions in the EU’s emissions trading system

– the Court of Justice of the EU found that the territoriality principle pro-

vided a legal basis for the exercise of jurisdiction as the aircrafts were

‘physically in the territory’ despite the fact that ‘certain matters contribut-

ing to the pollution of air, sea or land territory of the member states ori-

ginate in an event which occurs partly outside the territory’.141 Despite

this favourable ruling, concerns have been raised in the literature regard-

ing the extraterritorial impact of such economic instruments, especially

with respect to the potential inclusion of CO2 emissions from shipping

into the EU emissions trading system.142

Unilateral measures may provide useful lessons and experience for

the IMO concerning the implementation of specific regulatory tools.143

They can also operate as an incentive and political pressure for global

regulation. The shipping industry is however critical of regional regula-

tion of shipping and has argued that this is not compatible with the

global character of the industry, and increases costs and complexity to

ship operations, as vessels will need to comply with different stan-

dards and rules in different areas of the world.144

4 | PRIVATE AND HYBRID MARKET-

ORIENTED INITIATIVES

As discussed above, the shipping industry has actively participated in the

discussions in the IMO. It is particularly interested in three interrelated

issues: (i) global regulation and certainty in the legal framework to allow

for clear investment plans;145 (ii) cost- effectiveness of measures, includ-

ing their application; and (iii) consistent implementation and enforce-

ment to avoid market distortion and competitive advantage of

non- complying companies. There has also been an interest in private ini-

tiatives for ‘green shipping’ based on voluntary private standards and

rating schemes. Initiatives such as the Clean Cargo Working Group,

Clean Shipping Index and Triple- E provide performance standards (met-

rics), including for air pollutant emissions (SOx, NOx), to rank and bench-

mark individual vessels.146 Members are normally cargo owners and

shipping companies. The Sustainable Shipping Initiative is another initia-

tive with the participation of cargo owners, shipping companies, ship-

builders, classification societies and two environmental nongovernmental

organizations with the main objective to promote policies for greener

shipping practices both at the international and national level.147 The

objective of these projects is to enhance environmental performance,

accountability, transparency and best practices in the shipping industry.

The impact of these initiatives is still rather limited due to the small

135Molenaar (n 131) 198; H Ringbom, ‘Global Problem – Regional Solution? International Law

Reflections on an EU CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme for Ships’ (2011) 26 Journal of Maritime

Law and Commerce 613; TL McDorman, ‘Port State Enforcement: A Comment on Article 218

of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention’ (1997) 28 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce

205, 315; RR Churchill, ‘Port State Jurisdiction Relating to the Safety of Shipping and Pollution

from Ships – What Degree of Extra- territoriality?’ (2016) 31 International Journal of Marine

and Coastal Law 442, 454–455.

136Marten (n 134) 233–235.

137Kopela (n 130) 104–110.

138BMT Study (n 125) paras 3–4, 209.

139Winnes et al (n 25) 38.

140Similar conclusion with some flexibility in BMT Study (n 125) para 209.

141Case C- 266/10, Air Transport Association of America (ATAA) and Others v Secretary of State

for Energy and Climate Change, ECLI:EU:C:2010:629 paras 128–129; airlines operating flights

landing or taking off from EU airports were required to submit emission allowances for their

flights, which were calculated based on the distance between the airport of departure and the

airport of arrival.

142See T Baurle et al, Integration of Marine Transport into the European Emissions Trading System

(Umweltbundesamt 2010) 85; and C Hermeling et al, ‘Sailing into a Dilemma: An Economic

and Legal Analysis of an EU Trading Scheme for Maritime Emissions’ (2015) 78 Transportation

Research Part A 34, 47–48. By contrast, a report by CE Delft (CE Delft, ‘Technical Support for

European Action to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Maritime

Transport’ (2009) 16) argues that the territorial principle can justify such measures due to the

presence of the vessel in port. Similarly, see A O’Leary, D Holyoake and M Ballesteros, ‘Legal

Implications of EU Action on GHG Emissions from the International Maritime Sector’

(ClientEarth 2011) 20.

143See, for example, IMO, ‘Report on the EU Implementation/Enforcement of Sulphur Oxides

(SOx) Regulations’, submitted by the European Commission (MEPC 70/INF.41), ‘providing the

resultsandexperience gatheredduring 18 monthsofsulphur enforcementbyEU Member

States in EU waters’.

144Lister et al (n 34) 189, 192.

145ibid 192: ‘ship- owners argue this uncertainty deters their investment in environmental pro-

tection. Moreover, considerable uncertainty relates to moving deadlines and weak enforce-

ment of IMO regulation’ and that ‘weak enforcement could penalise shipping companies,

which invest in environmental upgrading’.

146Taudal Poulsen et al (n 11) 62.

147.

    

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KOPELA

percentage of vessels participating,148 but it could grow especially with

the increase of awareness and pressure by cargo owners for green

shipping.

