Enlargement and the Environment Acquis

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9388.2004.00392.x
Date01 July 2004
Published date01 July 2004
AuthorKirstyn Inglis
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
RECIEL 13 (2) 2004. ISSN 0962 8797
135
Enlargement and the Environment
Acquis
Kirstyn Inglis
INTRODUCTION
The sixth enlargement of the EU undoubtedly presents
its environmental law with greater challenges than any
previous enlargement.
1
The current Accession Treaty
2
provides for the accession to the previously existing EU
of 15 Member States (the Fifteen) by eight central and
eastern European countries
3
(CEECs), together with
Malta and Cyprus (the Ten). It entered into force on
1 May 2004. By 2020, the EU may well incorporate
many more European countries. Bulgaria and Romania
will accede in 2007. Turkey is already a candidate
country, although accession negotiations have still to
begin. Croatia and the other Balkan countries, as well
as Albania and Ukraine, also hold accession hopes.
The CEECs have made momentous progress in tack-
ling the environmental devastation of irresponsible
industrialization during the Communist era and in
approximating
4
their environmental policy and laws
with the EU. However, upon accession, they will all lag
behind the Fifteen in terms of the necessary adminis-
trative capacity and infrastructure to comply with the
environment chapter of the
acquis communautaire
5
in full. Around 30% of their joint total area contains a
rich biodiversity that must be managed in a frame-
work of sustainable development.
6
The Ten have new
typical and endangered species and habitats, to be
covered by the
acquis
, as well as a new bio-geographic
region – the Pannonian region.
7
While the EU has an impressive body of environment
legislation in place, the increased economic activity
as a result of EU integration has been accompanied
by a serious deterioration in the general state of the
environment
8
and an increased burden on the global
environment in terms of consumption of natural
resources.
9
The tensions between national sovereignty
and other (economic) priorities, on the one hand, and
EC competences and the goals of an effective environ-
ment policy, on the other, are particularly strained at
policy and law-making levels, as well as in implementa-
tion and enforcement. Furthermore, the environment
acquis
has continuously suffered a serious implementa-
tion and enforcement def‌icit by the Fifteen.
10
This article identif‌ies the main challenges facing the
environment
acquis
in an enlarged EU. The need for
the new Members to f‌ind f‌inancing and investment for
infrastructure projects will continue for many years
1
Commission Communication of 20 May 1998 on Accession Strategies
for Environment: Meeting the Challenge of Enlargement with the
Candidate Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, COM (1998) 294.
2
Accession Treaty (Athens, 16 April 2003), [2003] OJ L236/1 (Acces-
sion Treaty). Accession is subject only to those derogations and
safeguard clauses specif‌ied in the Accession Treaty (transitional
arrangements). As at 5 January 2004, only Estonia and Slovenia had
not formally notif‌ied ratif‌ication. The Fifteen did not all hold national
referenda. As at 5 January 2004, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
the UK, Ireland and Finland had deposited instruments of ratif‌ication
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic.
3
Czech Republic and the Republics of Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
4
‘Approximation of laws’ is the legal terminology used in Community
law, since its inception, to denote how the Member States, and third
country partners, approximate to the EC law rather than replace their
national laws. Approximation may involve amendment or adaptations
to national laws or the adoption of supplementar y laws for example,
but the means is left to the discretion of the Member States.
5
The ‘
acquis communautaire
’ encompasses the common rights and
obligations that bind all the Member States together within the EU.
It is constantly evolving and comprises the content, principles and
political objectives of the treaties; the legislation adopted in application
of the treaties and the case law of the European Court of Justice; the
declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; measures relat-
ing to the common foreign and security policy; measures relating to
justice and home affairs; international agreements concluded by the
Community and those concluded by the Member States between
themselves in the f‌ield of the Union’s activities. Thus the
acquis
comprises not only Community law, in the strict sense, but also all
acts adopted under the Second and Third Pillars of the EU and the
common objectives laid down in the treaties. See C. Delcourt, ‘The
Acquis Communautaire
: Has the Concept had its Day’, 38
Common
Market Law Review
(2001), 829– 870.
6
See J. Klarer and P. Francis, ‘Regional Overview’, in J. Klarer (ed.),
The Environmental Challenge for Central European Economies in
Transition
(Wiley, 1997), 1–66.
7
At the moment, the EU has six biogeographic regions: Continental,
Mediterranean, Alpine, Atlantic, Macaronesian and Boreal.
8
The European Environment Agency,
Europe’s Environment: the
Second Assessment
(EEA, 1998), at 4, which is conf‌irmed by Euro-
pean Environment Agency,
Europe’s Environment: the Third Assess-
ment
(EEA, 2003), at 5. The third report highlights certain areas where
environment policies that have been properly developed and imple-
mented have improved the state of the environment and reduced
pressures on it, but also highlights areas of degradation, both in the
EU and in the CEECs and beyond; see the latter report at 5–7.
9
European Environment Agency,
Total Material Requirement of the
European Union
, Report No 55 (EEA, 2001), and no major change
to this situation is reported in European Environment Agency,
Envir-
onmental Signals 2002
(EEA, 2002), at 3.
10
See the section below entitled Evolution of the Environment
Acquis
after Enlargement.
KIRSTYN INGLIS RECIEL 13 (2) 2004
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
136
after enlargement. This undermines the true potential
for implementation of the corner stones of the existing
acquis
by the CEECs. Efforts to improve administrat-
ive and judicial capacity will also continue to be a
major challenge after enlargement. Decision making
among such a diversity of countries will necessarily
affect new legislation and policy initiatives. Such a
multiplicity of countries can be expected to exacerbate
the implementation and enforcement def‌icit in the
environment
acquis
of the enlarged Union
.
Recent EC
governance initiatives become vital in making the
existing
acquis
effective after enlargement.
INVESTMENT AND CAPACITY
BUILDING AFTER
ENLARGEMENT
This enlargement is particularly challenging from the
perspective of EC environmental law when compared
to other chapters of the
acquis communautaire
. As is
the case for any other chapter of the
acquis
, the future
new Member States are required to have transposed
and implemented the
acquis
in its entirety, which
includes building up the necessary administrative
capacity for enforcement, in order to meet fully their
Treaty obligations as Member States of the EU. The
issues that arise in the monitoring and enforcement of
the environment
acquis
contrast with other chapters
of the
acquis communautaire
. However, before looking
at the provision for transitional arrangements set out
in the Accession Treaty, it is useful to consider the lim-
itations that external investment and f‌inancing present
to the environment
acquis
. The single most challeng-
ing task facing the new Member States in respect of the
environment
acquis
,
compared to other chapters, will
be to secure the necessary investment. Compliance will
involve considerable investment, not only in building
up the necessary administrative capacity but in the
necessary infrastructure upgrade required to implement
the environment
acquis
on waste, water, energy and
integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC).
FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
ENVIRONMENT
ACQUIS
ON 1 MAY
2004, DUE TO THE INVESTMENT
HURDLE, WOULD HAVE BEEN
IMPOSSIBLE
In its original strategy for accession to the environment
acquis
,
11
the Commission estimated that implementation
would require EUR120 billion, of which no more
than 10% could be met by the EU.
12
The more detailed
compliance-costing reports of 1997
13
give more of an idea
of the magnitude of capital and recurring costs. But
these reports are fraught with uncertainties and meth-
odological weaknesses (as noted in the reports them-
selves), and highlight the need for external f‌inancing
by the CEECs. In 2001, the Commission published its
guide
14
for the future new Member States to follow when
developing investment strategies for the implementation
of the environment
acquis
and national approximation
strategies. New estimates, outlined there, lowered the
original prediction by 10% to 20% but are not based on
a common methodology with the 1997 f‌igures. However,
the Priority Environment Programme for Accession
(PEPA)
15
that had been established in 1999 (designed
to develop investment strategies from domestic, foreign
and private sources for 13 of the heaviest directives
16
11
Commission Communication of 20 May 1998 in Accession Strat-
egies for Environment: Meeting the Challenge of Enlargement with
the Candidate Countries in Central and Eastern Europe
,
COM
(1998) 294 f‌inal.
12
Ibid.
13
For more information, see the website available at
www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enlarg/compcos.pdf>. A separate
report exists for Cyprus, available at
comm/environment/enlarg/cocyp.pdf>.
14
Commission Communication of 8 June 2001 on the Challenge of
Environmental Financing in the Candidate Countries, COM (2001) 304.
15
A programme set up by each candidate in accordance with Com-
mission Communication in Accession Strategies for Environment,
n. 11 above, and subsequently with the Commission Communication
on the Challenge of Environmental Financing in the Candidate
Countries, n. 14 above.
16
Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban
waste water treatment, [1991] OJ L135/40 (Urban Waste Water
Treatment Directive); Council Directive 98/83/EC of 3 November 1998
on the quality of water intended for human consumption, [1998] OJ
L330/32; Council Directive 76/464/EEC of 4 May 1976 on pollution
caused by certain dangerous substances discharged into the aquatic
environment of the Community, [1976] OJ L129/23 (Discharge of
Certain Dangerous Substances into Surface Water Directive); Council
Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection
of waters from pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources,
[1991] OJ L375/1; Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on
the landf‌ill of waste, [1999] OJ L182/1 (Landf‌ill Directive); Council
Directive 89/369/EEC of 8 June 1989 on the prevention of air pollution
from new municipal waste incineration plants, [1989] OJ L163/32
(Municipal Waste Directive); Council Directive 94/67/EC of 16 December
1994 on incineration of hazardous waste, [1994] OJ L365/34 (Hazardous
Waste Directive); European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/
EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste, [1994]
OJ L365/10 (as amended by Regulation 1882/2003, [2003] OJ L284/
1) (Packaging Waste Directive); Council Directive 88/609/EEC of
24 November 1988 on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants
into the air from large combustion plants, [1988] OJ L336/1 (Large
Combustion Plant Directive); Directive 98/70/EC of the European
Parliament and the Council of 13 October 1998 relating to the quality
of petrol and diesel fuels, [1998] OJ L350/58; Directive 1999/32/EC of
26 April 1999 relating to a reduction in the sulphur content of cer tain
liquid fuels, [1999] OJ L121/13 (Sulphur Content of Liquid Fuels
Directive); Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 con-
cerning integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC), [1996] OJ
L257/26 (IPPC Directive); Council Directive 94/63/EC of 20 December
1994 on the control of volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions
resulting from the storage of petrol and its distribution from terminals
to service stations, [1994] OJ L365/24 (VOC Directive). A complete list
is supplied in Annex I to Commission Communication on the Challenge
of Environmental Financing in the Candidate Countries, n. 14 above.
