Basic principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland in the European jurisdiction of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal

• Author: Marek Dobrowolski
• Pages: 505-512

505

MAREK DOBROWOLSKI

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

REPUBLIC OF POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN JURISDICTION

OF THE POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL

The aim of this paper is to present the consequences of the accession

of the Republic of Poland (henceforth: RP) to the European Union for the

understanding of such principles of Polish constitution as: principle of a

democratic state ruled by law (Article 2); supreme power of the Nation

(Article, point 1); separation of powers (art. 10) and also the principle of

Constitution’s supremacy (Article 8). The key meaning for this issue lies

within the rulings of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (henceforth: CT)

in few verdicts, which are defined as “European”.

I. The CT notices the changes occurring in the national constitutional

law caused by the European law. The CT attempts to ease the results of

collisions of the European law and the Polish Constitution by means of a

pro-European interpretation of the Constitution or by verdicts which

include a so-called adjourn clause (i.e. postponing the elimination of an Act

which was found inconsistent with the RP’s Constitution from the sources of

law.)1 However, the CT holds in reserve the issue of the impact of European

Union system solutions (henceforth EU) on the content of the constitutional

principles. The CT limits itself only to stating that the principles of the Polish

Constitution are shaping the “internal system of the state” and therefore they

are not adequate models for “evaluating the democracy or constitutionalism

of the system (...) of the EU”.

Nevertheless, in my understanding, it is not correct to narrow the

issue solely to evaluating the system of the EU through the RP

Constitution’s principles. What seems to be of greater importance, is to

set the consequences of Polish accession to the EU for the way of

understanding the constitutional principles. In other words, what should

have been examined was: were the EU institutional and competence

solutions influencing the content of such principles? And, if yes, it should

have been analysed whether the resulting change is permissible (therefore

if it is within the borders of the pro-European interpretation of the

1Postponing the coming into force of a CT verdict which found the inconsistency of

an implementing Act with the Constitution „gives time” for executing a relevant change

in the Constitution. Such a situation took place while implementing EAW (as described

further in the paper).