Similar initiatives to provide incentives for green shipping have

been undertaken by ports around the world. The World Ports Climate

Initiative of the International Association of Ports and Harbors has

adopted the Environmental Ship Index, which is a voluntary system

providing information for the environmental performance of ships

related to emissions, and which offers a bonus for energy efficiency

management.149 Reduced port and fairway dues are applied by some

ports based on these ratings. However, the impact of these initia-

tives is rather limited due to the relatively small number of ports

participating and the port dues forming a small part of the vessels’

cost.150

Despite interest in these schemes, the main drivers in decision

making for the cargo owners remain cost and reliability.151 The role

of these initiatives is more effective in the container sector (and not

bulk or tanker shipping), as there are closer links with the users of the

products/consumers, and there is thus more visibility and greater in-

centive for green shipping.152 A challenge for the industry which also

mitigates the effectiveness of these initiatives is ‘the lack of stand-

ardisation and verification of measures, inconsistency of data collec-

tion methodology and ranking’.153 The Sustainable Shipping Initiative

has attempted to streamline the process by comparing the various

private rating schemes established by the industry.154 Scott and col-

leagues have also found that the broader impact of these initiatives is

mitigated by limited transparency, low levels of ambition and lack of

data reliability.155 The fact that the information and data originate

primarily from the shipowners also creates concerns about the effec-

tiveness of these schemes.156 Lister and colleagues have suggested

that classification societies can play a role in the ‘set- up of indepen-

dent audits for their green rating data sets to improve the quality of

data available’.157 Coordination of these schemes and alignment with

global standards will enhance their contribution to reducing air pollu-

tion. A role has been suggested for the IMO in coordinating and or-

chestrating these schemes: ‘to improve global shipping perform ance,

the IMO will need to accept the sector’s governance challenges and

embrace its role as orchestrator: overseeing, leveraging and enabling

private and hybrid efforts as a complement to national and interna-

tional regulation’.158 Scott and colleagues have also argued for fur-

ther interaction between these private standards and legal regulation

– especially by the EU as a ‘meta- regulator’, which could ‘shape the

design and operation of private standards’ – though they argue that

the role of the IMO may be rather limited in this respect due to lack

of flexibility in decision making.159 The potential interaction between

private standards and the global regulatory regime has not been dis-

cussed in the MEPC.

5 | CONCLUSION

Reducing air pollution from international shipping has been a com-

plex endeavour, as it involves a multiplicity of technical, operational

and market- based measures, the commercial availability of clean

fuel oil and technological innovations for the construction of mar-

ine engines and the development of abatement techniques, and the

coordination of various stakeholders and actors (flag States, oper-

ators, shipowners, fuel oil providers). The financial costs and impact

of the measures on the shipping industry, world trade and develop-

ment – including potential market distortion vis-à-vis other means of

transport – have also been complicating factors in the establishment

of a regulatory framework for reducing air pollutant emissions from

ships.

Despite the slow start and concerns expressed by the industry

about cost implications, the IMO has adopted technical measures

and guidelines to reduce air pollutant emissions from ships. Its re-

cent decision to maintain the early deadline for the entry into force

ofthe0.50 percent m/msulphurlimit wasperceivedas evidenceof

its determination to play a central role in the global regulation of air

pollution from ships and to contribute to cleaner maritime transport.

The success of the measures will depend on their effective implemen-

tation, compliance by shipowners and operators, and enforcement in

cases of non- compliance. Developing further measures to facilitate

detection of non- compliance, enhancing coordinated inspections

and actions by port States and ensuring the availability of compliant

fuel and alternative energy sources in ports should be a priority for

States and the IMO. NOx emissions remain an issue of concern due

to the limited scope of application of the existing regulations; further

meas ures should be explored, including the introduction of new ECAs.

Regulation of other air pollutants such as black carbon and a more

coherent approach for measures to tackle air pollution and climate

change are also required to mitigate climate, health and environmen-

tal risks.

Resolve in addressing these issues in an ambitious way by the IMO

will prevent unilateral and regional initiatives which are problematic for

the shipping industry in terms of costs and complexity. Self- regulation

via private or hybrid initiatives and standards can also play an import-

ant role, but it cannot substitute global regulation which provides the

industry with certainty for strategic investment planning. Coordination

between the private standards and the global regulatory regime would

enhance their coherence and provide a more effective self- regulatory

tool for the industry.

148Lister et al (n 34) 190–191.

149.

150Lister et al (n 34) 191.

151Taudal Poulsen et al (n 11) 65.

152Lister et al (n 34) 190; Taudal Poulsen et al (n 11) 65.

153Taudal Poulsen et al (n 11) 62; Lister et al (n 34) 191–192.

154Lister et al (n 34) 190–191.

155J Scott et al, ‘The Promise and Limits of Private Standards to Reduce Greenhouse Gas

Emissions from Shipping’ (2017) 29 Journal of Environmental Law 231, 243–251. These au-

thors examine reduction of GHG emissions but the private initiatives they refer to also relate

to SOx and NOx emissions.

156Lister et al (n 34) 190, 192.

157ibid 193.

158ibid. 159Scott et al (n 155) 258–259.

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How to cite this article: Kopela S. Making ships cleaner:

Reducing air pollution from international shipping. RECIEL.

2017;26:231–242. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12220

Sophia Kopela is Lecturer in Law at Lancaster University Law

School. She holds an LLB from the University of Athens (Greece), an

LLM in Public International Law from the University of Nottingham

and a PhD in International Law of the Sea from Bristol University.

Her specialization lies in law of the sea, international environmen-

tal law and public international law, and she has published articles

in international journals and presented papers in international con-

ferences in these fields. She is the author of a monograph titled

Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff/

Brill, 2013). She is also the book review editor of the International

Journal of Marine and Coastal Law.