RECIEL 13 (2) 2004 ENLARGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
ACQUIS
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
137
in terms of investment) had been devised on the basis
of the 1997 estimates.
17
According to the Commission,
in the years 2000–2002, the loans signed by inter-
national f‌inancial institutions (IFIs) with all ten new
Member States amounted to EUR5 billion.
18
If it takes
3 years to attract EUR5 billion (EUR1.666 billion per
year), will it take until 2050 to attract the lower esti-
mate of total f‌inancing needed to apply fully the
acquis
?
19
Uncertainties and methodological weakness are inherent
in the process and undermine the f‌inancial planning,
not only for external investment but also for Community
funding both pre-accession and post-accession. The
consequent ‘political and f‌inancial trap for the Union’
identif‌ied by Hager lies in the fact that the headline f‌igure
for needed investments is both too high and too low:
too high in terms of initial investment because they
ref‌lect the traditional public planning and pricing
context that prevailed in the CEECs at the time of
their inception;
too low in terms of the follow-on costs, especially
for public budgets in terms of f‌inancial costs,
routine operating costs and maintenance.
Uncertainties and weakness in investment planning
imply uncertainty as to the reliability of timeframes
agreed for transitional arrangements in the environ-
ment
acquis
. As is seen below, the transitional
arrangements relate to those laws that require the
heaviest investment. Financing will inf‌luence the
political priorities of the new Member States and
their willingness to contribute to raising further
environmental standards after their accession to the
Union. Where investment thresholds have to be
revised upwards, the new Member States will have a
solid argument for additional EU contributions in
order that they may meet their post-accession imple-
mentation deadlines.
20
Additional f‌inancial burdens will also be an argument
for the new Members against their participation in
future EC environment initiatives that involve addi-
tional costs beyond their commitments under the
Accession Treaty.
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY:
HUMAN RESOURCES, MONEY AND
CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS
21
Certainly, lacks or weaknesses in the administrative
capacity of the future new Members affect their ability
to absorb funding and will therefore also affect the
leverage potential of EU funds for external invest-
ment. The acceding countries have had to build their
administrative and judicial capacities from scratch, in
parallel with the adoption of the
acquis
. Technical and
f‌inancial assistance has been provided to the CEECs
since 1989 in the form of the Phare programme,
22
beginning with Poland and Hungary but gradually
extending to all of the CEECs, including Bulgaria and
Romania. The ‘accession driven’ approach only began
in 1997 under the reinforced strategy – focusing all
Phare funds on adoption of the entire
acquis
and the
capacity to implement and enforce it.
23
Prior to this,
Phare was demand driven, in that the recipients
themselves chose how to use Phare resources. Con-
sequently, they progressed in different ways and at
different speeds. The 1995 White Paper,
24
which listed
all the legislation pertaining to the Internal Market
acquis
, was read by the aspiring Member States as a
goal for their approximation work.
It was only with the launch, in 1997,
25
of the ‘rein-
forced’ pre-accession strategy by the Agenda 2000
document
26
that 30% of Phare funds was allocated to
capacity building for the application and enforcement
of the
acquis
generally, the remaining 70% being alloc-
ated to transposition and implementation. This was
also the f‌irst clear signal that the adoption of environ-
mental rules and standards was ‘essential’, despite the
17
See Commission Communication to Accession Strategies for
Environment, n. 11 above.
18
Report from the Commission of 5 January 2004, General Report
on Pre-accession Assistance (Phare, ISPA, SAPARD), COM (2003)
844, at 21.
19
The original estimate stood at EUR120 billion. If it is reduced by
20%, it will stand at under EUR96 billion. An EU contribution of
EUR12 billion would mean that EUR84 billion would have to come
from external sources. If it is the case that EUR1.6666 billion external
investment is found on an annual basis, it would take approximately
50 years to attract the total investment required.
20
See W. Hager,
Enlargement: Paying for the Green Acquis
(Centre
for European Policy Studies, 2002), at 9–10. Indeed, Hager’s
concluding paragraph, at 68, is dramatic: ‘In sum, while sources of
economic intelligence and the instruments for applying such intelli-
gence exist, the Union’s governance of the enlargement process
is fragmented and lacks an administrative/political focus for any
strategy going beyond formal
acquis
compliance. The costs to the
candidate countries, the future stability of the euro, the Union’s own
budget and last, but by no means least, to the environment are
signif‌icant’.
21
See P. Nicolaides, ‘Preparing for Accession to the EU: How to
Establish Capacity for Effective and Credible Application of EU
Rules’, in M. Cremona (ed.),
The Enlargement of the European
Union
(Oxford, 2003), 43–78.
22
Council Regulation 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic
aid to the Republic of Hungary and the Polish People’s Republic,
[1989] OJ L375/11.
23
Commission Communication ‘Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider
Union’, COM (97) 2000, presented in three volumes, Vol. I at 49 –50.
24
Commission White Paper of 3 May 1995, Preparing the CEECs
for Integration into the Internal Market, COM (95) 163.
25
Agenda 2000, n. 23 above, based on the Europe Agreements, as
re-oriented by, among other instruments, the Copenhagen Criteria,
set out the basic elements of the strategy, including the legal and
economic instruments and institutional mechanisms for the pre-
accession phase, including the negotiations.
26
Ibid.
KIRSTYN INGLIS RECIEL 13 (2) 2004
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
138
fact that the full compliance with the environment
acquis
would not be possible upon accession.
27
As the
Commission noted:
The persistence of a gap between levels of environmental
protection in present and new Members would distort the
functioning of the Single Market and could lead to a protec-
tionist reaction. This situation would affect the Union’s
capability to develop its environmental policy.
28
Capacity building will continue to be a priority after
enlargement. As seen below, the work to be done in
the months leading up to the European Commission’s
f‌inal reports on progress in advance of accession
was considerable. The Court of Auditors, in a report
published on 21 May 2003
29
(examining the years
1995–2001), pointed out that the future new Member
States did not have suff‌icient institutional capacities to
develop environmental and f‌inancing strategies at a
suff‌iciently early stage. This resulted in problems with
project preparation and tendering for environmental
infrastructure projects. In particular, the Court of
Auditors highlighted the need to reduce EU grant
levels below the 75% ceiling even further than has
already been done in order to cover more projects. The
Court of Auditors also criticized the Commission for
its ‘over-emphasis on twinning’.
30
This state of affairs can be attributed to various cir-
cumstances, including the numerous re-orientations
of the approximation exercise undertaken by the
CEECs as a result of the accession strategy. In response
to this criticism, the Commission explains,
31
in its
response accompanying the Special Reports, the
historical and other limitations placed upon it.
Signif‌icantly, however, the Commission shares the
concerns expressed by the Court of Auditors. Phare
funding, inspired by the PEPA, concentrated on these
concerns during 2003 and the Commission has pro-
vided assistance to reduce def‌iciencies in tendering
and contracting. However, the grant rate has remained
at a 65% ceiling.
A new Transition Facility is also established by the
Accession Treaty to f‌inance further the strengthening
and development of administrative capacity and the
continued implementation and enforcement of EC law,
as well as to foster best practice among peers. Article
34 of the Act of Accession
32
provides for temporary
f‌inancial assistance to be given to the new Member
States: EUR200 million for 2004, EUR120 million for
2005, EUR60 million for 2006. Implementation of
Phare projects decided before 1 January 2004 (and
their equivalents for Cyprus and Malta) will continue
for 3 years. The implementation of contracts and pay-
ments for pre-accession assistance will be managed in
the new Member States by their national funds, sub-
ject to
special
ex-ante
control of the relevant body by
the European Commission.
33
Any country that fails
to obtain the
ex-ante
waiver could see its portion of
the money being either suspended or withdrawn. The
Commission highlights this as an area of ‘serious con-
cern’ in its November 2003
Comprehensive Monitor-
ing Report
, despite its positive predictions in its report
on pre-accession assistance for 2002.
34
The Instrument for Structural Policy for Pre-Accession
(ISPA)
35
is the pre-accession programme for funding
large-scale infrastructure projects in the transport and
environment sectors and SAPARD
36
is the pre-accession
programme for agricultural support and rural develop-
ment. ISPA and SAPARD projects will be succeeded
by the Cohesion Fund and the European Agricultural
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), respectively.
Thus, ISPA and SAPARD projects will fall under those
budget headings. Since 1 January 2004, the new Member
States have been eligible for structural funding under
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
27
Ibid., at 56. See also the Commission Communication of 20 May
1998 on Accession Strategies for the Environment, COM (1998)
294 and the Commission staff working paper of 25 August 1997,
‘The Road Map’ SEC (1997) 1608.
28
See Agenda 2000, n. 23 above, Vol. II, at 56.
29
See Special Report No 5/2003 concer ning PHARE and ISPA
funding of environmental projects in the candidate countries
together with Commission replies, Court of Auditors, [2003] OJ
C167/1.
30
See Special Report No 6/2003 concer ning PHARE and ISPA
funding of environmental projects in the candidate countries
together with Commission replies, Court of Auditors, [2003] OJ
C167/21, at 31.
31
See the responses of the Commission accompanying the Special
Reports, ibid., and n. 29 above.
32
All Treaties of Accession have an Act of Accession. The treaty
expressly mentions that the accompanying Act of Accession forms
an integral part of it. The Act of Accession contains the conditions
of admission and adjustments to the treaties on which the Union is
founded. These conditions and adjustments
may
be altered. The
body of the treaty itself is not subject to alteration. See n. 2 above.
33
Article 33(4) of the Act of Accession makes special provision for
the use of ISPA funds for the purposes of maintaining the neces-
sary statutory staff in the new Member States for 15 months after
the date of accession. This is impor tant because ‘off‌icials assigned
to posts in the new Member States before accession and who are
required to remain in service in those States after the date of acces-
sion shall benef‌it, as an exception, from the same f‌inancial and
material conditions as were applied to the Commission before
accession – in accordance with Annex X to the Staff Regulations of
Off‌icials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the
European Communities (Reg. 259/68, as amended). Certain ISPA
funds will be used together with the Community Budget (Part B –
‘Support expenditure for operation’).
34
See also the General Report of the Commission of 5 January
2004 on Pre-Accession Assistance (Phare–ISPA–SAPARD) in
2002, COM (2003) 844, at 14–17.
35
Council Regulation 1267/99 establishing an instrument for struc-
tural policies for pre-accession, [1999] OJ L161/73.
36
Council Regulation 1268/99 on Community support for pre-
accession measures for agriculture and rural development in the
applicant countries of central and eastern Europe in the pre-
accession period, [1999] OJ L161/87.
RECIEL 13 (2) 2004 ENLARGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
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© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
139
and the European Social Fund.
37
The main problem
concerning the structural and cohesion funds, accord-
ing to the European Commission’s November 2003
Comprehensive Monitoring Report
38
and the above
reports of the Court of Auditors, has been the lack of
a suff‌icient number of quality projects ready to be
launched. The start of the programmes will be delayed
if the legislative framework, including the EU rules
on public procurement, State Aid and environment
protection is not in place – only Lithuania does not
face this risk. Malta is singled out for needing to
strengthen procedures and institutions to implement
the structural funds. Financial management is the
main challenge for the CEECs and Malta.
However, adequacy of administrative capacity is more
than a matter of f‌inancing. While all (existing and
future) Member States are obliged to transpose and
comply with the
acquis, the institutions of the Union
have no formal jurisdiction to evaluate the judicial and
administrative capacity of the Member States in order
to do so.39 Member States are encouraged to improve
their administrative structures through more informal
channels to strengthen their capacity. For example,
this is underlined in the 2001 Recommendation on
Minimum Criteria for Environmental Inspections in
Member States,40 whereby the Member States are urged
to supply information on staff‌ing levels and other
resources of environmental inspection authorities.
The pre-accession strategy approach to building up
and reinforcing administrative and judicial capacity in
the future new Member States has been to ensure that
enough qualif‌ied staff are employed and that enough
money is made available in order to meet the end goal
of implementation and enforcement. Nicolaides points
out that this approach lacks the necessary ingredient
of ‘credible commitment’ to apply the acquis once they
have become Member States. He points to the weak-
ness in the eight methods the Union uses to ensure
effective implementation of the acquis and advises
the future new Members to adopt an institutional
approach to building administrative capacity.41 Through
the ‘institutional approach’ that he describes, Nico-
laides maintains that the future new Member States
will be able:
to demonstrate to the EU a credible commitment to apply
the acquis communautaire if they delegate that task to
suff‌iciently empowered and accountable institutions which
both have considerable decision-making independence and
are subject to specif‌ic performance obligations.42
IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ACCESSION TREATY
It has been apparent, since the pre-accession strategy
was enhanced in 1997, that transitional arrangements
were unavoidable if the political momentum of acces-
sion was to be maintained. Before 1 May 2004, the
future new Member States had a considerable work-
load to complete. The Accession Treaty, to a certain
extent, continues the pre-accession conditionality
for the f‌irst years after enlargement – the carrot of
enlargement will no longer exist as the incentive for
compliance with the acquis communautaire. Recent
EC governance initiatives will be vital to the EU-wide
implementation and enforcement of the environment
acquis in the Member States.
THE TRANSITIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS
Technical adaptations to various laws in order to apply
the transitional arrangements to each of the candid-
ates are provided for in Article 24 of the Act of Acces-
sion,43 referring to Annexes V through to XIV. Each
annex relates to a different new Member State and,
as was the procedure with previous enlargements, spe-
cif‌ies the extent to which they are entitled to derogate
from Community acts in line with the transitional
arrangements agreed at the December 2002 Luxem-
bourg European Council. The derogations are transi-
tional arrangements and do not relate to the entirety
of a piece of legislation. The exact nature of the
derogation is specif‌ied in the relevant country annex –
and the derogations for each of the future new Member
States are not the same.
The derogations in the chapter on the free movement
of goods are also minimal and do not relate to the
environment acquis.44 Other derogations are far
longer in duration and will involve considerable con-
tinued efforts, including f‌inancial, such as in the case
of the environment acquis where Poland45 will benef‌it
from a derogation in respect of large combustion
plants until 2017. Additionally, Poland has been
granted limited derogations from the State Aid acquis
to support necessary investments in meeting the
environment acquis.46 No other Member State has
agreed to such transitional arrangements on State Aid.
Of course, the existing community rules on green State
37 Act of Accession, Article 32.
38 See COM (2003) 844, n. 34 above.
39 See P. Nicolaides, n. 21 above.
40 Recommendation 2001/331, [2001] OJ L118/48.
41 See P. Nicolaides, n. 21 above, at 64–67.
42 Ibid., at 67.
43 Act of Accession, Ar ticle 54 expressly allows for the application of
the time limits set out in Annexes V–XIV.
44 These relate only to licensing of medical equipment and the
marketing authorizations for pharmaceutical products as described
earlier in the text, concerning Malta, Cyprus, Poland and Slovenia.
45 See Act of Accession, Annex XII, Articles 13A–E, at 3810–3844.
46 Ibid., Ar ticle 5(1)(a)(II)(bb) and 5(2), at 3764–3844 and 3770–
3773.
KIRSTYN INGLIS RECIEL 13 (2) 2004
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
140
Aid will be valuable tools for all (including the new)
Member States.47 The transitional arrangements pro-
vide derogations from Articles 87–89 EC and concern
State Aid for environmental protection standards for
which a transitional period has been granted for the
duration of the environmental transitional arrangement.
A regional ceiling applies, with a 15% supplement for
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). A 30%
aid intensity will be allowed until the end of 2010 for
IPPC installations entitled to transitional arrangements
and a 30% aid intensity is permitted until 31 October
2007 for IPPC-related investments that are not covered
by a transitional arrangement under the environment
chapter. Large combustion plants that are subject to
transitional arrangements will be entitled to a State
Aid intensity of 50% of investment.
The transitional arrangements referred to in Article 24
of the Act of Accession and worked out in the ten country
annexes enumerate the content of the European Com-
mission’s Guide to the Negotiations,48 published almost
immediately after the ‘closure’ of the negotiations in
December 2002. In no circumstances may the enforce-
ment of national rules during the transitional periods
lead to border controls between the Member States.49
Due to the fact that the acquis is constantly evolving,
the candidates are ‘approximating’ to a moving target
and the references of the acquis legislation may well
change between now and the date of accession (Article
55 of the Act of Accession),50 where new acquis meas-
ures have been adopted between 1 November 200251
and signature of the Accession Treaty. This is more
about adapting annexes to the Accession Treaty con-
taining transitional arrangements to take account of
evolutions in the acquis before accession rather than
to add further derogations to the country annexes.
Thus, the derogations themselves will not change.
In its Enlargement Strategy Paper for 2000,52 repeat-
ing its approach outlined in Agenda 2000 in 1997, the
Commission emphasized that transitional arrangements
would be exceptional, limited in time and scope, and
accompanied by a plan with clearly def‌ined stages
for application of the acquis. They must not involve
amendments to the rules or policies of the Union,
disrupt their proper functioning or lead to signif‌icant
distortions of competition. In this connection, account
must be taken of the interests of the Union, the
applicant country and the other applicant States. In
the negotiations, the Commission followed this approach.53
Transition periods will be few and short. Where con-
siderable adaptations and substantial efforts, including
f‌inancing, are required, transition arrangements have
been spread over a def‌inite period of time. That one
country was given a transitional arrangement was not
taken as a precedent for the other countries nor was the
fact that transitional measures were granted in a previous
accession. The transitional arrangements agreed for
the environment acquis are second only in number to
the agriculture chapter. The internal market acquis
has not been addressed as a chapter of the acquis in
its own right but is considered where relevant. Inter-
nal market rules arise in the context of the 31 chapters
of the acquis, including the environment chapter.
Requests for transitional arrangements by the acced-
ing countries were divided into three types54 by the
Commission:
Acceptable: being transitional measures of a technical
nature that pose no signif‌icant problem. Acceptance
of this type of request has advanced negotiations in
certain chapters from early on in the negotiations.
Negotiable: being those requests with a more sign-
if‌icant impact, in terms of competition or the internal
market, or in time or space. Such transitional meas-
ures were acceptable subject to set conditions and
a time limit. Account was taken of their relationship
to other transitional arrangements or areas of the
acquis without transitional measures or of the coun-
try’s commitment to well-def‌ined plans for imple-
mentation and investment. Necessarily, implications
for competition and the single market were a decisive
factor in the f‌inal grant of the transitional arrange-
ment, as were effects on the economy, health,
safety, the environment, consumers, citizens, other
common policies and the Community budget.
47 See Information from the Commission: Community guidelines on
State Aid for environmental protection, [2001] OJ C37/3. These
guidelines are valid until 31 December 2007.
48 European Commission, Guide to the Negotiations (no off‌icial pub-
lication reference), updated and published on the Europa website in
December 2002 but since removed therefrom.
49
As noted above, an Act of Accession forms an integral part of the
Accession Treaty itself and contains the conditions of admission and
adjustments to the treaties on which the Union is founded. The
2003 Act of Accession (see n. 2 above) reads: ‘In order not to hamper
the proper functioning of the internal mar ket, the enforcement of the
new Member States’ national rules during the transitional periods
referred to in Annexes V to XIV shall not lead to border controls
between Member States’. Act concerning the conditions of accession of
the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland
and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on
which the European Union is founded. This is the same text as in
Article 153 of the Act of Accession for Austria, Finland and Sweden.
50 Ibid., Article 55 reads: ‘At the duly substantiated request of one of
the new Member States, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission, may, before 1 May 2004, take measures con-
sisting of temporary derogations from acts of the institutions adopted
between November 2002 and the date of the signature of the Treaty
of Accession’.
51 This was just after the 2002 Commission Country Reports that
formed the basis for the December 2002 negotiations, where the
transitional arrangements were agreed.
52 European Commission Enlargement Strategy Paper, Report on
Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries
(for 2000) (8 November 2000), at 26–28, available at
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/index.htm>.
53 See European Commission, n. 48 above.
54 See European Commission Enlargement Strategy Paper, n. 52
above and also European Commission, n. 48 above.
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Unacceptable: being requests for transitional meas-
ures posing ‘fundamental problems’. Thus, the
Commission would not consider relaxing the rule
that the (environment) acquis be transposed upon
the date of accession, although implementation may
be deferred during the transitional derogations.
Transitional Arrangements: The Example
of Poland Taking the example of Poland, transi-
tional arrangements in the environment acquis are
fewer than had originally been intended. The thrust of
the transitional arrangements are to allow the new
Member State the time to attract the often massive
infrastructure investment required for implementing a
directive or to introduce new institution structures
and systems for the enforcement and monitoring of
legislation. However, the transitional arrangements do
not compensate for lacks in the capacity of the new
Member States to maintain compliance and enforce
the acquis once they have acceded to the Union.
Referring to the country annex to the Accession Treaty
concerning Poland,55 the derogations can be summar-
ized as follows:
Directive 99/32 on sulphur content of liquid fuels
(until 31 December 2006).56 The most challenging
task for both this directive and the VOC Directive57
is the introduction of a new institutional structure,
and systems for the monitoring and enforcement
of the legislation. In the case of Poland, in the
negotiations it was shown that the application of
regular limits would raise specif‌ic technical and
economic problems. Moreover, this directive is
linked to other directives, notably the Large Com-
bustion Plants Directive,58 which will also be sub-
ject to a transitional arrangement, allowing time to
attract the necessary investments. This derogation
is designed to draw in the crucial investment and
f‌inancing required but it must not bring about any
negative effects on the market in gas and oil.
Directive 94/6359 on VOC emissions from storage
and distribution of petrol (until 31 December
2005). The most challenging task for this directive
is the introduction of a new institutional structure,
and systems for the monitoring and enforcement
of the legislation. It also involves local actors in
Poland. Operators of petrol terminals, service sta-
tions and petrol transports are also involved in the
implementation of technical and management
requirements to minimize vapour losses from the
handling of petrol.
Directive 94/62 on packaging waste60 (until 31
December 2007). Compliance will require the building
of infrastructure for the separation and re-use of
waste and the modernization of existing incinera-
tion plants. Among other things, this is due to the
lack of EC pre-accession funding for such projects,
coupled with the limited f‌inances of public f‌inance
sources in the regions or local authorities respons-
ible for management and implementation.
Directive 99/31 on landf‌ill61 (until 1 July 2012, with
target quantities specif‌ied each year until the cut-off
date of 2012). The most diff‌icult and costly aspects
of implementing this directive relate to the admin-
istration and establishment of suff‌icient facilities
for the reduction of biodegradable municipal waste
to be land f‌illed and wastes that may no longer be
put in landf‌ills. Unsatisfactory landf‌ills have to be
phased out, involving considerable maintenance costs,
and restoration and aftercare costs. In a study
f‌inanced by the Commission, the entire cost for
Poland alone for meeting the requirements of this
directive was estimated at EUR3.5 billion, of which
60% would have to be used for the aftercare of the
existing landf‌ills and closing down others.62
Directive 93/259 on waste shipments63 (until 31
December 2012). Poland alone has a transitional
arrangement because of the problem of disposing
of its own waste due to the lack of waste disposal
infrastructure and the level of investment required
to remedy this.
Directive 91/271 on urban wastewater treatment64
(until 31 December 2015). Sewers and wastewater
treatment facilities must be built and the time-
frame will depend upon the availability of f‌inance
and construction engineering resources in Poland;
hence the 2015 deadline.
Directive 76/464 on the discharge of certain danger-
ous substances into surface water65 (until 31 December
2007). Full compliance requires investment to bring
55 See Act of Accession, Annex XII (Poland), Articles 13A–E.
56 See Sulphur Content of Liquid Fuels Directive, n. 16 above.
57 VOC Directive, ibid.
58 Large Combustion Plant Directive, ibid.
59 VOC Directive, ibid.
60 Until 2014 under Directive 2004/12/EC, n. 106 below.
61 Landf‌ill Directive, ibid.
62 See DISAE Project POL-101, Costing and Financial Analysis of
Approximation, Agriconsulting Europe (DISAE, June 1998).
63 Council Regulation 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision
and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the Euro-
pean Community, [1993] OJ L30/1, as amended.
64 See Urban Waste Water Trea tment Directive, n. 16 above.
65 See Discharge of Cer tain Dangerous Substances into Surface Water
Directive, ibid. The derogations apply to the following directives, which
detail the limit values for discharges of certain c hemicals into the
waters specif‌ied in Directive 76/464/EEC, namely: Council Directive
82/176/EEC of 22 March 1982 on limit values and quality objectives
for mercury discharges by the chlor-alkali electrolysis industry, [1982]
OJ L81/29, Council Directive 83/513/EEC of 26 September 1983 on limit
values and quality objectives for cadmium discharges, [1983] OJ L291/
1, Council Directive 84/156/EEC of 8 March 1984 on limit values
and quality objectives for mercury discharges by sectors other than
the chlor-alkali electrolysis industry, [1984] OJ L74/49 and Council
Directive 86/280/EEC of 12 June 1986 on limit values and quality
objectives for discharges of certain dangerous substances included
in List I of the Annex to Directive 76/464/EEC, [1986] OJ L181/16.
KIRSTYN INGLIS RECIEL 13 (2) 2004
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existing plants up to a level of operation that will allow
them to meet the directive’s emission limit values or
quality objectives – in some cases new plants will have
to be built. The thrust of the directive is to establish
and enforce systems for the monitoring and measur-
ing of pollution of water by certain dangerous sub-
stances throughout the entire country. However, where
results are unfavourable, the directive envisages that
remedial action must be taken, which in turn depends
very much on the investment timescale available to con-
struct improvement works at the plants concerned. The
Commission agrees to the terms with the operators.
Directive 96/61 on IPPC66 (until 31 December 2010
instead of 2007 for the Fifteen). Costs involved in
compliance and proper implementation of the
directive are incurred by operators and the admin-
istration. For the administration, the setting up of
administrative arrangements for the allocation and
implementation of permits is a heavy and costly task,
and requires that a number of operations are already
fully functioning in order that the system can be
properly evaluated. Also, compliance requires the
negotiation of best available techniques (BAT) with
the various industrial sectors to identify the viabil-
ity of the processes. For operators, considerable
capital expenditure is required and, inevitably, the
detailed planning, design, permitting and construc-
tion of new or upgraded facilities to conform with the
new standards will be required. Constructing plants
in accordance with BAT, including pollution abate-
ment facilities, at new installations will be required
by operators, as will alterations to existing plants to
incorporate BAT and pollution abatement facilities.
Finally, all new plants must meet the BAT require-
ments, while existing plants normally must meet
the requirements of the directive after 2004.
Directive 88/609, as amended, on air pollution from
large combustion plants67 (until 2017). The costs for
competent national authorities of compliance with
this directive are signif‌icant. But the costs involved for
operators in complying with the directive and abating
emissions will be many times higher. Costs for the
competent authorities are to be gathered from operators
in line with the polluter-pays principle. As for installa-
tions and plants, it is the adaptation of existing installa-
tions that will prove the greatest stumbling block.
Directive 97/43/Euratom on nuclear safety68 (until
31 December 2006). A derogation from Article 8
provides that the provisions on radiological equip-
ment shall not apply in Poland until 31 December
2006. Such equipment shall not be placed on the
market of other Member States.
Other environment-related derogations are also con-
tained in other chapters of the transitional arrangements.
For example, Poland has a derogation from agriculture
legislation concerning certain information require-
ments under the 1991 Directive on Marketing of Plant
Protection Products until the end of December 2006.69
OUTSTANDING WORK TO HAVE
BEEN COMPLETED BEFORE
1 MAY 2004
Much of the new Members’ pre-accession commitments
are excluded from pre-determined transitional measures.
Reading the programme of work to be achieved by the
Ten in the Commission’s 2002 country reports, it was
clear that the candidates had indeed to be ‘vigorous’
before the end of April 2004. Transitional derogations
have not been granted on the transposition of legislation
(as opposed to implementation); framework legislation
(air, waste, water, environmental impact assessments
(EIA), access to information); nature protection (habitat,
birds); essentials of the internal market (all product-
related legislation); and compliance by all new installa-
tions with the acquis. Considerable pre-accession efforts
were required of the new Member States in all areas
of the acquis, and particularly in building adminis-
trative and judicial capacity. In the 6 months before
accession, the Commission’s 2003 Comprehensive
Monitoring Report70 highlighted the need for ‘enhanced
efforts’ in transposition of legislation (including, to
name a few, the EIA Directive – Malta, Cyprus and
Poland – and the nature protection rules) and admin-
istrative capacities in most f‌ields. In a brief overview,
the Comprehensive Monitoring Report reads:
In the f‌ield of environment policy, Estonia in particular
must now increase efforts to complete legal alignment with
EU rules on air quality, waste management, nature protec-
tion, industrial pollution and radiation protection.71 Other
countries must enhance efforts in specif‌ic f‌ields: waste
management in Malta, nature protection in the Czech
Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta and Poland; industrial
pollution and risk management in Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia; and genetically modif‌ied organisms in Cyprus.72
Transposition is the easier of the tasks, although some
of the Commission’s annual monitoring reports on the
progress made highlight delays in transposition, even
of framework legislation. This also raises enforcement
issues, dealt with below.
66 See IPPC Directive, n. 16 above.
67 See Large Combustion Plant Directive, ibid.
68 Council Directive 97/43/Euratom of 30 June 1997 on health pro-
tection of individuals against the dangers of ionizing radiation in
relation to medical exposure, and repealing Directive 84/466/Euratom,
[1997] OJ L180/22.
69 Accession Treaty, Annex XII, at 884. The directive is Council
Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of
plant protection products on the market, [1991] OJ L230/1.
70 European Commission, 2003 Comprehensive Monitoring Report
(5 November 2003) (without any off‌icial publication reference), avail-
able at t_2003/
index.htm#comprehensive>.
71 Ibid., at 10.
72 Ibid., at 13.
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Poland has had to do considerable work since Decem-
ber 2002.73 Referring to the 2002 and 200374 progress
reports drawn up by the Commission for Poland, by
30 April 2004, Poland must have undertaken the fol-
lowing tasks (an indicative list):
complete transposition for horizontal legislation,
air quality directives, water quality framework acquis,
biocides, solvents, large combustion plants, nature
protection, some waste management, genetically
modif‌ied organisms (GMOs), ambient noise;
improve implementation for waste management,
water quality, including nitrate pollution, industrial
pollution control and major industrial accident
hazards, nature protection, chemicals, biocides;
improve environmental integration into the
def‌inition and implementation of all other sectoral
policies so as to promote sustainable development
(specif‌ied only in the 2002 report);
improve administrative capacity for implementing
the environmental acquis through additional staff
resources, making the Polish voivodships and coun-
ties fully operational in this regard and completing
the creation of the national and 16 regional EIA
Commissions;
ensure issuance of, and compliance with, IPPC
integrated permits – a signif‌icant challenge for the
regional and local authorities as about 70% of the
installations covered by the IPPC Directive will
have to be dealt with at district level;75
improve environmental planning and programming;76
improve monitoring capacity;77
improve environmental inspectorates;78
agree on improvement programmes for f‌ines and
enforcement with the environmental authorities –
an important incentive to operators and a source of
f‌inancing to authorities; and
improve investments.79
POST-ACCESSION
CONDITIONALITY
The carrot of accession that has driven the Union’s
conditionality during the pre-accession phase, guiding
all Community and IFI funding and technical assist-
ance since 1997, will no longer be available to the
Commission after enlargement. While the Accession
Treaty, at Article 38, contains a safeguard clause to
protect the functioning of the internal market, no
such legal tool is available to the Commission in
respect of the environment acquis as such. However,
the Commission will be able to make use of the safe-
guard clause in respect of sectoral policies, including
the environment acquis, where it adversely affects
the functioning of the internal market. The safeguard
clause applies exclusively to the new Member States
and not to the Fifteen. The Commission may take
‘appropriate measures’ against new Member States that
have failed to implement their commitments made
during the accession negotiations.80 It will enable the
Commission to exclude products from the internal
market or suspend Community funds.81
73 The Commission’s reports on the progress of all the candidate
countries were published on 13 December 2002 and are available at
t2002/#report2002>.
74 Ten separate European Commission comprehensive country reports
(5 November 2003) for each of the Ten (without any off‌icial publication
reference) are available at
report_2003/index.htm#paper2003>.
75 To do this there is an urgent need for training staff at regional and
district levels in issuing integrated permits, notably as regards process
issues and technology; staff increases; clear guidelines from central
authorities on how to implement the new laws; and place staff a t the
newly established Centre for ‘Best Available Techniques’.
76 While the situation is improving and deadlines have been set to
establish plans and programmes required under the acquis (preparation
of programmes for air quality, the national waste management plan),
regional and district plans still need to be improved.
77 For air, the monitoring capacity needs to be strengthened, in particular
as regards particulates (PM10); for water, monitoring of drinking water
needs to be extended and all laboratories must be able to measure the
full set of parameters under the Drinking Water Directive. See n. 74 above.
78 Referring to the 2002 report, see n. 73 above, although well established
and well staffed, they need a transfer of staff from laboratories to monitor-
ing and inspection roles in some cases. The frequency of inspections
also needs to be improved, in particular for small and medium-sized
installations. (Nonetheless, large installations are suff‌iciently inspected
and voivodship inspectorates have a good basis for planning and carry-
ing out inspections and for ensuring follow up to non-compliance.)
79 See the 2002 report, ibid., at 109: ‘Poland needs a more strategic
approach to environmental investments with clear investment plan-
ning and listing of priorities. Considerable investments need to be
secured, also in the medium term, to ensure the implementation of
the environment acquis’.
80 Act of Accession, Ar ticle 38(1) reads: ‘If a new Member State has
failed to implement commitments undertaken in the context of the
accession negotiations, causing serious breach of the functioning of
the internal market, including any commitments in all sectoral pol-
icies which concern economic activities with cross-border effect, or
an imminent risk of such breach, the Commission may, until the end
of the period of up to three years after the date of entry into force of
this Act, upon motivated request of a Member State or on its own
initiative, take appropriate measures. Measures shall be propor-
tional and priority shall be given to measures, which disturb least
the functioning of the internal mar ket and, where appropriate, to the
application of the existing sectoral safeguard mechanisms. Such
safeguard measures shall not be invoked as a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States. The safeguard clause may be invoked even before acces-
sion on the basis of the monitoring f‌indings and enter into force as
of the f‌irst day of accession. The measures shall be maintained no
longer than strictly necessary, and, in any case, will be lifted when
the relevant commitment is implemented. They may however be
applied beyond the period specif‌ied in the above paragraph as long
as the relevant commitments have not been fulf‌illed. In response to
progress made by the new Member States concerned in fulf‌illing its
commitments, the Commission may adapt the measures as appro-
priate. The Commission will inform the Council in good time before
revoking safeguard measures, and it will take duly into account any
observations of the Council in this respect’.
81 Act of Accession, Article 38.
KIRSTYN INGLIS RECIEL 13 (2) 2004
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The Commission will be obliged to fall back on its tra-
ditional EC Treaty enforcement mechanisms to pursue
breaches by the new Member States of their Accession
Treaty commitments and Treaty obligations in respect
of measures of the acquis designed to improve or pro-
tect the environment. This does not bode well for full
and coherent compliance with, and enforcement of,
the environment acquis.
The Safeguard Clause The internal market safe-
guard clause, never seen before in an accession treaty,
enables the Commission to take unspecif‌ied action
against a new Member State where it has failed to
meet the commitments given during the negotiations.
After enlargement, the Commission will monitor the
new members ‘using the same mechanisms as those
applied to the existing Member States’.82 For the f‌irst
3 years after accession, the safeguard clause will be an
additional means of ensuring compliance in addition
to the traditional Treaty basis of Article 226 EC for
pursuing a new Member State that has failed to meet
its EC Treaty obligations. Article 38 of the Accession
Treaty is more a tool of prevention, designed to anti-
cipate compliance, implementation and enforcement
inadequacies. Article 226 EC is more reactive in that
the breach must already have occurred.83
Overall, the approach is to continue with the Union’s
pre-accession conditionality in the f‌irst years after
accession and, thereby, to ensure the integrity of the
acquis in an enlarged Union and avoid rifts between
the 25 Member States or any protectionist backlash
against the new Member States. Giving such respons-
ibilities to the Commission takes the political heat out
of managing and checking compliance with what is a
highly political area of the acquis. The Commission
may take ‘appropriate measures’ under Article 38 of
the Act of Accession, if one of the new Member States
fails to meet its commitments under the accession
negotiations. Such a failure must, however, ‘cause seri-
ous breach of the functioning of the Internal Market,
including commitments’.84 The safeguard measures
may extend to ‘any commitments in all sectoral policies
which concern economic activities with cross-border
effect or an imminent breach of such risk’.85
A number of the transitional arrangements concerning
the environment acquis have been adopted under (or
in combination with) the internal market legal basis:
the directives on environmental impact assessment,86
the sulphur content of liquid fuels,87 VOCs,88 packaging
and packaging waste,89 and the discharge of dangerous
substances into surface water.90 The transitional deroga-
tions from the State Aid provisions undoubtedly fall
within the body of commitments that will be subject
to the safeguard clauses. Other central instruments
of the environment acquis, however, are founded
upon the environment legal basis, such as conservation
measures, where a number of transitional arrange-
ments are foreseen in the Accession Treaty.91
The internal market safeguard clause is a clear indica-
tion of the political importance given to the internal
market acquis over other policy areas, such as the
environment acquis. It can be read as an incentive to
new Member States to prioritize compliance with the
internal market acquis over other environmental
provisions in order to avoid safeguard measures. Thus,
the Accession Treaty has stronger conditionality in
respect of implementation of the internal market acquis
compared to the environment acquis.
These safeguard measures will enter into force on the
f‌irst day of accession. Only the Commission may adopt
measures under the safeguard clause, although any
Member State (including the Ten) may make a request
that they be adopted. Preference will be given to meas-
ures that least disturb the functioning of the common
market. The principles of proportionality and non-
discrimination are explicitly incorporated in the for-
mulation of safeguard measures and those measures
must not act as disguised restrictions on trade. They
must ‘be maintained no longer than strictly necessary,
and, in any case, will be lifted when the relevant com-
mitment is implemented’,92 and the Commission may
only revert to using safeguard measures within the f‌irst
3 years of enlargement. Where safeguard measures
are in place before the end of the 3-year period, the
Commission will be able to continue their application
should the new Member States not have met their
pre-accession commitments to which the safeguard
measures apply. Once in place, the Council must be
82 See Guide to the Negotiations, n. 48 above. An updated version
(as at December 2003) is available at
comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/index.htm>.
83 Of course, all 25 Member States will be open to make use of Art-
icle 30 EC and the safeguard clauses contained in the secondary
EC legislation where emergency measures by the Commission or a
Member State are provided for where a serious risk is posed to
human health, animal health or the environment.
84 Act of Accession, Article 38, f‌irst paragraph.
85 Ibid.
86 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assess-
ment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the
environment, [1985] OJ L175/40, as amended.
87 See Sulphur Content of Liquid Fuels Directive, n. 16 above.
88 See VOC Directive, ibid.
89 See Packaging Waste Directive, ibid.
90 See Discharge of Dangerous Substances into Surface Water
Directive, ibid.
91 Only Malta has a derogation in respect of the trapping of birds,
see the Accession Treaty, Annex XI.10.D, at 870. The staggered
implementation of the EU nature directives has to be taken into
account when implementing other policy areas (structural, trans-
port, agriculture): see the Commission’s website concerning Malta,
available at
enlargement.htm>.
92 Act of Accession, Article 38.
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informed ‘in good time’ before the Commission may
revoke the measures and it must take the Council’s
observations into account – although the Commission
will be able to adapt the safeguard measures in line
with progress in meeting pre-accession commitments.
So, the internal market safeguard clause gives broad
discretion to the Commission, together with seemingly
far-reaching powers to sanction action or inaction by
the new Members under their pre-determined transi-
tional measures and under their pre-accession com-
mitments made in December 2002 and throughout
the negotiations, in order to be ready for membership
on 1 May 2004. In an attempt to introduce some legal
certainty into the use of this clause, six of the new
Members have aimed to restrict the scope of Article 38
of the Accession Treaty to failures to fulf‌il Treaty obliga-
tions, in the same way as under Article 226 EC. Both
provisions are aimed at bringing about compliance at
national level with the acquis.93 The Commission gives
no such guarantees and accepts no such restrictions
on its discretion under the safeguard clause.94 It has
been declared by the Commission that it will hear the
views of Member States directly affected by such
measures and will duly take into account these view
and positions.95
The Commission has not limited itself to the fulf‌ilment
of Treaty obligations. The safeguard measures may
address the commitments made during the negoti-
ations, which include, for example, building adminis-
trative capacity and making provision for criminal
sanctions. This is an extension of the pre-accession
conditionality that has been prevalent throughout pre-
accession. Just as was the case before accession, the
new Members must do more than meet the acquis. In
the f‌irst 3 years after their accession to the Union, they
will have to convince the Commission and the Fifteen
of their willingness and capacity to contribute to the
evolution of the acquis.
It is useful to compare Article 38 of the Accession
Treaty with Article 226 EC. Under the Article 226 EC
procedure, the Commission submits a reasoned opin-
ion and hears the Member State concerned, giving
that Member State the opportunity to bring itself into
compliance before initiating court action against it.
Unlike the Article 226 EC procedure, under the Acces-
sion Treaty’s internal market safeguard clause, the
new Members have no legally established right to
submit observations or to be heard on a Commission
proposal for a safeguard measure. The Commission
declaration that it will hear the views of the Member
State(s) directly affected by the safeguard measures,
and will duly take account of those views, is no more
than a declaration – it is not referred to within the
body of the Accession Treaty. The only certainty for
the new Member State(s) to be heard will be when
the Commission makes a proposal for the revocation
of the safeguard measures. At this point, any of the
25 Member States meeting within the Council may
submit observations, not only the Member State sub-
jected to the safeguard measures. Under the Article
226 EC procedure, however, only the Member State
concerned is entitled to submit observations in the
pre-litigation phase – once before the court, of course,
all Member States may submit observations.
Finally, on the matter of timing and f‌ines, the internal
market safeguard clause enables the Commission to
take immediately effective action in respect of the new
Member States by means of appropriate measures,
which may involve the suspension of EC funds. By
comparison, the lead-time for the Commission between
the issue of the reasoned opinion under Article 226 EC
and actually bringing a Member State before the court
may take years. In the case of the Article 226 EC pro-
cedure against the Member States, the procedure lasts
59 months. In the past, where the Article 228 EC pro-
cedure is launched, it takes, on average, 9 years, from
the issue of the formal notice,96 to impose f‌ines.97 Con-
sequently, the imposition of f‌ines has not always
elicited corrective action by those of the Fifteen in
default. Withholding funds from the new Member
States would certainly seem to pose a stronger incentive
to bring about compliance.
EVOLUTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT ACQUIS
AFTER ENLARGEMENT
How the environment acquis will evolve in the Union
of 25 Member States is more a question of how the
93 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and the
Slovak Republic jointly declared (Joint Declaration 22 to the Final
Act to the Treaty of Accession to the European Union 2003) that
they understand ‘the notion “has failed to implement commitments
undertaken in the context of the accession negotiations” only [to
cover] the obligations that are arising from the original Treaties . . .
under the conditions laid down in the Act of Accession and the obli-
gations def‌ined in this Act’ and that therefore, they ‘understand that
the Commission will consider application of Ar ticle 38 only in cases
of alleged violations of the obligations’ arising from the original treat-
ies. These countries also expressly declared, in paras 2 and 3, that
Article 38 is without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) and, insofar as any sanctions might be con-
cerned, they must be heard before measures are taken against
them.
94 See, in particular, ibid., Declaration 43.
95 Ibid.
96 See Article 226 EC.
97 See Twentieth Annual Report of 22 November 2003 on Monitor-
ing the Application of Community Law (2002), COM (2003) 669
f‌inal, at 9–11. These three pages give a summary of the compliance
by the Member States with court judgments against them. Of the
28 cases, 13 concern the environment acquis.
KIRSTYN INGLIS RECIEL 13 (2) 2004
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CEECs, Cyprus and Malta will meet the existing
environment acquis. The last enlargement, taking in
Austria, Finland and Sweden, who had certain higher
environmental standards, did not serve to bring the
other Member States to the same standards. More-
over, accession for Austria, Finland and Sweden put
limits on their scope to act at the national level. Deci-
sion making will become even more of a challenge in a
Union of 25. The parallel evolution of national envir-
onmental law after enlargement will be crucial to the
protection and improvement of Europe’s environment
and to redress the environmental costs of EU integra-
tion. Equally relevant is the matter of implementation
and enforcement by the existing Member States.
GREEN DECISION MAKING IN A
UNION OF 25
Decision making in a Union of 25 will certainly further
complicate matters. Compared to the Fifteen, which is
a diverse group of countries in itself, the CEECs have
dramatically different environments (some land-locked,
others with coast lines for example), environmental
pasts and socio-economic priorities, as well as consid-
erable pressures on existing f‌inancing and investment
resources.98 Some of the most ambitious and costly EC
environmental legislation has been developed after the
accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 and, therefore,
also with their inclusion throughout consultations,
drafting and decision making. For example, the rules
on large combustion plants,99 IPPC,100 urban waste
water,101 the air quality framework102 and its daughter
directives, hazardous waste incineration,103 municipal
waste,104 packaging and packaging waste105 have all
been enacted since that time.
Subsequently, raising the environmental standards
has proved politically charged due to the dramatic
diversity in the Member States’ environments, and
economic and social priorities and needs. Take the recent
decision to more than double minimum recycling tar-
gets (of 25%) for packaging waste under Directive 94/
62, which will apply generally as of 2008.106 Greece,
Ireland and Portugal have an additional 3 years, while
the deadlines for the acceding countries has been left
aside for the moment.107 It has been a hard debate that
has long pre-dated the Commission’s proposal of
2001, evidenced by the fact that, despite its adoption
in 1994, 10 years later the Member States are still
debating aspects of the system and, while the Packag-
ing Waste Directive was adopted by qualif‌ied majority,
the Austrian and Dutch delegations voted against the
new implementing directive in the f‌inal Council vote
on 26 January 2004, so that Member States are en-
titled to count incineration for the purposes of reach-
ing their EU targets. And the European Court of Justice
has also found that packaging waste incinerated in
municipal incinerators can no longer be counted for
the recovery targets of the packaging directive.108 Sev-
eral Member States have used incineration as part of
their strategy to fulf‌il the EU targets and are now faced
with falling short of the targets under the new inter-
pretation. This situation is to be raised again in the
framework of the EU Thematic Strategy on Waste Pre-
vention and Recycling.109
Apart from raising existing standards, numerous gaps
in the environment acquis prevail. The no man’s land
between EC competence and national competence
has resulted in policy gaps in the provision for the
improvement or protection of the environment at both
EU and national levels. Due to lack of political con-
sensus for example, or the subsidiarity ‘excuse’, the
European Commission has faced a political impasse,
even withdrawing key proposals, in crucial initiatives
designed to improve the state of the environment and
prevent the escalation of pollution. That the most
sensitive policy areas of the environment acquis
will remain subject to majority voting restrains EC
initiatives in those f‌ields in an enlarged EU, including
f‌iscal measures, town and country planning, quant-
itative management of water resources, land use
(except waste management), and measures affecting
a Member State’s choice between energy sources and
the general structure of its energy supply. This has
proved a major stumbling block to the development of
the environment acquis in these areas. Those Member
States, such as the Netherlands and Germany, who
have traditionally taken the lead in environmental law
at the EC the level, f‌ind considerable resistance to
their pro-active environmental measures.
98 See J. Klarer and P. Francis, n. 6 above.
99 See Large Combustion Plant Directive, n. 16 above.
100 See IPPC Directive, ibid.
101 See Urban Waste Water Trea tment Directive, ibid.
102 Council Directive 96/62/EC of 27 September 1996 on ambient air
quality assessment and management, [1996] OJ L296/55.
103 See Hazardous Waste Directive, n. 16 above.
104 See Municipal Waste Directive, ibid.
105 See Packaging Waste Directive, ibid.
106 Directive 2004/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 February 2004 amending Directive 94/62/EC on pack-
aging and packaging waste – Statement by the Council, the Com-
mission and the European Parliament, [2004] OJ L47/26.
107 Initially the Commission had proposed an implementation dead-
line of 2006 for the 12 Member States and 2009 for Greece, Ireland
and Portugal. See the Commission’s press release IP/03/1671 of
8 December 2003, available at /
cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/03/1671|0|RAPID&lg=EN>.
See Proposal of 7 December 2001 for a Directive amending Direct-
ive 94/62/EC on Packaging and Packaging Waste, as amended,
COM (2001) 729, which, at the time of writing, is on the brink of f‌inal
adoption.
108 See ECJ 13 February 2003, Case C-228/00, Commission v. Ger-
many, [2003] ECR I-1439; and ECJ 13 February 2003, Case C-116/
01, EcoService Nederland BV, [2003] ECR I-2969.
109 COM (2003) 301 of 27 May 2003.
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For example, the f‌irst move at the EC level envisaging
an energy tax dates back to 1984,110 while the Commis-
sion’s proposal for a directive in 1992 was replaced in
1995 and further watered down in 1997.111 Eco-taxes
offer the possibility of a more eff‌icient way of tackling
environmental problems and reportedly ‘a single eco-
nomic instrument such as a tax on fuel could replace
117 “regulatory” directives in force in the EU relating
to the environment’.112 The objections of one Member
State, Spain (although other Member States, notably
France and the UK, were also instrumental in the
downfall of the proposal) served to shelve the initi-
ative completely.113 The Commission took an entirely
different tack, proposing a directive using the legal
basis of harmonization in taxes114 and having the main
aim of reducing distortions in competition due to
differing national levels of taxation. The directive115
explicitly refers to the obligation (Article 6 EC) on the
Member States to integrate environmental protection
requirements into the def‌inition and implementation
of the directive, although this obligation is clearly sub-
ordinate to the economic purpose of the system:
In accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty, environmental
protection requirements must be integrated into the def‌ini-
tion and implementation of other Community policies.116
Moreover, it establishes a Community minimum level
designed to encourage rather than bind Member States
to work toward common levels. Various derogations,
exemptions or reductions are available to Member States
until 2012 in some cases. The Commission recently
proposed measures to apply derogations and exemptions.117
The system involves transitional arrangements until
2007 and will, inevitably, involve the introduction of
transitional arrangements for the new Member States.
In addition to transposition and compliance by the
Member States with the environment acquis, there is
the matter of non-observance. In 2001, the Commis-
sion proposed a directive on the protection of the envir-
onment through criminal law118 on the basis of Article
175 EC, which would oblige the Member States to
adopt at least a minimum level of sanctions against
breaches of EC environmental law. The Commission
sees this as the only type of measure that is adequate
and dissuasive enough to achieve proper implementa-
tion of environmental law. However, the Member
States are reluctant to commit to tackling effectively
environmental crime. The Council adopted a frame-
work decision119 on environmental crime under the
EU Treaty. This is an inter-governmental instrument,
which served to bypass the right of initiative of the
European Commission, as well as to exclude it from
managing the application of criminal law measures for
the enforcement of the green acquis. The Commission
has brought an action against the Council,120 challeng-
ing its jurisdictional competence.
As already seen, there is a considerable workload for
the new Members regarding the environment acquis
for many years after enlargement. They will have had to
adopt the acquis wholesale. This will necessarily affect
their ability and willingness to participate in raising
environmental standards any further at the EC level. It
is also clear, however, that there are policy gaps in the
acquis and, consequently, the new Members will also need
to make progress on their national environment laws.
INSIGHTS FROM THE LAST
ENLARGEMENT
It is interesting to draw certain conclusions on how
the environment acquis evolved to take account of the
higher environmental standards of Austria, Finland
and Sweden following the last enlargement.
The approach taken to the last enlargement was to
allow the new Member States to maintain their higher
standards during a 4-year review period,121 beginning
110 Resolution of 13 April 1984 on a Community energy tax on the
consumption of hydrocarbons and its effect on energy policy, [1984]
OJ C127/258.
111 Proposal of 27 May 1992 for a Council Directive Introducing a
Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, COM (92) 226,
[1992] OJ C196 and Amended Proposal of 10 May 1995 for a
Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions
and Energy, COM (1995) 172.
112 See J. Burchell and S. Lightfoot, The Greening of the European
Union (Sheff‌ield Academic Press, 2001), at 98–100.
113 See Answer by Commissioner Bolkestein of 12 July 2001 to Writ-
ten Question P-1725/01 by Alexander de Roo (Verts/ALE) to the
Commission – Structure of, and Timescale for, a European Energy
Tax on the Basis of Enhanced Cooperation, [2001] OJ C350E/215.
For other examples, see the Resolution on the Communication of
14 November 1996 from the Commission on the review of the Com-
munity strategy for waste management and the draft Council resolu-
tion on waste policy, [1996] OJ C362/241.
114 EC Treaty, Article 93.
115 Council Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework
for the taxation of energy products and electricity, [2003] OJ L283/51.
116 Ibid., Recital 6. See also Article 15, which leaves considerable
discretion to the Member States on environmental measures.
117 The Commission proposed a revision to the Directive on 28 January
2004 (no reference as yet), entitled ‘Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Directive 2003/96/EC as regards the possibility for certain
Member States to apply, in respect of energy products and electricity,
temporary exemptions or reductions in the levels of taxation’.
118 See Commission Communication of 13 March 2001 on a pro-
posal for a directive on the protection of the environment through
criminal law, COM (2001) 139, as amended by COM (2002) 544 of
30 September 2002.
119 The Framework Decision was adopted on 27 December 2003
(unpublished) and no further action is planned until the judgment of
the ECJ has been delivered. See the Minutes of the Article 36 Com-
mittee of the Council of the European Union (DG H III) of 30 June
2003 (10925/03), 42–43.
120 The Commission brought an action before the ECJ against the
Council on 15 April 2003, Case C-176/03 pending.
121 Act of Accession, n. 49 above, at Articles 69, 84 and 112.
KIRSTYN INGLIS RECIEL 13 (2) 2004
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148
on the date of accession and lasting until 31 December
1998. The higher standards concerned 11 amendments
to nine directives. (Of course, it was not necessary to
amend measures adopted under the legal basis for the
environment adopted under Article 174 EC, which in
any case allows for more stringent national measures.)
The review clause gave the European Commission
and the Member States (Austria, Finland or Sweden)
4 years to revise the Community standard upwards
to their level. However, a literal reading of the review
clause gave no guarantees to the new Members that
the Community standard would indeed be raised:
At the end of the transitional period . . . the EC acquis will
be applicable to the new Member States under the same
conditions as in the present Member States.122
It was political pressure that enabled Austria, Finland
and Sweden to maintain their higher standards after
the review period. The review123 even went to concilia-
tion between the Council and Parliament in the last
months of the transitional period.124 While four of the
directives125 were amended by technical amendment126
in order to incorporate the higher standards, the
remaining directives127 had to be revised substantially
– according to the full co-decision procedure involv-
ing Parliament and Council. Legally speaking, how-
ever, in f‌ive cases, the new Members have had their
derogations extended – for all intents and purposes –
as opposed to raising the overall Community standard.
In the case of cadmium content in fertilizers, the
approach was f‌irst to extend the transitional deroga-
tion for Austria, Finland and Sweden from the acquis
until December 2001 under the full co-decision pro-
cedure.128 Thereafter, the derogation has, effectively, been
extended by means of the notif‌ication and authoriza-
tion procedure under Article 95(4) EC.129 Moreover,
the new Fertilizers Regulation,130 which repeals and
replaces the previous fertilizers law as of 2005, is
drafted in such a way as to allow Austria, Finland and
Sweden to maintain their standards in accordance
with the Commission Decision under Article 95(4) EC.
Directives 88/379/EEC and 78/631/EEC on classif‌ica-
tion, packaging and labelling of dangerous prepara-
tions and pesticides were both repealed and replaced
in 1999 by Directive 1999/45/EEC. The new directive
effectively extends the derogations that Austria, Finland
and Sweden were given under their Accession Treaties
in order to allow them to maintain their higher stand-
ards.131 Austria, Finland and Sweden are now subject
to the Article 95 procedures to maintain or further
raise their standards.132 Finally, Directive 1999/45/EEC
also introduced new provisions on classif‌ication and
labelling of pesticide preparations, which incorporated
the higher standards contained in the derogations for
Austria, Finland and Sweden from Directive 91/414/
EEC on the placing on the market of plant protection
products.133
In the cases of Directives 93/12/EEC on the sulphur
content of certain liquid fuels134 and 85/210/EEC on
122 Ibid., Articles 69, 84 and 112.
123 See Commission Communication of 11 December 1998, ‘The
Review Clause: Environmental and Health Standards Four Years
after the Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European
Union’, COM (1998) 745.
124 Decision 2179/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 September 1998 on the review of the European Com-
munity programme of policy and action in relation to the environ-
ment and sustainable development ‘Towards sustainability’, [1998]
OJ L275/1. See also the European Parliament’s Resolution of 4 July
1996 on the review clause, [1996] OJ C211/20.
125 Directive 67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967 on the classif‌ication,
packaging and labelling of dangerous substances, as amended,
[1967] OJ L196/1; Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 on the
placing on the market of plant protection products, as amended,
[1991] OJ L230/1 (Plant Protection Products Directive); Directive 76/
769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on marketing and use of dangerous sub-
stances and preparations, as amended, [1976] OJ L262/02; and
Directive 91/157/EEC of 18 March 1991 on batteries and accumu-
lators, as amended, [1991] OJ L78/38.
126 Derogations were also extended by 2 years, for example in the
case of Directive 67/548/EEC by Directive 1999/33/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999 amending
Council Directive 67/548/EEC as regards the labelling of certain
dangerous substances in Austria and Sweden, [1999] OJ L199/57.
127 Council Directive 78/631/EEC of 26 June 1978 on the approxima-
tion of the laws of the Member States relating to the classif‌ication,
packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations (pesticides),
[1978] OJ L206/13; Council Directive 88/379/EEC of 7 June 1988
on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States relating to the classif‌ication, pac k-
aging and labelling of dangerous preparations, [1988] OJ L187/14;
Plant Protection Products Directive, n. 125 above; Council Directive
76/116/EEC of 18 December 1975 on the approximation of the laws
of the Member States relating to fer tilizers, [1976] OJ L24/21; Coun-
cil Directive 85/210/EEC of 20 March 1985 on the approximation
of the laws of the Member States concerning the lead content of
petrol, [1985] OJ L96/25 (Lead Content of Petrol Directive); and
Sulphur Content of Liquid Fuels Directive, n. 16 above.
128 Directive 98/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 22 December 1998 amending Directive 76/116/EEC on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to fertil-
izers, as regards the marketing in Austria, Finland and in Sweden of
fertilizers containing cadmium, [1999] OJ L18/60.
129 See Commission Decision 2002/398/EC of 24 May 2002 on the
national provisions notif‌ied by the Republic of Finland under Article
95(4) of the EC Treaty concerning the maximum admissible content
of cadmium in fertilizers, [2002] OJ L138/15.
130 Regulation (EC) No 2003/2003 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 October 2003 relating to fertilizers, [2003] OJ
L304/1.
131 See Annex VIII to Directive 1999/45/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 31 May 1999 concerning the approxima-
tion of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the
Member States relating to the classif‌ication, packaging and label-
ling of dangerous preparations, [1999] OJ L200/1.
132 See, for example, Commission Decision 2002/398/EC of 24 May
2002 on the national provisions notif‌ied by the Republic of Finland
under Article 95(4) of the EC Treaty concerning the maximum
admissible content of cadmium in fertilizers, [2002] OJ L138/15.
133 See Plant Protection Products Directive, n. 125 above.
134 See Sulphur Content of Liquid Fuels Directive, n. 16 above.
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the lead content of petrol,135 Austria, Finland and
Sweden had higher standards for gas oils. The overall
Community standard was raised but Greece was given
a special 5-year derogation and Austria’s derogation,
allowing it to maintain stricter standards in respect
of the benzene content of petrol, was prolonged until
1 January 2000.136 In any case, Directive 98/70/EC
introduced a specif‌ic provision (Article 6) allowing
Member States to apply more stringent environmental
specif‌ications to the marketing of fuels – but not raising
the Community average environmental specif‌ication.
Overall, therefore, the accession of countries with
higher environmental standards than those contained
in internal market measures did not serve generally to
raise EC environmental standards. The Union has not
raised its ‘average’ to the level of Austria, Finland and
Sweden; however, political pressure has prevented a
lowering of the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish stand-
ards. The actual room left to Member States to pursue
higher national standards for the environment has
been given a degree of legal certainty as a result of
the amendment to the internal market legal basis by
the Amsterdam Treaty. It introduced a notif‌ication
and approval procedure for such national measures,
within Article 95 EC, managed by the European Com-
mission – although it, in turn, introduced new ques-
tions, particularly concerning Member States’ room to
manoeuvre to raise environmental standards.137
Austria, Finland and Sweden have thus limited their
scope of manoeuvrability in internal market laws to
raise their national environmental standards. Accession
has limited the possibility for qualitative improvements
in their environments and serves to keep the status
quo at the lowest common denominator at Community
level.
‘DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO’
Under the Accession Treaty, the Commission has con-
siderable discretion in respect of the new Member
States. Certainly, the safeguard clause appears more
effective than the Article 226 EC procedure. The Com-
mission determines whether commitments have been
met or not, decides the form of the measures, adapts
those measures and evaluates whether compliance with
the pre-accession commitments has been suff‌icient to
merit lifting the safeguard measures. While the inter-
nal market safeguard clause gives the European
Commission an additional stick with which to cajole
compliance out of the Ten, and this should also
improve trust between the Member States, the Com-
mission has no such preventive route for managing
and enforcing compliance by the Fifteen.
This differentiation in treatment implies that the Fifteen
themselves do not require such cajoling. This is not
the case.138 The Commission must revert to the com-
parably limited resort of Article 226 EC in the event of
failures arising in compliance by the Fifteen. Even in
terms of administrative capacity, the Commission held
seminars for the Fifteen Member States in 2002 on
the correct implementation of particularly complex
environmental directives.139
The Commission’s 1996 f‌indings of a high level of poor
application of the environment acquis remains true
today. One-third of all infringement cases investigated
by the Commission concern the environment acquis.
Of the 129 European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments
against the Member States that remain unimplemented,
59 concern the environment acquis. The Fifteen are
failing to meet their obligations for conformity with
the acquis and compliance in all areas of the environ-
ment acquis, including in those areas where the new
Member States are obliged to be in full compliance by
the date of accession. In 2002, Belgium, France and
Luxembourg were condemned by the ECJ for failure
to transpose the 1997 amendment to the EIA Directive
by its implementation deadline of 14 March 1999.
Also, in the Commission f‌indings for 2002, Ireland
and Spain were condemned for def‌iciencies in the con-
formity of national legislation with the EIA Directive.
Annex IV140 to the Commission’s twentieth report on
monitoring the application of Community law (2002)141
lists 14 ongoing cases against ten Member States for
non-conformity with this same directive.
By comparison, the new Member States have no
transitional measures for the transposition of, and for
bringing themselves into conformity with, the EIA
Directive. Their pre-accession commitment is to reach
full compliance on the date of accession. This can
be said of many other EC environmental laws. In
135 See Lead Content of Petrol Directive, n. 127 above.
136 See Article 14 of Directive 98/70/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 October 1998 relating to the quality of
petrol and diesel fuels and amending Council Directive 93/12/EEC,
[1998] OJ L350/58 and subsequent corrigendum, [1999] OJ L40/52,
which amended the 1993 Directive.
137 On the def‌iciencies in legal certainty, as well as the conf‌lict be-
tween national measures and EC harmonization measures and the
impact of the control procedure on national law, see N. de Sadeleer,
‘Procedures for Derogations from the Principle of Approximation of
Laws under Article 95 EC’, 40 Common Market Law Review (2003),
889, at 908– 913.
138 See the Twentieth Annual Report of 21 November 2003 Monitor-
ing the Application of Community Law, COM (2002) 669, at 61–65.
See also the FVO General Report 2002 for an overview of its
inspection f‌indings for the year 2002, available at
europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/inspections/policy_papers/ann_rep_
2002_en.pdf>.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid. This annex is available at .europa.eu.int/comm/
secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/pdf/rapport_annuel/annexe4_2_en.pdf>.
141 Ibid.
KIRSTYN INGLIS RECIEL 13 (2) 2004
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150
addition to the above comments, an important exam-
ple of the lack of commitment by the existing Fifteen
is the recent Commission forecast that 13 of the Fif-
teen will miss their targets for cutting greenhouse
gases under the Kyoto Protocol.142 On the other hand,
only one new Member – Slovenia – is predicted to miss
its target under the Kyoto Protocol.143 It will be the
majority of the existing Fifteen that will be responsible
if the EU of 25 misses its Kyoto emissions reduction
targets.
CONCLUSIONS
As to the evolution of the EC environment acquis, in
an enlarged Union, the resources of the new Member
States and the Community will focus on reaching
compliance with the acquis as it stands today. The
adoption of new environmental measures will be fraught
with the political hurdles of decision making among so
many countries. For the new Member States, the major
challenge will be attracting suff‌icient investment and
maintaining the necessary administrative capacity to
enforce the environment acquis. A shift towards more
framework (and less detailed) legislation will emerge
in order to take account of the diversity of environ-
ments and the political/social/economic interests of
25 Member States. Past experience with unsuccessful
initiatives, like the eco-tax, that promise considerable
progress in environmental protection and improve-
ment, highlight the weaknesses of decision making in
politically sensitive areas. The last enlargement high-
lighted the fact that incoming countries often have a
political struggle to maintain their higher standards
once they have become a Member State. Austria, Finland
and Sweden, together with other traditional ‘pusher’144
countries, notably the Netherlands and Germany, f‌ind
themselves restrained from initiating national envir-
onmental measures that affect trade and therefore,
also, from leading EC environmental standards and,
ultimately, global standards. In this enlargement, the
incoming countries have, in many cases, had to start
from scratch with building environmental policies.
From the point of view of enforcement, recent initiatives,
such as that on preventing and remedying environ-
mental damage,145 will provide a strong disincentive to
further polluting activities, although this initiative is
only at proposal stage and will need to be adopted
by a Union of 25. Nevertheless, the implementation
def‌icit in the Fifteen has inspired work on governance
initiatives to improve and encourage the means of
redress for citizens and operators, to improve the
effectiveness of the pre-litigation stage (of the Article
226 EC procedure) for seeking compliance by Member
States with their Treaty obligations and, ultimately, to
foster trust between Member States.146 The existing
Fifteen are not setting an example of a properly func-
tioning environment acquis. The new internal market
safeguard clause will only address discrepancies in the
transitional arrangements and pre-accession commit-
ments of the new Member States, irrespective of the
situation in the Fifteen. Moreover, it will only address
discrepancies in the transitional arrangements and
pre-accession commitments that adversely affect the
functioning of the internal market. Thus, the ECJ will
continue to play a big role in maintaining the integrity
of EC environmental law in an enlarged EU. A recent
judgment147 of the ECJ indicates another potential
future development: that of the imposition by the ECJ
of penalties in addition to daily f‌ines (under Article
228 EC) in respect of continued non-compliance with
court judgments.
The twentieth report (2003) on monitoring the applica-
tion of Community law notes that:
A substantial improvement will require efforts by the Com-
mission to develop new working methods with Member
States at all stages of the implementation life cycle. This
is particularly relevant in the build up to enlargement to
ensure that new Member States transpose and implement
correctly the acquis communautaire within the agreed
timeframes.148
Consequently, implementation and enforcement by
the existing 15 Member States is as much a part of the
equation as implementation and enforcement by the
142 See Council Decision 2003/231/EC of 17 March 2003 concern-
ing the accession of the European Community to the Protocol of
Amendment to the International Convention on the simplif‌ication
and harmonization of customs procedures (Kyoto Convention), [2003]
OJ L86/21 and Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002 con-
cerning the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the joint fulf‌ilment of commitments there-
under, [2002] OJ L130/1. See also Decision 280/2004/EC of 10 March
2004 concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse
gas emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol, [2004] OJ
L49/60.
143 See Commission Press Release IP/03/1637 of 2 December 2003.
144 See M. Skou Andersen and D. Lieferink, ‘Introduction: The Impact
of the Pioneers on EU Environmental Policy’, in M. Skou Andersen
and D. Lieferink (eds), European Environmental Policy: The Pioneers
(Manchester University Press, 1997), 25, at 43. Pusher countries
are those that pursue ‘strategies to push environmental issues on to
the EU agenda and build the necessary alliances with other Mem-
ber States in order to push through environmental initiatives’.
145 Environment: Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Reme-
dying of Environmental Damage, COM (2002) 17, of 23 January
2002, as amended by COM (2004) 55 of 26 January 2004.
146 White Paper of 25 July 2001 on European Governance, COM
(2001) 428.
147 ECJ 25 November 2003, Case C-278/01, Commission v. Spain
(not yet published). However, the only other case where penalties
were imposed in addition to the daily f‌ine was in ECJ 14 July 2000,
Case C-387/97, Commission v. Greece, [2000] ECR I-5047.
148 See n. 138 above, at 33.
RECIEL 13 (2) 2004 ENLARGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT ACQUIS
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
151
new Member States.149 Generally speaking, the success
of ‘environmental integration’ initiatives is crucial to
improving the state of the environment. The Union
is stepping up initiatives, including that on Green
Diplomacy150 and those contained in the White Paper
on European Governance,151 designed to, for example,
further the implementation of the environment acquis
through regional and tripartite agreements. Recently,
annual environmental policy reviews by the Commission
have been introduced to tackle the priority issues,
both at national and EU levels. The administrative
burden on the European Commission in monitoring
compliance and pursuing the Member States for failure
to meet their obligations to comply with the acquis will
increase. Additionally, the Commission will be respons-
ible for the follow up of the new Members’ pre-
accession commitments and transitional arrangements
and now, also, the safeguard measures provided for in
the Accession Treaty to protect the internal market.
Enlargement will certainly make improvements to the
qualitative state of the environments of the Ten.152
Whether or not the acquis is appropriate to the needs
of the new Members no longer seems to be a relevant
question. The pre-accession strategy has been the
route followed. It has been practical and expedient to
the political goal of enlargement. Whether the environ-
ment acquis will be better enforced and have more
positive results for the environment is another matter.
Ultimately, it seems, the state of Europe’s environ-
ment will depend on national environmental policies
and law, on enforcement and the effectiveness of EC
initiatives to integrate the needs of the environment
into EC policy areas.
Kirstyn Inglis is a Senior Legal Researcher, at the
European Institute, University of Ghent, Belgium. This
article was prepared under the auspices of the project
‘Pre-accession and Accession: A Legal Appraisal of the
EU Enlargement Strategy’, funded by the Flemish
Scientif‌ic Research Fund (Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk
Onderzoek).
149 See the European Commission’s Fourth Annual Survey of 17
July 2003 on the implementation and enforcement of European
Union environment law, SEC (2003) 804 (and all the earlier reports
for that matter).
150 For more information, see the website available at
www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/international_issues/green_
diplomacy_en.htm>.
151 For more information, see European Commission, White Paper
of 25 July 2001 on European Governance, COM (2001) 428, avail-
able at
index_en.htm>.
152 See ‘The benef‌its of compliance with the environmental acquis
for the candidate countries and their preparations for accession’,
a Commission external service contract carried out by Ecotec
Research and Consulting Limited, B7-8110/2000/159960/MAR/H1
(2000), at xxxix, which is available at
comm/environment/enlarg/pdf/benef‌it_long.pdf>.

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